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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays. In the first essay, “The Asymmetric Cycli-
cal Behavior of the U.S. Labor Market,” I develop a search-and-matching model
with endogenous job destruction and heterogeneous workers (in skill/productivity)
that accounts for the asymmetry exhibited by cyclical fluctuations in the U.S. labor
market and output while also generating (i) realistic volatility in unemployment and
job-finding rates and (ii) preserving a downward-sloping Beveridge curve. The model
delivers stark predictions for the time series of skill-specific unemployment rates that
hold in the Current Population Survey (CPS) micro data once I sort workers by age
and education. A general implication of the analysis is that the responsiveness of
unemployment to stimulus policies increases substantially during recessions.
In the second essay, “Volatility and Slow Technology Diffusion: The Case of
Information Technologies,” I address the following question: does business cycle
volatility affect the rate at which new technologies are adopted? The answer to this
question provides new insights on the link between volatility, total factor produc-
tivity (TFP), long-run economic growth, and cross-country differences in incomes
per capita. The paper presents novel cross-country evidence on the link between
volatility and time adoption lags. I find a highly statistically and economically sig-
nificant negative relationship between volatility and the diffusion of three major
information and communication technologies (ICT’s)—personal computers, internet
and cell phones. Countries with more volatile growth rates of real GDP per capita
iv
have higher time adoption lags. This negative relationship is rather robust and per-
sists after controlling for cross-country differences in average growth rates of real
GDP per capita. I also offer a simple stochastic model of technology adoption in
which I derive in closed form the theoretical mapping between time adoption lags,
growth, and volatility. In the model as in the data, there is a positive link between
volatility and time adoption lags: the interaction of uncertainty with sunk costs of
adoption generates a real option value of inaction which delays the adoption of new
technologies with the consequent adverse effect on long-run economic growth.
In the third essay, “Commodity Prices, Long-Run Growth and Fiscal Vulnerabil-
ity” (coauthored with Pietro Peretto), we study the short- and long-run effects of
commodity price changes and how fiscal policy interacts with the amplification and
propagation of external shocks to these prices. To this aim, we develop a Schumpete-
rian small open economy (SOE) model of endogenous growth that does not exhibit
the scale effect. Because of the sterilization of the scale effect, commodity prices
have level effects on economic activity but no steady-state growth effects. A gen-
eral implication of our analysis is that the economy dynamic response to commodity
price changes depends both on the structure of the tax code in place and on the
policy response necessary to balance the government budget. We show that asset
income taxation has negative steady-state growth effects. Furthermore, a positive
tax rate on asset income acts as an automatic amplifier of external shocks to com-
modity prices and makes the effects of these shocks more persistent. Ultimately,
our analysis provides insights on how to design welfare-enhancing tax policies for
commodity-exporting countries.
v
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1The Asymmetric Cyclical Behavior of the U.S.
Labor Market
1.1 Introduction
Labor market fluctuations are large and strongly asymmetric. The U.S. employment
rate contracts deeper and sharper during recessions than it expands in booms. Out-
put, as employment, falls deeper below trend in recessions, but it declines as sharply
as it raises.1 These facts are well known, yet the literature lacks a quantitatively
successful explanation.
Explaining these facts is interesting per se given the strong presence of asymmetry
in U.S. macroeconomic series. Moreover, as I show in the paper, developing such
an explanation leads to an explanation for the volatility of the U.S. labor market.
In addition, understanding these nonlinearities is critical to address policy-relevant
questions such as how the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies varies over the
business cycle. By constructing a model in which asymmetries arise in equilibrium,
1 See Mitchell (1913, 1927), Mitchell and Burns (1946), Neftci (1984), Sichel (1989, 1993), Long and
Summers (1986), Falk (1986), Rothman (1991), McQueen and Thorley (1993), Verbrugge (1997),
Belaire-Franch and Peiro (2003), Bai and Ng (2005), Hamilton (2005), and McKay and Reis (2008).
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one can study state-dependent effects of stimulus policies more rigorously.
To inform my theoretical analysis, Section 1.2 details new asymmetry facts. First,
I show that total hours worked feature cyclical asymmetries comparable to those of
the U.S. employment rate. However, the asymmetric behavior is not exhibited in the
fluctuations of hours per worker. These two facts suggest that the extensive margin is
critical to understand the asymmetries of the labor input. Second, fluctuations in the
U.S. participation rate (fraction of the population in the labor force) are symmetric.
This fact suggests I can safely abstract from movements in and out of the labor force.
Third, through a counterfactual exercise based on Shimer (2012), I document that
both the job creation and job destruction margin of the labor market are needed to
fully account for the asymmetric dynamics of the U.S. employment rate.
Motivated by the facts above, Section 3.2 develops a search-and-matching model
of unemployment with endogenous job destruction and permanently heterogeneous
workers (in skill/productivity) that accounts for the asymmetric fluctuations of the
U.S. labor market and output.2 The fundamental properties of the model are that
recessions are initiated by a burst of job losses leading to a spike in unemployment
followed by recoveries that are driven by a low aggregate job-finding rate.3 In what
follows, I detail the key mechanism of the model that generates asymmetry in the
labor market.
Consider first the scenario in which the economy rests at the steady state and it is
hit by a positive shock to productivity. In this case, no endogenous separation occurs
and job destruction is only due to exogenous separations. Therefore, unemployment
dynamics are exclusively driven by a high aggregate job-finding rate. In this case,
the distribution of skills in the unemployment pool closely replicates the distribution
2 The permanent nature of heterogeneity is reasonable in the sense that over the cycle there is not
much workers can do to change their skills/productivity.
3 See Davis et al. (2006, 2010), Fujita and Ramey (2009), and Elsby et al. (2009) for evidence
supporting this view.
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of skills in the economy. Consider now a negative shock to productivity. Given
the heterogeneity in workers’ skill/productivity, the model features a “reservation
property” such that all matches with workers with productivity below a cutoff value
are endogenously destroyed. Since laid-off workers are permanently low-skilled, they
are not rehired until aggregate productivity returns to its normal level. Thus, in this
case the unemployment pool is characterized by a distribution of skills that is skewed
to the left. It is this change in the distribution of skills of the unemployment pool
over the cycle that generates asymmetries in the aggregate job-finding rate.
In principle, worker heterogeneity aside, endogenous job destruction alone can
give rise to “spiky” dynamics in the job-separation rate leading to asymmetries
in employment. For example, consider the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP)
model augmented with shocks to the separation rate as in Shimer (2005) or the en-
dogenous job separation model a` la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). While these
models could (at least qualitatively) account for the asymmetries in the U.S. data,
it is well known that this class of models generate a counterfactual Beveridge curve
and fail to generate realistic volatility in vacancies and job-finding rates. Further-
more, as discussed above, I document in the paper that the asymmetries in the U.S.
data are due to both job-separation and job-finding rates. As such a model relying
exclusively on endogenous job destruction would be counterfactual vis-a`-vis this ob-
servation. Thus, while relying solely on endogenous job destruction would “match”
the asymmetry facts it will be at odds with other key empirical facts. It is the inter-
action between the endogenous separation margin and the permanent heterogeneity
that allows the model to account for the asymmetry facts jointly with (i) realistic
volatility in unemployment and job-finding rates, as well as (ii) the correct relative
contribution of job-separation and job-finding rates to the asymmetry properties of
the data.
In Section 1.4, I calibrate the model and evaluate its quantitative implications. I
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argue the model is able to replicate the key asymmetry facts as well as generate real-
istic volatility in unemployment and job-finding rates while preserving a downward-
sloping Beveridge curve (unemployment-vacancy locus). Specifically, it is well known
that accounting for the volatility of the U.S. labor market is one of the puzzles in
analysis based on DMP models.4 Crucially, the model does not rely on a high cali-
bration of the worker’s outside option. Precisely, worker heterogeneity jointly with a
fixed outside option delivers a spectrum of replacement ratios (i.e., worker’s outside
option as percent of the wage). This leads to a disconnect between average and
marginal workers. On the one hand, marginal workers are the least productive in
the labor force and the ones laid off during recessions. These workers feature high
replacement ratios but account for only 5 percent of the labor force. On the other
hand, high-skilled workers have low replacement ratios and account for the bulk of
the workforce. As such the economy features on average a low replacement ratio.
As a by-product, the model provides stark predictions for the time series of skill-
specific unemployment rates. In Section 1.5, I use CPS micro data for the period
1976:M1- 2013:M2 to test these predictions. Specifically, the model predicts that
less productive workers account for the bulk of the average and variation over time
of the unemployment rate. Since age and education are natural proxies for skills,
I analyze their unemployment behavior and indeed find that (i) young and least-
educated workers experience average unemployment rates that are up to nine times
that of prime-aged workers and (ii) they account for approximately 70 percent of
the time series variation in the U.S. unemployment rate. These facts provide strong
support for the main prediction of the model: understanding cyclical movements
of low-skilled workers is critical to explain the large fluctuations of the U.S. labor
market.
The model has a wide range of implications for the design of macroeconomic
4 See Andolfatto (1996), Shimer (2005), and Costain and Reiter (2008).
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policies. A general prediction of the analysis is that the effectiveness of stimulus
policies varies over the business cycle. In Section 1.6, I show that the effects of
policies that restore the profitability of low-productivity matches are time varying:
these policies are much more effective during economic downturns than expansions.
That is, the economy features impulse responses that vary with the state of the
economy.
This paper relates to the literature on asymmetric cycles. Most of this literature
consists of papers focusing on output and/or investment.5 Two exceptions are the
studies on the labor market of Andolfatto (1997) and McKay and Reis (2008). How-
ever, this paper is the first attempt to provide a unified and quantitatively successful
explanation for the volatility and asymmetry of the U.S. labor market. Importantly,
I also show how cyclical asymmetries connect with nonlinearities in the amplification
and propagation of shocks and argue about their relevance for policy analysis.
1.2 Asymmetry Facts
This section details the basic facts on hours, unemployment and output that motivate
the paper and discusses new facts on their asymmetry properties. I consider the
employment rate (fraction of the labor force working in a given month, one minus
the unemployment rate) as the main cyclical indicator of the U.S. labor market.
Following Sichel (1993), I measure deepness and steepness asymmetry in an economic
time series with the skewness coefficient of respectively its detrended counterpart—
asymmetry in levels—and log-first-differences—asymmetry in growth rates. To test
for asymmetry against the null hypothesis of symmetry, I use the test developed by
Bai and Ng (2005). To isolate fluctuations at business cycle frequencies, I detrend
the data with the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Figure 1.1 summarizes the main
5 See Ball and Mankiw (1994), Acemoglu and Scott (1997), Kocherlakota (2000), Hansen and
Prescott (2005), Jovanovic (2006), Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006), Devereux and Siu
(2007), Cheremukhin and Tutino (2013), and Go¨rtz and Tsoukalas (2013).
5
asymmetry facts for employment and output.
1.2.1 Hours, unemployment, and output
In Figure 1.2, I report percent deviations from the HP trend for the U.S. employ-
ment rate for the period 1948:Q1-2012:Q2. This figure illustrates that the largest
deviations below trend (in absolute value) exceed the largest deviations above trend,
i.e., troughs are deeper than peaks are tall. For example, there are six NBER-dated
recessions during which the U.S. employment rate falls 2 percent below trend or
more. On the other hand, the employment rate barely reaches as high as 2 percent
above trend over the same period. This asymmetry between peaks and troughs indi-
cates deepness in employment cycles. Moreover, the rate at which the employment
rate falls during downturns exceeds the rate at which it raises during upturns. This
asymmetry in rates of change over the contraction and expansion phases indicates
steepness in employment.
Fact 1. Employment rates display negative skewness in levels and growth rates.
Fact 1 is well-known in the empirical literature on asymmetric cycles. Since
Sichel (1993), this fact has been confirmed by many authors.6 Panel A and B in
Figure 1.1 show that the empirical distributions of respectively detrended and first-
difference employment rates are left-skewed. For the detrended series, the skewness
coefficient equals 0.581 and it is highly statistically significant with a p-value of
0.005. Negative skewness in the detrended series is capturing the fact there are a
relatively large number of small deviations above trend compared to a relatively
small number of large deviations below trend. The tails of the distribution reflects
the asymmetry between peaks and troughs. For the series in first differences, the
skewness coefficient equals 1.115 with a p-value of 0.001. The skewness coefficient
6 See Verbrugge (1997) and Bai and Ng (2005) among others.
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of growth rates is a simple statistics apt to identify large and sudden changes in
employment rates. Negative skewness captures the presence of a relatively large
number of small positive changes compared to a small number of large negative
changes. These large negative changes in the employment rate occur at the onset of
U.S. recessions.
To strengthen Fact 1, I further document that cyclical asymmetries also charac-
terize age-, gender- and education-specific employment rates and are a robust feature
across U.S. states and different sectors of the U.S. economy. These findings prove
that cyclical asymmetries characterize the entire labor market as such they can be
meaningfully studied as an aggregate phenomenon (see Appendix B.1 for further
details).
Furthermore, I show that total hours worked feature cyclical asymmetries com-
parable to those of the U.S. employment rate. However, the asymmetric behavior is
not present in hours per worker. These two facts suggest that the extensive margin
of the labor market is critical to understand the asymmetries of the labor input.
This observation is reminiscent of the well-known fact that most of the volatility of
hours worked at business cycle frequencies is due to fluctuations in the number of
employed as opposed to fluctuations in hours per employed worker.7 Table 1.1 shows
results for hours and hours per worker.
There is some debate in the literature as whether the employment rate (as frac-
tion of the labor force) or the employment-population ratio is a better indicator
representing the state of the labor market. For example, Blanchard et al. (1990)
argue that the number of workers moving directly into employment from out-of-the-
labor force is as large as the number who move from unemployment to employment.8
7 See Rogerson and Shimer (2011) among others.
8 See also Flinn and Heckman (1983), Juhn et al. (1991), Jones and Riddell (1999) and Cole and
Rogerson (2001) for further discussions on whether the categories “unemployed” and “out-of-the-
labor force” are different labor force states.
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To address this issue, I study the asymmetry properties of the U.S. participation
rate, i.e., fraction of the population in the labor force (employed plus unemployed
to population ratio). Figure 1.3 clearly shows that the null hypothesis of symmetry
cannot be rejected in the data.
The results in Figure 1.3 establish that fluctuations in the U.S. participation
rate are symmetric. This fact suggests that to understand cyclical asymmetries in
employment, I can abstract from movements in and out of the labor force.
In Figure 1.1, Panel C and D show the empirical distributions of detrended and
first-difference industrial production (IP). In Panel C, the skewness coefficient for the
detrended series equals 0.644 and is highly statistically significant with a p-value
of 0.001. However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of symmetry for the series
in first differences. Panel D reports a skewness coefficient of 0.238 with a p-value
of 0.258.
Fact 2. Output displays negative skewness in levels but no skewness in growth rates.
Fact 2 is consistent with the evidence documented by Sichel (1993), Falk (1986),
Long and Summers (1986) and more recently McKay and Reis (2008). Appendix
B.1 reports further results showing that steepness asymmetry is rejected in the data
for several measure of real output as real GDP, business sector and nonfarm business
sector output.
1.2.2 Inflows and Outflows of Unemployment
In this section, I document new facts about the asymmetric dynamics of the U.S.
labor market. I compute counterfactual employment rate series based on Shimer
(2012) and assess the relative contribution of job-finding and job-separation rates to
the asymmetry properties of the U.S. employment rate.
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Job-Finding and Separation Rates
In the standard DMP framework, the continuous time law of motion for employment
is the following differential equation:
9eptq  uptqfptq  eptqsptq, (1.1)
where a dot denotes a time derivative, uptq denotes the number of unemployed, fptq
and sptq denote respectively job-finding rate (JFR) and job-separation rate (JSR).
To estimate fptq and sptq, I follow Shimer (2012). As such, I simply summarize
here, and refer the reader to Shimer’s work for further details.9 The approach uses
monthly data on employment, unemployment and short-term unemployment from
the CPS of BLS. All variables are in level (thousands of persons) and short-term
unemployment refers to the number of unemployed persons for less than five weeks.
The job-finding probability, Ft, between month t and t+1 can be computed as:
Ft  1
ut 1  u
s
t 1
ut
,
where ut is the unemployment level in month t and u
s
t 1, short-term unemployment
level, is the number of persons unemployed for less than 5 weeks in month t+1. The
job-finding rate is then ft  log p1 Ftq ¥ 0. Shimer (2012) shows that one can
solve the differential equation (1.1) forward to obtain an implicit nonlinear expression
for the job-separation rate st. Given the job-finding rate ft, data on employment
and unemployment levels then the job-separation rate st is uniquely determined.
Finally, I calculate quarterly job-finding and job-separation rates by averaging over
the corresponding monthly observations.
9 The job-finding and job-separation rates are derived under two assumptions: 1) workers do not
transit in and out of the labor force; 2) workers are homogeneous with respect to job-finding and
job-separation probabilities.
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Employment Counterfactuals
To compute employment counterfactuals, I follow Shimer (2012) by approximating
the U.S. employment rate series using its theoretical steady-state value from equation
(1.1), associated with the contemporaneous job-separation and job-finding rate—
Stochastic equilibrium:
eset 
ft
st   ft
. (1.2)
Hall (005b) and Shimer (2012) show that the stochastic equilibrium is a strikingly
good approximation for the actual U.S. employment rate (see Appendix B.1 for a
plot of actual and counterfactual employment). Given equation (1.2), I construct
two counterfactual series. The first is an employment rate series that only allows for
variation in the job-finding rate:
ejfrt 
ft
s¯  ft
, (1.3)
where s¯ is the sample average of the job-separation rate st. The second counterfac-
tual, instead, only allows for variation in the job-separation rate:
ejsrt 
f¯
st   f¯
, (1.4)
where f¯ is the sample average of the job-finding rate ft.
Which counterfactual series better accounts for the asymmetric dynamics of the
U.S. employment rate? To answer this question, I implement the asymmetry tests
of Section 1.2.1 on the counterfactual employment rates ejfrt and e
jsr
t .
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10 The counterfactual employment series (1.3) and (1.4) are constructed under the assumption that
job-finding and job-separation rates are two independent sources of fluctuations. The independence
assumption holds in all DMP models with exogenous and constant job-separation rate and in the
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)’s model with endogenous job separations.
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In Table 1.2, the first row shows that both counterfactual employment series, ejfr
and ejsr, display significant negative skewness as in the U.S. data. I conclude that
both job-finding and job-separation rates are critical in accounting for the depth of
fluctuations in the U.S. employment rate.
Fact 3. Job-finding and job-separation rates are jointly responsible for the negative
skewness in levels in the employment rate.
In Table 1.2, the second row forcefully shows that negative steepness in the U.S.
employment rate is entirely driven by the dynamics of job-separation rates.
Fact 4. Job-separation rates are the only responsible for the negative skewness in
growth rates in the employment rate.
Barnichon (2012) reaches the same conclusion in Fact 4 using a different approach.
Furthermore, notice that if the dynamics of the U.S. employment rate was only driven
by job-finding rates then we would observe positive skewness in the distributions of
employment rate changes, i.e., positive instead of negative steepness as in the U.S.
data.
Overall, this section suggests that both job-finding and job-separation rates are
relevant to fully account for the asymmetric dynamics of the U.S. labor market.
Specifically, job-separation rates are the only responsible for the sharp reductions in
the U.S. employment rate that occur at the onset of recessions. Job-finding rates
are instead mostly responsible for why U.S. employment spends more time below
trend. The combined of Fact 3 and 4 contribute to the ongoing debate on the proper
treatment of the separation margin over which there is still little consensus in the lit-
erature. This debate has been recently revived by a series of papers with contrasting
conclusions. On the one hand, Hall (005a,b) and Shimer (2012) attribute most of
the volatility in unemployment at business cycle frequencies to the dynamics of job-
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finding rates—“hiring-driven view.” On the other hand, Fujita and Ramey (2009)
and Elsby et al. (2009) resurrect the role played by the job-separation margin. While
these papers focus on second-order moments of the data, I analyze their asymmetry
properties.
1.3 Model
In this section, I extend the textbook Pissarides (2000)’s model by introducing worker
heterogeneity. Precisely, workers exhibit permanent differences in skill/productivity
while employers are identical.
1.3.1 Economic Environment
Time is discrete and indexed by t P t0, 1, . . . ,8u. Workers are heterogeneous in their
skills. Specifically, I consider an economy populated by M types of workers indexed
by x P tx1   . . .   xMu. The type x is a permanent characteristic of the worker which
is perfectly observable to employers. I ex-ante sort workers in submarkets based on
their types. Therefore, the aggregate labor market is organized in M submarkets
indexed by worker’s type x. In each submarket, there is a unit mass of infinitely lived
workers of type x, either employed, etpxq P r0, 1s, or unemployed and searching for a
job, utpxq P r0, 1s. The aggregate labor force is then
°
x
 
etpxq   utpxq

 M . Each
worker is endowed with an indivisible unit of labor. I adopt a 2-state representation
of the labor market such that I abstract from movements in and out of the labor force.
There is no on-the-job search, therefore only unemployed workers can search for a
job. The economy is also populated by a continuum of identical and infinitely lived
employers, either producing output, ytpxq, or posting job vacancies, vtpxq, to hire
unemployed workers of type x. Workers and employers have risk-neutral preferences
and discount future payoffs at rate β P p0, 1q. I assume workers and employers
can respectively search for jobs and post vacancies only in one submarket at the
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time. Specifically, employers are allowed to optimally choose how many vacancies to
create and in which submarket to locate them. Workers instead do not move across
submarkets.11
Matching and production technologies. I adopt the standard view of match-
ing frictions in the labor market and postulate the exitence of a matching technology.
Assumption 1 (Matching function). In each submarket x, the matching func-
tion m
 
vtpxq, utpxq

 µvtpxq
αutpxq
1α is strictly increasing and concave in both
arguments and homogeneous of degree one in the number of unemployed workers,
utpxq, and vacancies, vtpxq. The scale parameter µ measures matching efficiency,
and α P p0, 1q is the elasticity of new matches, or hires, m
 
vtpxq, utpxq

with respect
to the number of vacancies vtpxq.
Each submarket is characterized by the tightness ratio θtpxq  vtpxq{utpxq.
12 An
unemployed worker of type x finds a job with probability φ
 
θtpxq

 µθtpxq
α that is
strictly increasing and concave in θtpxq, i.e., φ
1pq ¡ 0 and φ2pq   0, and a vacancy
posted in submarket x is filled with probability ρpθtpxqq  φpθtpxqq{θtpxq  µθtpxq
α1
that is strictly decreasing and convex in θtpxq, i.e., ρ
1pq   0 and ρ2pq ¡ 0. I assume
workers and firms that are matched at time t produce output at time t   1. A
worker-employer match produces output via a linear technology.
Assumption 2 (Production function). In each submarket x, output is produced
according to the linear production function, ytpxq  ztx, where zt is the aggregate
stochastic component of labor productivity and x is a time-invariant worker-specific
component.
11 This modelling choice is without loss of generality. One can show that in the equilibrium under
directed search any active submarket is visited exclusively by one type of worker. Hence, the labor
market is endogenously segmented by worker’s type. See Menzio and Shi (2010) and Carrillo-Tudela
and Visschers (2013) for a similar result.
12 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) provide evidence supporting the constant-returns-to-scale as-
sumption.
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Shocks. Fluctuations are driven by exogenous variations in the aggegate com-
ponent of labor productivity tztu
8
t0.
13
Assumption 3 (Symmetric shocks). The stochastic process for the exogenous
state tztu is an asymptotically stationary S-state Markov chain pZ,Π, pi0q, with a
unique, symmetric, and uni-modal stationary distribution pi8.
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1.3.2 Equilibrium Characterization
I next characterize the equilibrium dynamics of a single submarket x P tx1, . . . , xMu.
Abusing notation slightly, let φspxq  φ
 
θspxq

and ρspxq  ρ
 
θspxq

denote respec-
tively the job-finding and job-filling rate in submarket x when the random state of
the model economy is s P t1, . . . ,Su.
Employer’s problem. The employer decides either to remain in the match, and
get the value J cspxq, or to post a job vacancy, and get the value Vspxq. Specifically,
let Jspxq denote the value for an employer in submarket x if the economy is in state
s,
Jspxq  max
 
J cspxq, Vspxq
(
with
13 Empirical evidence by Abraham and Katz (1986) and Blanchard et al. (1989) suggests that reces-
sions are driven by aggregate activity shocks. In line with this evidence, I assume that fluctuations
are driven by aggregate disturbances.
14 The state space for tztu is the finite set Z  tz1, . . . , zSu. The states zs P Z take on S possible
values, z1   . . .   zsm   . . .   zS , that are symmetrically spaced around the median state zsm
which I normalize to one. The probability transition matrix is a pS  Sq matrix Π  rpis,s1s with
transition probabilities pis,s1  Prob tzt 1  zs1 |zt  zsu, non-negative and stochastic, i.e., pis,s1 ¥ 0
and
°
s1 pis,s1  1, for all ps, s
1q. The stationary distribution pi18  limtÑ8 pi
1
0Π
t is symmetric and
uni-modal, satisfying: pis8  pi
Ss 1
8 and pi
s
8   pi
s 1
8 , for s P t1, . . . , sm  1u, where pi
s
8 denotes the
s-th element of the probability vector pi8. The probability distribution at time t  0 is the pS  1q
vector pi0.
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J cspxq  pspxq  ωspxq   β
¸
s1
pis,s1
"
1 δs1pxq

Js1pxq   δs1pxqmax
x
 
Vs1pxq, 0
*
,
where J cspxq is the value of remaining in the match. Πspxq  zsxωspxq are profits
accruing to the employer, pspxq  zsx denotes output, ωspxq is the wage payment
to the worker, and δspxq is the state-contingent job-separation rate. The price of
output is normalized to one. The economy transits from state s to the next period
state s1 according to the transition probability pis,s1 . The value for the employer to
post a vacancy in submarket x if the economy is in state s is,
Vspxq  kpxq   β
¸
s1
pis,s1
"
ρspxqJs1pxq  

1 ρspxq

max
x
 
Vs1pxq, 0
*
, (1.5)
where kpxq is the unit cost to keep a job vacancy open for one period.
Worker’s problem. The worker decides either to remain in the match, and
get the value W cs pxq, or to be unemployed, and get the value Uspxq. Specifically, let
Wspxq denote the value for a worker in submarket x if the economy is in state s,
Wspxq  max
 
W cs pxq, Uspxq
(
with
W cs pxq  ωspxq   β
¸
s1
pis,s1
"
1 δs1pxq

Ws1pxq   δs1pxqUs1pxq
*
,
where W cs pxq is the value of working in a continuing match. The value for the
worker of being unemployed and searching for a job in submarket x when the economy
is in state s is,
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Uspxq  λ  β
¸
s1
pis,s1
"
φspxqWs1pxq  

1 φspxq

Us1pxq
*
, (1.6)
where λ is the worker’s outside option, i.e., income earned when unemployed.
Timing. At time t, the aggregate shock zt realizes. Endogenous separations
(layoffs) take place. The search and matching process follows: employers post job
vacancies on one side and unemployed workers search for jobs on the other side.
Unemployed workers matched with employers at time t become productive at time
t  1. Finally, production takes place.
Nash-bargaining equilibrium. Upon matching, the employer and worker enter
Nash bargaining to determine the wage. The tightness ratio θspxq is taken paramet-
rically by agents and determined in equilibrium by the collection of all the individual
optimal allocations.
Definition 4 (Nash-bargaining equilibrium). A Nash-Bargaining Equilibrium is
a collection of value functions Jspxq and Vspxq for the employers, Uspxq and Wspxq
for the workers, wage payments ωspxq, and tightness ratios θspxq, such that for each
s P t1, . . . ,Su,
1. Employers are optimizing, taking as given the tightness ratios θspxq and the
wage payments ωspxq. That is, employers with a filled job prefer to remain
matched with the worker rather than posting a vacancy, Jspxq  Vspxq ¡ 0;
2. Workers are optimizing, taking as given the tightness ratios θspxq and the wage
payments ωspxq. That is, workers in a job prefer to remain matched with an
employer rather than being unemployed, Wspxq  Uspxq ¡ 0;
3. The free-entry condition is satisfied, Vspxq  0;
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4. Wage payments for newly formed and continuing matches solve the generalized
Nash-bargaining problem:
ωspxq  arg max

Wspxq  Uspxq
η


Jspxq  Vspxq
1η
,
where η denotes the bargaining weight of workers.
The Nash-bargaining solution implies that worker and employer receive a constant
and proportional share of the total surplus, Wspxq  Uspxq  ηSspxq and Jspxq 
p1ηqSspxq, where Sspxq  Wspxq JspxqUspxq. The wage payment to the worker
is,
ωspxq  p1 ηqλ  η

zsx  kpxqθspxq

. (1.7)
Under Nash-bargaining, the equilibrium dynamics of the model economy is fully
characterized by the Bellman value equation for total match surplus,
Sspxq  max
 
Scspxq, 0
(
(1.8)
with
Scspxq  zsx λ  β
¸
s1
pis,s1

1 δs1pxq  ηφspxq

Ss1pxq,
where Scspxq is the continuation value of the total match surplus. After imposing
Vspxq  0 for all s P t1, . . . ,Su, equation (1.5) becomes,
kpxq  βρspxq
¸
s1
pis,s1
 
1 η

Ss1pxq. (1.9)
Equation (1.9) captures a central aspect of the model dynamics. Employers
post vacancies up to the point where the expected surplus from making a match,
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β
°
s1 pis,s1p1 ηqSs1pxq, is exactly offset by the expected recruiting costs, kpxq{ρspxq.
As the employers post more vacancies, the tightness ratio θspxq rises, the probability
to fill the posted vacancy ρspxq decreases, and the point of zero net expected surplus
is achieved. This mechanism pins down the key variable of the model, that is, the
vacancy-unemployment ratio, θspxq. In a tight market with a relatively high ratio of
vacancies to unemployment, it is easy for job seekers to find jobs—the job-finding
rate φpθspxqq is high—and difficult for firms to hire—the job-filling rate ρpθspxqq is
low.
1.3.3 Endogenous Job Destruction
Equation (1.8) determines when jobs are endogenously destroyed—Job destruction
margin. Since the continuation value of the total match surplus Scspxq is mono-
tonically increasing in labor productivity, pspxq  zsx, job destruction satisfies the
reservation property. There exists a unique cutoff value for the aggregate state, z¯pxq,
such that all matches with workers of type x are endogenously destroyed when hit
by an adverse aggregate shock, zs ¤ z¯pxq. Since employers and workers have the
option to separate at no cost, a match continues in operation for as long as its value
is above zero. Note that under Nash bargaining, separations are bilaterally efficient
in that employers and workers agree on the decision to destroy existing matches.
Hence, large negative shocks induce job destruction but the choice of when to de-
stroy the job is optimally chosen by employers and workers, jointly. Therefore, the
job destruction rate δspxq is the following step function,
δspxq 
$&%
δ if zs ¡ z¯pxq ô S
c
spxq ¡ 0
1 if zs ¤ z¯pxq ô S
c
spxq ¤ 0
(1.10)
for each submarket x P tx1, . . . , xMu. Since total match surpluses are increasing in
x, the cutoff on the aggregate state varies across workers’ types, z¯px1q ¡ . . . ¡ z¯pxMq.
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This implies that matches with low-skilled workers are more likely to be destroyed,
i.e., low-skilled workers face an higher probability to be laid off. Notice that the
reservation property defines three regions in the productivity space: (1) ScSpxq  0.
Matches with workers of type x ¤ x are never active in that total match surpluses
are negative for any realization of the aggregate shock; (2) Sc1pxq  0. Matches with
workers of type x ¡ x feature an exogenous constant rate of job destruction in that
total match surpluses are always above zero; and (3) matches with workers of type
x   x ¤ x feature both endogenous and exogenous rates of job destruction. This hap-
pens because exogenous variations in the aggregate state lead swings in total match
surpluses that occasionally hit the non-negativity constraint, Scspxq ¥ 0. Hence,
heterogeneous jobs respond differently to common shocks. Specifically, low-skilled
workers experience more frequent and longer unemployment spells. Davis (2005)
argues that layoffs are associated with greater unemployment incidence and longer
unemployment spells than quits. To summarize, endogenous job destruction oper-
ates through a “selection mechanism.” As the model economy is hit by an adverse
aggregate shock, low-skilled workers are laid off. High-skilled workers instead enter
unemployment spells at a constant exogenous rate. This implies that the aggregate
separation rate spikes at the onset of economic downturns. Fujita and Ramey (2009)
and Elsby et al. (2009) provide evidence supporting this prediction. The model also
predicts that layoffs are countercyclical. As such, a disproportionate part of unem-
ployment inflows during a downturns consists of laid-off workers. Davis et al. (1998)
and Elsby et al. (2013) provide evidence supporting this view. Furthermore, since
in the model laid-off workers are low-skilled, during downturns low-skill workers are
over-represented in the group flowing into unemployment which in turn leads to a
decrease in the average skill level of the unemployed pool, i.e.,
°
x xutpxq{
°
x utpxq
falls during downturns.
To further sharpen intuition, I next focus on the labor market in steady state,
19
i.e., zt  zs for s P t1, . . . ,Su and all t. This enables me to derive the cutoff value
on the aggregate state analytically. To this aim, after manipulating equation (1.8),
one gets
pˆpxq  zˆx  λ. (1.11)
Equation (1.11) is a key condition of the model. The left hand side of the equation
is the lowest productivity acceptable to employers with a filled job for remaining
matched with workers of type x rather than dissolve the match. The right hand side
is instead the opportunity cost of employment for workers of type x, which consists
of the worker’s outside option λ. It is easy to verify that when x decreases the cutoff
on the aggregate state zˆ needs to increase for (1.11) to hold, i.e., the cutoff value
zˆpxq  λ{x is decreasing in worker’s type x. In other words, high-skilled workers
are laid off at lower realizations of the aggregate shock. Furthermore, for given x,
an increase in λ requires an equal increase in zˆpxq for (1.11) to hold. This implies
that workers of type x are more likely to be laid off and that a larger fraction of
the labor force is now at risk of layoffs. The analysis suggests that workers’ outside
options are critical to understand the destruction margin of the labor market. This
is particularly true for low-skilled workers who are always at the margin between
participating the labor market and enjoying the value of non-market activities. A
direct implication of this argument is that exogenous increases in workers’ outside
options, i.e., changes in the relative return to market versus non-market activity, lead
to longer unemployment durations for low-skilled workers and extend the endogenous
destruction region to workers with higher skills.
1.3.4 Job Creation and Job Rationing
In the model, endogenous job destruction and job creation are entwined by the
reservation productivity in equation (1.11) that determines when (i) matches with
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low-skilled workers are endogenously destroyed and when (ii) low-skilled workers pre-
viously laid-off are viable for hiring (in the sense that they generate a positive sur-
plus). This implies that the (permanent) heterogeneity in workers’ skills that matters
for the endogenous separation decision also affects hiring decisions. Specifically, it
becomes profitable to hire low-skilled workers only when the aggregate state returns
to a level that is high enough to guarantee positive surpluses. This is the essence
of the selection mechanism that drives the dynamics of the model during downturns
and recoveries. The model predicts that jobs are rationed during recessions.
Definition 5 (Job rationing). Following Michaillat (2012), I define job rationing
as the situation in which positive unemployment would persist even if the recruiting
cost kpxq was zero.
To understand how job rationing emerges in equilibrium, notice that the threshold
pˆpxq in equation (1.11) is independent of the cost of posting a vacancy kpxq. Em-
ployers would find unprofitable to hire low-skilled workers with pspxq ¤ pˆpxq even if
the cost to post a vacancy was zero. This is intuitive since skills are a time-invariant
characteristic of the labor force and low-skilled workers previously laid off remain
low-skilled at the time of hiring.
To further sharpen intuition, I focus on the labor market in steady state, i.e.,
zt  zs for s P t1, . . . ,Su and all t. This enables me to represent the equilibrium
diagrammatically. To this aim, consider steady-state employment in submarket x,
espxq 
φ
 
θspxq

δspxq   φ
 
θspxq
 . (1.12)
After manipulating equations (1.8) and (1.9), one gets
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zsx λloomoon
Net marginal
profits

kpxq
βp1 ηq


1 β
 
1 δspxq

ρ
 
θspxq
   ηβθspxqloooooooooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooooooooon
Marginal
recruiting expenses
. (1.13)
Equations (1.12) and (1.13) fully characterize the steady-state equilibrium. Fig-
ure 1.4 represents the equilibrium diagrammatically.
In Figure 1.4, Panel A shows the equilibrium in the submarket for high-skilled
workers, i.e., workers of type xhigh ¡ x. As discussed in Section 1.3.3, these workers
never experience endogenous separations in equilibrium, i.e., Sspxhighq ¡ 0 for all
realization of the aggregate shock. Equilibrium employment is obtained at the inter-
section of net marginal profits and recruiting expenses curves. Panel B depicts the
equilibrim for high-skilled workers as I progressively decrease the cost of posting a
job vacancy kpxhighq. A decrease in the cost of posting a vacancy makes the marginal
recruiting expenses curve shift rightward which in turn leads to an increase in em-
ployment. This mechanism is the cornerstone of the frictional view of labor markets.
As the recruting cost goes to zero, unemployment tends to vanish with high-skilled
workers approaching full employment. Panel C shows how equilibrium employment
changes as the aggregate state falls. The fall in the aggregate state makes the net
marginal profits curve shift downwards, which in turn leads to a decrease in em-
ployment. An adverse shock to profits curtails the incentives to vacancy posting
which in turn leads a drop in the market tightness ratio, job-finding probabilities
and employment. This is the core mechanism driving recessionary unemployment in
search-and-matching models. For high-skilled workers all unemployment is frictional
at any point of the business cycle. Panel D depicts instead the equilibrium for low-
skilled workers, i.e., workers of type x   xlow ¤ x, when the adverse aggregate shock
makes their productivity hit the rationing threshold, i.e., pspxlowq ¤ pˆpxq. For these
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workers, employment goes to zero irrespective of the cost of posting a vacancy.
The model predicts that during downturns job-finding probabilities endogenously
fall for all workers, though disproportionally more for low-skilled workers previously
laid-off. This happens because jobs are rationed. At each point in time, aggregate
unemployment consists of frictional (UFt ) and rationing (U
R
t ) unemployment,
Ut 
¸
ptpxq¤pˆpxq
utpxqlooooooomooooooon
Rationing
unemployment
 
¸
ptpxq¡pˆpxq
utpxqlooooooomooooooon
Frictional
unemployment
 URt   U
F
t . (1.14)
Furthermore, the relative importance of each component depends on the magni-
tude of the adverse aggregate shock. Specifically, deeper dowturns are characterized
by larger shares of rationing unemployment, i.e., uRt  U
R
t {pU
R
t   U
F
t q is decreasing
in the aggregate shock. This happens because a bigger fraction of the aggregate
labor force hits the rationing threshold, pˆpxq, in equation (1.11).
Absence of Job Rationing in Existing Search-and-Matching Models with Endogenous
Separations
Michaillat (2012) discusses the absence of job rationing in standard search-and-
matching models with a constant exogenous rate of job destruction. As such, I refer
the reader to Michaillat’s work for further details. In this section, I show that job
rationing is also absent in models with endogenous separations a` la Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994). To this aim, I focus on a discrete time version of Mortensen and
Pissarides’s model as discussed in Fujita and Ramey (2012). In this setting, workers
are identical. Heterogeneity arises ex-post due to match-specific idiosyncratic shocks
to productivity. The match-specific component of productivity, x P tx1, . . . , xMu,
switches to a new value with probability ξ. In this latter event, the value of x is
drawn randomly according to the c.d.f. Gpxq. Matches are exogenously destroyed at
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the constant rate δ and those whose productivity is below a cutoff are endogenously
destroyed. All new matches start at x  xM . Hence, workers are homogeneous at
the time of hiring. I refer the reader to Fujita and Ramey’s work for further details
on the model’s structure.
To study the equilibrium theoretically, I focus on steady states (i.e., zt  z for
all t).
Proposition 6 (Job rationing in models a` la Mortensen and Pissarides).
Under assumptions in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), limk×0 θpkq   8 and
limk×0 epkq  1, i.e., full employment, or limk×0 θpkq  0 and limk×0 epkq  0, i.e.,
the entire labor market shuts down.
Proof. See Appendix A.3. 
Hence, in models with endogenous separations a` la Mortensen and Pissarides, as
the cost to post a job vacancy goes to zero, either the economy converges to full
employment or it features a 100% unemployment rate, i.e., labor-market shutdown.
The full employment case is a standard property of the texbook DMP model in that
frictional unemployment vanishes in the absence of recruiting costs. In the case of
market shutdown, the 100% unemployment rate is due to rationing (in the sense
that all matches would generate negative surplus). Obviously, this latter case is
unrealistic. As such I conclude that models in the extended Mortensen-Pissarides
class are unable to generate job rationing.
1.3.5 Aggregate Job-Finding Rate
In this section, I focus on the labor market in steady state, i.e., zt  zs for s P
t1, . . . ,Su and all t. This allows me to discuss the key properties of the aggregate
job-finding rate in a transparent manner. The main goal of this section is to show
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that permanent heterogeneity in workers’ skill/productivity is the critical ingredi-
ent that enables the model to account for the volatility and asymmetry of actual
job-finding rates. To this aim, in Section 1.3.5 below, I analyze a version of the
model in which the labor market is integrated instead of (endogenously) segmented
as presented in Section 1.3.1. This allows me to make a clear assessment of which
margin, permanent heterogeneity versus segmentation, is the key for the qualita-
tive and quantitative properties of aggregate job-finding rates. In fact, I argue that
permanent heterogeneity, instead of segmentation, is the most relevant margin at
work.
Segmented Labor Market
In this section, I study the steady-state properties of the aggregate job-finding rate
in the segmented labor market as presented in Section 3.2. Let Φpzsq denote the
aggregate job-finding rate which is a weighted average of job-finding probabilities
specific to each submarket with weights equal to unemployment shares pispxq 
uspxq{Us where Us 
°
x uspxq denotes aggregate unemployment:
Φ pzsq 
¸
x
pispxqφ
 
θspxq


UE
 
x¤xˆpzsq

 0hkkkkkkkkkkkikkkkkkkkkkkj¸
x¤xˆpzsq
uspxqφ
 
θspxq

 
UE
 
x¡xˆpzsq

¡ 0hkkkkkkkkkkkikkkkkkkkkkkj¸
x¡xˆpzsq
uspxqφ
 
θspxq

¸
x¤xˆpzsq
uspxqlooooomooooon
UR  Non-employable
workers
 
¸
x¡xˆpzsq
uspxqlooooomooooon
UF  Employable
workers
.
(1.15)
At the numerator of equation (1.15), UEpzsq  UE
 
x ¤ xˆpzsq

 UE
 
x ¡ xˆpzsq

are unemployment-to-employment (UE, hereafter) worker flows when the aggregate
state of the economy is s P t1, . . . ,Su. Note that UE x ¤ xˆpzsq  0 since low-skilled
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workers below the rationing threshold xˆpzsq in (1.11) are non-employable workers
(in the sense that they generate negative surplus), i.e., φ
 
θspxq

 0 for all x ¤
xˆpzsq. However, low-skilled, non-employable workers are in the unemployed pool, as
such they count in the denominator of equation (1.15). This is the direct outcome
of the selection mechanism that drives the endogenous separation decision. Low-
skilled workers that are not viable for hiring are exactly the ones that have been laid
off. This mechanism ties endogenous job destruction and job creation all together.
Importantly, this is also the main point of departure from models of endogenous
separations a` la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
In Mortensen-Pissarides class of models, workers are identical, and heterogene-
ity across matches comes ex-post due to match-specific idiosyncratic shocks. Once
matches are endogenously destroyed, workers flowing into the unemployment pool
become viable for hiring. To make a closer analogy with the model of this paper,
a Mortensen-Pissarides economy behaves as if laid-off workers become employable
as soon as they enter the unemployment pool. As such the incentives to vacancy
posting are larger and job-finding rates fall by less during downturns. In fact, the
selection effect at work in the model of this paper is entirely due to the permanent
nature of skills and it is also the only responsible for the large and deep falls of the
aggregate job-finding rate during recessions.
Figure 1.5 shows the aggregate job-finding rate Φ pzsq (see Panel A), UE worker
flows UEpzsq (see Panel B), share of rationing unemployment, u
R
s  U
R
s {
 
URs   U
F
s

(see Panel C), and share of frictional unemployment, uFs  U
F
s {
 
URs   U
F
s

(see
Panel D). The steady-state values are computed numerically with the same parameter
values used for the quantitative analysis of Section 1.4. Panel A shows that aggregate
job-finding rates are asymmetric. Same asymmetric behavior holds for UE worker
flows in Panel B. These asymmetries derive from the fact that the number of non-
employable workers in the unemployed pool (i.e., share of rationing unemployment
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to total unemployment) sharply increases in response to a negative aggregate shock
(see Panel C). The share of frictional unemployment instead decreases in recessions
(see Panel D). Consistently with Michaillat (2012), the model suggests that the
unemployment problem during recessions is caused by insufficient economic activity
rather than matching frictions. However, differently from Michaillat’s work, I argue
that an increasing share of recessionary unemployment involves workers in the left
tail of the skill/productivity distributon.
To further clarify the main point of this section, I rewrite the aggregate job-finding
rate in (1.15) as follows:
Φ pzsq 
¸
x¡xˆpzsq
pispxqφ
 
θspxq

with pispxq 
uspxq
Us
. (1.16)
In principle, fluctuations in the aggregate job-finding rate Φ pzsq come from move-
ments in worker-specific shares of employable workers in the unemployed pool, pispxq,
and worker-specific job-finding probabilities of employable workers, φ
 
θspxq

. To as-
sess which margin is the most relevant, in the quantitative analysis of Section 1.4,
I contrast two versions of the model: (i) endogenous job destruction (EJD) model
which features endogenous separations and job rationing; and (ii) constant job de-
struction (CJD) model in which I calibrate the distribution of skills such that en-
dogenous separations never occur in equilibrium. In this latter case, all workers in
the unemployed pool are employable at any point of the business cycle. The quan-
titative results show that, different from the EJD model, the CJD model is unable
to replicate the large and asymmetric fluctuations of the U.S. labor market. Thus,
I conclude that fluctuations in the fraction of employable workers are of first-order
importance for the quantitative success of the model.
As a final remark, note that during recessions the unemployment pool is charac-
terized by a distribution of skills that is skewed to the left. This affects the aggregate
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job-finding rate only through changes in the share of employable workers. Job-finding
probabilities in each submarket are instead independent of the distribution of skills
of the unemployed pool and only depend on the aggregate state of the economy. This
latter result comes from the assumption that workers’ types are observable to the
employers at the time of vacancy posting such that the labor market is segmented.
Integrated Labor Market
In this section, I study the steady-state properties of the aggregate job-finding rate
in the integrated labor market version of the model presented in Section 3.2. In this
version of the model, the worker’s type is known to the worker but it is unobservable
by vacancy posting employers. Hence, an employer posting a vacancy to hire an
unemployed worker internalize that it may come in contact with a worker of any type
x P tx1, . . . , xMu. The contact probability is taken parametrically by the employer
and determined in equilibrium by the distribution of unemployment across worker
types, pis  tpispx1q, . . . , pispxMqu with pispxq  uspxq{
°
x uspxq. Upon contact, the
worker’s type is revealed. At this stage, workers and employers decide whether to
form a match and create a job or to continue their search process. The structure
of the matching process implies that all unemployed workers face the same job-
contact probability, φ
 
θsppisq

, but different job-finding and separation rates. Notice
that I explicitly denote the dependence of the tightness ratio θsppisq on the entire
distribution of contact probabilities, pis. I refer the reader to Appendix A.4 for further
details on the model structure. Let ΦInt pzsq denote the aggregate job-finding rate in
the integrated labor market:
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ΦInt pzsq 
φ
 
θsppisq
°
x¡xˆpzsq
uspxq°
x uspxq
 φ
 
θsppisq
loooomoooon
Job-contact
rate

¸
x¡xˆpzsq
pispxq.loooooomoooooon
Employable share
of unemployed
(1.17)
In principle, fluctuations in the aggregate job-finding rate ΦInt pzsq come from
cyclical movements in job-contact probabilities, φ
 
θsppisq

, and the share of employ-
able workers in the unemployed pool,
°
x¡xˆpzsq
pispxq. Notice that in the integrated la-
bor market, worker-specific shares of the unemployed pool pispxq affect the aggregate
job-finding rate through two channels: (1) the distribution of worker-specific shares
pis  tpispx1q, . . . , pispxMqu directly affects market tightness θs ppisq. This channel is
absent in the model with a segmented labor market. (2) The share of employable
workers
°
x¡xˆpzsq
pispxq determines the fraction of workers in the unemployment pool
that generate positive surplus once they come in contact with an employer. This
channel is the only one at work in the model with a segmented labor market.
Figure 1.6 shows the aggregate job-finding, ΦInt pzsq, and contact rate, φ
 
θsppisq

(see Panel A), UE worker flows (see Panel B), and the shares of rationing and fric-
tional unemployment (see Panels C-D). Panel A shows that the aggregate job-finding
rate (dotted line) displays a noticeable asymmetry. As such the job-finding rate in
the economy with an integrated labor market shares the same asymmetric behavior
of the economy with segmented labor markets (see Table 1.5, Panel A). Furthermore,
as for the segmented labor-market case I discuss above, most of the asymmetry in
the aggregate job-finding rate comes from the marked asymmetry in the share of
non-employable workers in the unemployed pool (see Table 1.6, Panel C). Note that
also the job-contact rate is asymmetric. However, its asymmetry is much less pro-
nounced if compared to that of the job-finding rate. This result is important for
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two reasons: (1) the direct effect from the composition of the unemployed pool to
market tighteness is not of first-order importance; and (2) the key mechanism driving
asymmetry in the aggregate job-finding rate is the share of non-employable workers
in the unemployed pool. Importantly, this is the key force at work in the model with
segmented labor markets.
1.3.6 Aggregate Variables
Unemployment in submarket x P tx1, . . . , xMu follows the process:
ut 1pxq 
$&%
1 if Stpxq ¤ 0
utpxq   δetpxq  φ
 
θtpxq

utpxq if Stpxq ¡ 0.
(1.18)
Aggregate labor force is
°
x
 
etpxq   utpxq

 Et  Ut M , where Et 
°
x etpxq
and Ut 
°
x utpxq denote respectively aggregate employment and unemployment.
The aggregate employment and unemployment rates are respectively et  Et{M and
ut  Ut{M . The aggregate job-finding and job-separation rates are respectively,
Φt 1 
1
Ut
¸
x
φ
 
θtpxq

utpxq and ∆t 1 
1
Et
¸
x
δt 1pxqetpxq,
where φpθtpxqq and δtpxq are respectively job-finding and job-separation proba-
bilities for workers of type x. Aggregate vacancies are vt 
°
x vtpxq, where vtpxq is
the number of vacancies posted in submarket x. Total output and aggregate labor
productivity are respectively,
Yt 
¸
x
ytpxq  zt
¸
x
xetpxq and pt 
Yt
Et
 zt 
°
x xetpxq°
x etpxq
.
Notice that aggregate labor productivity pt consists of an exogenous component,
zt, and an endogenous component,
°
x xetpxq{
°
x etpxq, which is a skill-adjusted
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measure of the employed pool.
1.3.7 Cross-Sectional Dispersion in Labor-Market Conditions and Matching Effi-
ciency
The model features cross-sectional dispersion in labor-market conditions. Dispersion
comes from the fact that different types of workers respond differently to aggregate
shocks. This is a fundamental property of the model which endogenosuly arises since
workers are permanently heterogenous in skill/productivity. I next show that if an
econometrician wrongly assumes the existence of an aggregate matching function
then she would infer cyclical movements in matching efficiency. This would be mis-
leading since in the model the technology parameter governing the efficiency of the
market-specific matching function, µ, is constant. Recall that for each submarket
the number of hires is mtpxq  µvtpxq
αutpxq
1α. In the aggregate instead, total hires
are Mt 
°
xmtpxq,
Mt  µ
¸
x
vtpxq
αutpxq
1α, (1.19)
which is the true data generating process (DGP). Now, if an econometrician
assumes the existence of an aggregate matching function then she would expect the
following relationships to hold,
M˜t  A˜t
¸
x
vtpxq

α¸
x
utpxq

1α
 A˜tV
α
t U
1α
t , (1.20)
where M˜t are the number of hires implied by an aggregate matching function, Vt °
x vtpxq and Ut 
°
x utpxq are respectively aggregate vacancies and unemployment,
and A˜t is measured matching efficiency. Suppose the econometrician is endowed
with a dataset of artifical data generated by the model, tMt, Vt, Utu
T
t0, and the value
of the parameter α. I ask now the fictional econometrician to estimate matching
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efficiency A˜t without providing her the true DGP in equation (1.19). She would
calculate efficiency in a residual way as
ln A˜t  lnMt  α lnVt  p1 αq lnUt. (1.21)
Concavity of the matching function and Jensen’s inequality imply that Mt ¤ M˜t
such that ln A˜t ¤ 0 for all t ¥ 0. Therefore, cross-sectional dispersion in tightness
ratios induces a negative level effect on measured matching efficiency as compared to
the benchmark economy with homogenous workers. Table 1.7 shows that, in addition
to a level effect, measured matching efficiency would also display cyclical properties.
However, these infered variations are the artifact of neglecting heterogeneity. If
the econometrican is endowed with the DGP in equation (1.19) and market-specific
data on job vacancies and unemployment, tvtpxq, utpxqu
T
t0, then she would estimate
ln A˜t  µ for all t ¥ 0.
The model suggests that recessions would look like periods of extremely low
matching efficiency. The model generates an high correlation between measured
matching efficiency and the aggregate shock, i.e., corrpln A˜t, ln ztq  0.792. Elsby
et al. (2010) and Barnichon and Figura (2011) provide empirical support for this
prediction. Using CPS micro data for 1976-2010, Barnichon and Figura (2011) show
that the composition of the pool of unemployed accounts for most of the cyclical
variation in matching efficiency up to 2006, and forty-five percent of the decline in
matching efficiency for the 2007-2010 period. Note that in the model, dispersion in
labor-market conditions across workers depends only on their different responses to
aggregate shocks. Hence, there is no room for “mismatch.” By mismatch I mean
the sectoral misalignment between vacant jobs and unemployed workers, i.e., unem-
ployed seeking employment in sectors (occupations, industries, locations) different
from those where the available jobs are. Sahin et al. (2012) and Herz and van Rens
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(2012) argue that fluctuations in unemployment due to mismatch are small com-
pared to the overall unemployment rate. As a final remark, the discussion of this
section also suggests that interpreting cyclical movements in matching efficiency as
“structural shocks” to the matching process can lead to erroneous explanations of
unemployment dynamics during recessions.
1.3.8 Textbook DMP Model
In this section, I discuss the properties of the textbook DMP model which is a special
case of the model with worker heterogeneity.
Remark 1 (Textbook DMP model). When xj  1 for all j P t1, . . . ,Mu, all
workers are identical. In this case, the model nests a standard DMP model with a
constant exogenous rate of job destruction.
The analysis focuses on the stochastic equilibrium of the economy. This allows
me to study the equilibrium analytically.
Definition 7 (Stochastic equilibrium). A stochastic equilirium is any equilibrium
in which the shock tztu repeats itself, i.e., zt 1  zt  zs, for s P t1, . . . ,Su.
At the stochastic equilibrium, the employment rate is
es 
φpθsq
δ   φpθsq
.
Employment rate, es, job-finding rate, φpθsq, vacancies, vs  θsus, and log output,
ln ys, are strictly increasing and concave functions of the tightness ratio, θs.
1.3.9 Three Propositions
I next derive analytical results for the stochastic equilibrium of the standard DMP
model.
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Proposition 8 (Asymmetry bounds). Any stochastic equilibrium consistent with
a constant exogenous rate of job destruction features asymmetry bounds on the uncon-
ditional distributions of the endogenous variables: for market tightness, (i) ∆θMMD 
E rθs  θsm ¡ 0; and for any strictly increasing and concave function ξpθq (i.e.,
employment rate, job-finding rate, vacancies, and log of output), (ii) ∆ξMMD 
E rξpθqs  ξpθsmq   ξpErθsq  ξpθsmq   ξ1pθsmq∆θMMD.
Proof. See Appendix A.3. 
Proposition 8 formally states that the asymmetry properties of the endogenous
variables are bounded by those of market tightness. Despite the theoretical convexity
proved by Lemma 22 in Appendix A.3, the relationship between market tightness and
aggregate shock turns out to be approximatively linear for all plausible calibrations
of the model. This latter observation motivates the next corollary.
Corollary 9 (Mean-median asymmetry in levels). Consider the stochastic equi-
librium for market tightness. If the support of the distribution of θ is symmetric
around the median value then any equilibrium consistent with a constant exogenous
rate of job destruction features negative skewness in the unconditional distribution of
employment rate, job-finding rate, vacancies and log of output.
Proof. See Appendix A.3. 
The results in Corollary 9 derive from a key property of the search-and-matching
framework, i.e., matching displays decreasing returns to unemployment and vacancy
posting. When the labor market is tight—θ is high—increasingly more vacancies are
needed to generate a given redution in unemployment. This is the essence of the
congestion externality which drives fluctuations in DMP models.
Proposition 10 (Volatility and mean-median asymmetry in levels). Con-
sider a mean-median-preserving spread ∆ in the distribution of market tightness with
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stochastic equilibrium, θs  θsm  
pssmq
pSsmq  ∆, for s P t1, . . . ,Su and ∆ ¡ 0. In any
stochastic equilibrium consistent with a constant exogenous rate of job destruction,
as ∆ increases, the unconditional distribution of employment rate, job-finding rate,
vacancies and log of output become more negatively skewed.
Proof. See Appendix A.3. 
Notice that by construction ∆ does not affect the symmetry of the distribution
of the tightness ratio, but it controls its range of variation. Hence, Proposition 10
characterizes a tight link between volatility and asymmetry in levels. Notice also that
the proposition is built on the properties of the key endogenous variable of the model,
i.e., market tightness, implying that any mechanism, be it exogenous or endogenous,
raising the volatility of the tightness ratio also affects the asymmetry properties of
the model. Specifically, more volatility induces more asymmetry in levels. Figure
1.8 shows a numerical example of the analytical results stated in Proposition 10.
In Figure 1.8, the inner distributions (red lines) are associated to the least volatile
tightness ratio. The outer distributions (purple lines) are associated instead to the
most volatile tightness ratio. Two features of the theoretical distributions are worth
further explanation. First, in Panel A, notice that despite an evident increase in
volatility, the distributions of tightness ratios preserve a substantial symmetry. This
happens because the tightness ratio is approximately linear in the shock, see Panel
A in Figure 1.9. Second, as the dispersion in the distribution of the tightness ratio
increases, the distributions of the endogenous variables become increasingly left-
skewed. This happens because employment rate, job-finding rate, vacancies and
output are concave functions of the tightness ratio, see Figure 1.9. Notice that
asymmetries arise with perfectly symmetric shocks, see Panel F in Figure 1.8.
I next characterize the properties of the endogenous variables in first-differences.
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Proposition 11 (Mean-median asymmetry in first-differences). Consider the
stochastic equilibrium of a generic variable of the model x˜s, for s P t1, . . . ,Su. At any
equilibrium of the model consistent with a constant exogenous rate of job destruction:
(i) if the support of the distribution of x˜s is symmetric around the median, x˜sm,
then the unconditional distribution of ∆x˜s,s1 is symmetric; (ii) if the support of the
distribution of x˜s has a longer left tail, then the unconditional distribution of ∆x˜s,s1
is right-skewed; and (iii) if the support of the distribution of x˜s has a longer right
tail, then the unconditional distribution of ∆x˜s,s1 is left-skewed.
Proof. See Appendix A.3. 
Tables A.6 and A.7 show numerical results which further strengthen the theoret-
ical predictions of this section. The numerical analysis is based on two alternative
calibrations of the worker’s outside option. In the first calibration, which I refer to
as Hall and Milgrom (2008)-type calibration, the worker’s outside option amounts to
73% of steady-state wage. In the second calibration, which I refer to as Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008)-type calibration, I set the worker’s outside option to 95% of steady-
state wage. It is well-known that a textbook DMP model with a Hall-Milgrom-type
calibration fails to generate realistic amplification in response to exogenous impulses.
On the other hand, Hagedorn-Manovskii-type calibrations greatly help the standard
model to generate realistic unemployment fluctuations. The numerical results in Ap-
pendix B.1 suggest that a textbook DMP model with a constant exogenous rate of
job destruction cannot account for the asymmetry properties of the data irrespective
of its ability to generate realistic volatility.
1.4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, I assess the quantitative properties of the model.
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1.4.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated at the monthly frequency, as summarized in Table 1.3.
The discount rate is set to β  0.9959 to accord with an annual risk-free interest
rate of 5%. I next discuss calibration of the labor-market parameters: α and µ
for the matching function, worker’s Nash-bargaining weight, η, vacancy costs, kpxq,
exogenous and constant job destruction rate, δ, and worker’s outside option, λ.
Relative to the standard DMP model, the model adds a number of new parameters:
xj, for j  1, . . . ,M .
I assume a Cobb-Douglas matching function, such that the job-finding rate, φpθq,
and job-filling rate, ρpθq, are in the following relation, φpθq  θρpθq  µθα. A
large literature that directly estimates the aggregate matching function, provides a
range of estimates for the parameter α. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) establish
a plausable range of 0.3-0.5. Bru¨gemann (2008) obtains a refined range of 0.37-0.46.
I specify α  0.4 at the mid point of these ranges. For comparability with previous
work, I specify the parameter of the Nash-bargaining problem as η  1α such that
the Hosios (1990)’s condition is met and the decentralized equilibrium is efficient. I
refer to Shimer (2005) for further details.
I set the matching function scale to µ  0.33 such that the model-implied median
unemployment rate equals 5.6%, which matches the median unemployment rate in
the U.S. data for 1948:Q1-2011:Q3. The seasonally-adjusted monthly U.S. unem-
ployment rate series is constructed by the BLS from the CPS. I set the constant
exogenous rate of job destruction to δ  0.0189, which is the average quit rate in
the U.S. data for 2001:M1-2011:M9. The seasonally-adjusted monthly series for total
quits to employment in the nonfarm business sector is constructed by the BLS from
JOLTS.
I choose to target a v-u ratio of 1 in each submarket, which requires setting
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vacancy costs to kpxq P r0.0005, . . . , 0.3359s. This calibration strategy implies that
the cost to post a vacancy is (approximately) linearly increasing in skills, i.e., kpxq 
kx. This is broadly consistent with the empirical evidence reported by Hamermesh
and Pfann (1996).
I assume that workers’ productivity distribution is uniform, satisfying x1  x,
xM  x, and xj  xj1  px xq {M . Thus, j  M is the most productive, and
j  1 is the least productive submarket. I choose M  200 and normalize x  1.
For the lower bound, I set x  0.44, such that the submarket at the 90th percentile
of the distribution is twice as productive as the submarket at the 10th percentile,
lnpx180{x20q  0.651. Syverson (2011) finds productivity differences of this order of
magnitude within four-digit SIC industries in the U.S. manufacturing sector.
I set the flow value of unemployment to λ  0.44 such that all submarkets
feature positive match surpluses in steady-state (zsm  1 in my normalization),
as such steady-state unemployment is all frictional. This calibration implies an
average replacement ratio of 62%, which is a value smaller than those used in Hall
and Milgrom (2008), Mortensen and Nagypal (2007) and Pissarides (2000), and
much smaller than Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)’s calibration. In this regard, this
paper’s calibration is a conservative one.
Calibration of the worker’s outside option, λ, deserves further explanation. The
assumption that λ is the same across workers of different skills implies that replace-
ment ratios, i.e., λ as percent of the wage, greatly differ across workers’ types. This
happens because low-skilled workers earn lower wages. Hence, while on average λ
amounts to 62% of aggregate wage compensation, there is a spectrum of replace-
ment ratios. In Figure 1.10, Panel A shows the CDF of replacement ratios. Notice
that approximately 5% of the aggregate labor force features a Hagedorn-Manovskii-
type calibration, and approximately 70% of the labor force have replacement ra-
tios smaller than those implied by a Hall-Milgrom-type calibration. Panel B shows
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that replacement ratios are decreasing in workers’ productivity. Specifically, the 5%
of Hagedorn-Manovskii-type of workers are the least productive in the labor force.
These low-skilled workers are the ones benefiting relatively less from being employed
and always at risk of layoff. They are necessarily marginal workers in that they are
almost indifferent to work in the labor market and enjoy the value of non-market
activities.
Finally, I calibrate the exogenous stochastic process for labor productivity, which
is the only driving force of fluctuations. I estimate an AR(1) process for the HP-
filtered seasonally-adjusted quarterly real output per worker in the nonfarm business
sector constructed by the BLS from the LPC release, for 1948:Q1-2011:Q3: lnpzt 1q 
ρz lnpztq σt 1 with t
iid
 N p0, 1q. The HP-filter smoothing parameter is 105. With
quarterly data, we obtain an autocorrelation of ρˆz  0.8963 and a residual standard
deviation of σˆ  0.0091, which yields ρˆz  0.8963
1{3  0.9642 and σˆ  0.0055 at
monthly frequency. Following Tauchen (1986), I approximate the continuous-valued
AR(1) process for lnpztq through a S-state Markov chain, having a discrete state
space tz1, . . . , zSu and transition probabilities pis,s1  Pr tzt 1  zs1 |zt  zsu. I set
the number of grid points for the state space to S  9.
1.4.2 Simulated Moments
In this section, I assess the quantitative performance of the model by comparing
important simulated moments to their empirical counterparts in the U.S. data. I
contrast two versions of the model which differ for the calibration of the lower bound
of the workers’ productivity distribution: (1) endogenous job destruction (EJD)
model. In this case, x  0.438, and the model features an endogenous rate of
job destruction as in (1.10); (2) constant job destruction (CJD) model. In this
case, x  0.455, and endogenous job separations never occur in equilibrium. Notice
that the CJD model can be seen as a collection of standard DMP models with
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constant exogenous rates of job destruction and cross-sectional dispersion of total
match surpluses, i.e., Sspxq   Sspx2q   . . .   Sspxq. Comparing these two versions
of the model highlights the key ingredients for the quantitative success of the model.
Volatility and Comovement in U.S. Data and Model
Table 1.4 shows standard deviations (relative to labor productivity) and correlations
for labor-market variables in the model and U.S. data. Panel A forcefully shows
that the EJD model generates fluctuations in the unemployment rate, vacancies
and job-finding rates that are comparable to those in the U.S. data. The EJD
model outperforms the CJD model in any dimension. In this regard, the results
for the CJD model confirm the previous negative findings on the inability of the
standard DMP model to amplify exogenous impulses. The findings suggest that key
for the amplification properties of the model is the selection mechanism which drives
endogenous job destruction and job creation.
In Table 1.4, Panel B shows comovements between labor-market variables. Ex-
cept for the correlation between vacancies and unemployment (Beveridge curve), the
EJD model outperfomrs the CJD model. However, it still produces correlations of
unemployment, job-finding rates and vacancies with labor productivity that are too
high (in absolute value) compared to the data. The success of the CJD model in
replicating the empirical Beveridge curve is not surprising given its resemblance to
a textbook DMP model. Shimer (2005) shows that the Berveridge curve is the only
quantitative success of a textbook DMP model.
To understand the comovement between vacancies and unemployment, Figure
1.11 shows lead-lag correlations, where the current period unemployment rate is as-
sociated with future and lagged values of vacancies up to four quarters. First observe
that a large value of contemporaneous correlation between unemployment and va-
cancies observed in the U.S. data, 0.858, is reasonably close to the value generated
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by the model of 0.561. The model preserves a downward-sloping Beveridge curve.
A well-known criticism to models with endogenous job separations a` la Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994), is their counterfactual implications for the Beveridge curve.
These models produce a strong positive correlation of unemployment with vacancies,
whereas in the U.S. data this correlation is strongly negative at business cycle fre-
quencies. With respect to the lead-lag relationship, the data suggest some tendency
for vacancies to lead unemployment.15 Qualitatively, this pattern is captured well in
the model. This reflects the mechanics of the model, wherein the search friction pro-
duces some lagged response in unemployment after the response in vacancy posting.
In Mortensen and Pissarides’s type of models, in contrast, the feedback from the
movement of the separation rate into vacancy posting erases this feature, generating
the tendency that unemployment leads vacancies.
Asymmetry in U.S. Data and Model
Table 1.5 contrasts the model with the asymmetry properties of the data. The EJD
model generates asymmetries in employment, output and job-finding rates compa-
rable to those observed in the data. Not surprisingly, given the results in Section
1.3.8, the CJD model completely fails to do so. Remarkably, the EJD model is also
able to replicate the disconnect between the asymmetry properties of employment
and output, i.e., it generates deep and steep cycles in employment, and deep cycles
in output with no steepness.
The model produces counterfactual implications for the asymmetry properties
of vacancies, i.e., positive instead of negative skeweness in level and growth rates.
These counterfactual predictions are due to the “echo effect” that characterizes the
dynamics of vacancies in models with endogenous job separations. After a adverse
15 Correlations between lagged values of vacancies and current unemployment tend to be larger (in
absolute value) than those between future values of vacancies and current unemployment.
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aggregate shock that induces endogenous destruction of jobs, the pool of unemployed
raises, the probability to fill a vacancy increases such that for the employer the
expected recruiting cost decreases. This gives to employers strong incentives to post
vacancies right at the end of a downturn since it is relatively cheaper to do so.
Because in the model vacancies are a jump variable, they react “too much and too
fast” to positive changes in the aggregate state coming from a recession causing
positive skewness in levels and growth rates.
What drives asymmetric employment dynamics?
In this section, I assess the relative contribution of job-finding and job-separation
rates to the skewness asymmetry of the employment rate series generated by the
model. To this aim, I construct two counterfactual series for the employment rate
in the EJD model. Recall that aggregate employment and employment rate are
respectively Et 
°
x etpxq and et  Et{M . The first counterfactual is an employment
rate series that only allows for variation in job-finding rates, ejfrt 1  E
jfr
t 1{M , where
Ejfrt 1  E
jfr
t  
¸
x
φ
 
θtpxq

ujfrt pxq 
¸
x
δsmpxqe
jfr
t pxq,
and δsmpxq  δ are steady-state job-separation rates which are calibrated to
be the same across submarkets. The second counterfactual series only allows for
variation in job-separation rates, ejsrt 1  E
jsr
t 1{M , where
Ejsrt 1  E
jsr
t  
¸
x
φ
 
θsmpxq

ujsrt pxq 
¸
x
δt 1pxqe
jsr
t pxq,
and φ
 
θsmpxq

 µ are steady-state job-finding rates which are calibrated to be
the same across submarkets. Which counterfactual series better accounts for the
asymmetry properties of the employment rate? Recall I asked the same question in
Section 1.2 for the actual U.S. employment rate. Answering this question allows us
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to disentangle the contribution of job-finding and separation rates to the skewenss
in levels and growth rates. In Table 1.6, Panel A shows that both margins of the
labor market, i.e., job-finding and job-separation rates, are jointly responsible for the
skewness in levels of the employment rate. This prediction hold in U.S. data (see
Fact 3 in Section 1.2).
Panel B shows that in the model, job-separation rates are the only responsible for
negative skewness in growth rates. Moreover, when the dynamics are only driven by
job-finding rates, the model generates positive instead of negative skewness in growth
rates. Importantly, these model predictions hold in the data (see Fact 4 in Section
1.2). To summarize, this section strengthens the results in Section 1.4.2 in that it
shows the model is able to replicate not only the skewness asymmetry in employment
but also the asymmetry properties implied by job-finding and separation rates.
What drives asymmetric output dynamics?
To understand what drives the disconnect between the asymmetry properties of
employment and output, Table 1.7 shows statistics for the skewness in levels and
growth rates for each output component simulated from the EJD model. In the
model, aggregate output is
Yt 
¸
x
ytpxq  zt 
¸
x
xetpxq,
where zt is the exogenous aggregate shock, and
°
x xetpxq is a quality-adjusted
measure of aggregate employment, which is a weighted average of worker-specific
employment rates with weights equal to workers’ types x P tx1   . . .   xMu. In Table
1.7, the column labeled Y reproduces the skewness statistics for aggregate output
in Table 1.5. As discussed in Section 1.4.2, in the model as in the data, aggregate
output displays negative skewness in levels with nearly no skewness in growth rates.
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Recall that the aggregate state zt is by assumption a symmetric Markov process,
as such simulated shocks display (approximately) zero skewness both in levels and
growth rates. Note that quality-adjusted employment,
°
x xepxq, displays negative
skewness in levels and growth rates. Hence, it inherits the asymmetry properties of
aggregate employment (see Table 1.5).
The results in Table 1.7 suggest the reason why aggregate output behaves more
symmetrically than employment is that aggregate shocks are symmetric and hit the
production function directly.
1.4.3 Impulse Response Functions
In this section, I discuss key properties of the model by the means of impulse re-
sponse functions (IRFs). I derive the dynamic response to a productivity shock by
comparing the expected paths of two economies. The first economy starts with the
level of the endogenous variable associated with the median state but is in the state
below (above) the median state. The second economy starts with the same level of
the endogenous variable and is in the median state. The difference between the two
paths is the response over time to a negative (positive) impulse, which is the tran-
sition from the median to lower (higher) states that occured at time zero. I report
the average response across 5, 000 replications. Critically, the size of the positive
and negative shock is the same. Figure 1.12 shows the responses of labor-market
variables to a negative (solid line) and positive (dashed line) impulse. I flip the sign
of the response to a positive impulse (dashed line) such that both responses lie in
the same quadrant. Panel D shows the responses of the exogenous aggregate shock,
which is by assumption a symmetric stochastic process.
In Figure 1.12, Panel A shows that the employment rate’s response to shocks is
strongly asymmetric, with the response to a negative impulse being stronger than
the response to a positive impulse. What is driving the asymmetric dynamics of
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the employment rate? Suppose at time t  0 the economy rests at the median
state (zsm  1 in my normalization), and a negative shock realizes. The immediate
response of the model economy is a burst of job destruction which leads a spike in the
aggregate separation rate, see Panel B. The endogenous job destruction margin is the
one contributing more to the speed at which the employment rate reaches the trough
of the response. At this stage, the aggregate job-finding rate plays a minor role in the
dynamics. After the trough of the response is reached, the dynamics are governed
by a low aggregate job-finding rate which determines the slow recovery towards the
initial state. At this stage, job rationing is at work. The employment rate’s response
to a positive shock is driven only by a high aggregate job-finding rate. In this case,
the forces driving the dynamics are the same as those of a standard DMP model
with a constant job-separation rate. Panel C shows that the IRFs of the aggregate
job-finding rate are also strongly asymmetric. The aggregate job-finding rate falls in
response to a negative impulse much farther than it raises in response to a positive
impulse. This asymmetric response comes from the direct effect that endogenous
job destruction exerts on the aggregate job-finding rate. After a negative shock, job-
finding probabilities of all workers fall, however, they drop disproportionally more for
low-skilled workers previously fired which are over-represented in the group flowing
into unemployment. Notice that the asymmetric behavior of the labor market comes
entirely from the mechanics of the model. Panel D shows that the IRFs of the
exogenous aggregate shock are fully symmetric. In the model, aggregate output is
Yt 
°
x ytpxq  zt 
°
x xetpxq. Labor productivity, Yt{Et, consists of an exogenous
and endogenous component,
Yt
Et
 ztlomon
Aggregate
shock

°
x xetpxq°
x etpxq
.looooomooooon
“Composition effect”
(1.22)
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The first term on the right hand side of equation (1.22) is the exogenous aggregate
shock, zt. The second term on the right hand side—“composition effect”—is a skill-
adjusted measure of employment, which is an endogenous variable. Figure 1.13 shows
the impulse responses for output, labor productivity, and the composition effect.
In Figure 1.13, Panel A shows that output contracts deeper after a negative
impulse than it expands after a positive shock, i.e., the trough (in absolute value)
exceeds the peak. However, besides the peak-trough asymmetry, the impulse re-
sponses are more symmetric if compared to those of the employment rate (see Panel
A in Figure 1.12). Panel B shows the response of labor productivity. The sharp
fall in employment after a negative impulse is muted by the endogenous response
of labor productivity, which tends to fall by less because of the composition effect.
Panel C shows that the composition effect’s responses to shocks are strongly asym-
metric. It reacts much stronger to a negative than to a postive impulse. Specifically,
it raises more in response to a negative impulse than it falls after a positive im-
pulse. After a negative impulse, low-skilled workers are laid off, a disproportionate
part of the employed pool consists of high-skilled workers. This selection mecha-
nism causes skill-adjusted employment to raise sharply. After a positive impulse
instead, no endogenous job destruction occurs, a disproportionate part of the em-
ployed pool consists of low-skilled workers. In this case, the composition effect causes
skill-adjusted employment to smoothly decrease.
1.5 Labor-Market Fluctuations at the Micro Level
The model highlights the crucial role of low-skilled workers in shaping cyclical move-
ments in aggregate unemployment. As a by-product, the model provides stark pre-
dictions for the time series of skill-specific unemployment rates. Precisely, low-skilled
workers experience (i) higher average unemployment rates and (ii) they account for
most of the variation in aggregate unemployment. In this section, I use CPS mi-
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cro data for the period 1976:M1-2013:M2 and test this prediction. Specifically, the
goal is to investigate whether there are relatively unskilled groups of workers that
contribute disproportionately more to the large fluctuations of the U.S. labor market.
Clearly, the identification of worker’s abilities in the data is challenging. However,
a large empirical literature in the tradition of Mincer (1974)’s work, has identified
experience and education as important drivers of wage differentials. Hence, to the
extent to which actual wages reflect workers’ marginal product, one can arguably
think of age and education as good proxies for worker-specific productivity on the
job. Following the lead of this literature, I consider unemployment rates by age and
education groups and investigate whether their time series properties accord with
the predictions of the model. To this aim, I consider 6 age groups (16-24, 25-34, 35-
44, 45-54, 55-64, 65 and over) and 3 education levels (High school dropouts, HSD,
High school graduates joint with some college, HSG/SC, and College graduates and
post-college degree holders, CGPC). As such there are 18 age/education groups. The
first row of Table 1.8 reports average unemployment rates for different age groups.
Unemployment rates decrease monotonically with age. This fact is well-known,
see Gervais et al. (2013). Specifically, the average unemployment rate for the 16-24
years old is 12.9% and sharply falls to 3.92% for the 55-64 years old. Note also
that the age differences are large. The second row of Table 1.8 displays the average
unemployment rate for each age group relative to that of the 45-54 years old. Over
the period 1976:M1-2013:M2, the average unemployment rate for the 16-24 years old
was 3.16 times that of the 45-54 years old.
Table 1.9 displays average unemployment rates for different education groups.
Clearly, unemployment rates sharply decrease with education. The average unem-
ployment rate for high-school dropouts is 12.72% and falls to 2.79% for workers with
the highest educational attainments. Note that the average unemployment rate for
HSD is 2 times that of the HSG/SC and as high as 4.56 times that of workers with
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a college or post-college degree.
Table 1.10 reports average unemployment rates for different age/education groups.
The results show that unemployment rates are decreasing in age and education even
within groups. Precisely, (i) average unemployment rates decrease monotonically
with age after sorting on education levels and (ii) average unemployment rates de-
crease monotonically with education after sorting on age differences. These facts are
important since confirm a tight monotonic link between unemployment rates and
skill levels. Note also that age/education differences are large. High-school dropouts
in the 16-24 years old group experience an average unemployment rate of 21% which
is 9 times that of the CGPC workers in the 45-54 years hold group.
Overall, the empirical findings suggest that the U.S. labor market features large
differences in average unemployment rates once I sort workers by age and education.
These facts are broadly consistent with the predictions of the model. Table 1.11
displays average unemployment rates by skill/productivity group for artificial data
generated by the model. Recall that the index x P tx1, . . . , xMu denotes the skill
type of the worker which determines her productivity on the job. The model gen-
erates large dispersion in average unemployment rates across workers. Specifically,
lowest-skilled workers experience an average unemployment rate 8.5 times larger
than that of high-skilled workers in the right tail of the productivity distribution,
i.e., px7  x200q group. Importantly, this dispersion in unemployment rates is the en-
dogenous outcome of the model. I calibrated the unemployment rates to be the same
across workers in the median state (zsm  1 in my normalization). As such these
large differences in average unemployment rates come exclusively from the different
cyclical behavior of workers with different skills.
I next provide evidence that the young and least-educated workers not only ex-
perience higher average unemployment rates but they also contribute disproportion-
ately more to the time series variation of the U.S. unemployment rate.
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To this aim, let us decompose the actual U.S. unemployment rate as the sum of
unemployed workers sorted in different groups indexed by x divided by the aggregate
labor force, lft  Et   Ut, such that
ut 
Ut
Et   Ut

utpx1q
Et   Ut
 
utpx2q
Et   Ut
  . . . . . . 
utpxMq
Et   Ut
(1.23)
where Ut 
°
x utpxq and Et 
°
x etpxq are respectively the total number
of unemployed and employed. The index x P tx1, . . . , xMu denotes an observ-
able worker-specific charecteristics, e.g., age and/or educational attainments. Let
uˆtpxq  utpxq{lft denote the share of unemployed workers of characteristic x in the
labor force. Standard calculations yield
V arputq 
¸
x
V ar
 
uˆtpxq

 
¸
xx1
Cov
 
uˆtpxq, uˆtpx
1q

. (1.24)
Tables 1.12-1.13 report percentage shares of U.S. unemployment rate variance
attributed to a specific group of workers. Specifically, I group workers by age (see
Table 1.12), education (see Table 1.13), and age/education (see Table A.8 in Ap-
pendix B.1).
Table 1.12 shows that 2 age groups, i.e., 16-24 and 25-34, account for the bulk of
the variation in the actual U.S. unemployment rate. A similar picture emerges from
Table 1.13 in which HSD, HSG and SC are responsible for most of the time series
variation of U.S. unemployment. Table A.8 in Appendix B.1 further confirms that
in the U.S. economy, unemployment volatility is clustered between the young and
the least-educated workers.
Importantly, these findings are consistent with the predictions of the model. In
Table 1.14, I report volatility shares for artificial data generated by the model. In the
model, as in the data, few skill/productivity groups account for most of the variation
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of the unemployment rate. These are workers in the left tail of the skill/productivity
distribution.
Note that changes in unemployment shares uˆtpxq  utpxq{lft are due to changes
in either skill-specific unemployment rates, or skill-specific shares of the aggregate
labor force:
uˆtpxq 
utpxq
etpxq   utpxqloooooomoooooon
Skill-specific
unemployment rate

etpxq   utpxq
Et   Ut
.looooooomooooooon
Skill-specific
shares of the labor force
(1.25)
I refer to the first margin as the unemployment margin, and to the latter as the
participation margin. If the participation margin was the main driver of fluctuations
in unemployment shares of young and/or least educated workers then modeling skill-
specific differences in participation decisions would be of first-order importance. In
this case, my modelling choice of constant labor force shares would be unappealing. If
not, it would suggest that to a first-order, the factor generating age/education group
differences are variations in skill-specific unemployment rates. This would bring
support to the main mechanism at work in the model. The variance of unemployment
shares is decomposed as:
V ar
 
uˆt

 V ar
 
urtpxq

  V ar
 
lfstpxq

  2Cov
 
urtpxq, lfstpxq

, (1.26)
where urtpxq  utpxq{
 
etpxq   utpxq

and lfstpxq 
 
etpxq   utpxq

{
 
Et   Ut

.
Tables 1.15-1.16 show that almost all variation at business cycle frequencies in unem-
ployment shares comes from fluctuations in skill-specific unemployment rates. Table
A.9 in Appendix B.1 shows the unemployment shares’ variance decomposition by
age/education group.
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To summarize, the facts documented in this section state that: (i) most of the
time series variation in the U.S. unemployment rate can be attributed to the young
and least-educated workers. Since age and education are natural proxies for skills,
the empirical findings suggest that understanding the cyclical behavior of low-skilled
workers is critical to explain the large fluctuations of the U.S. labor market; (ii) at
business cycle frequencies, most of the volatility in unemployment shares comes from
changes in skill-specific unemployment rates and not from variation in skill-specific
shares of the aggregate labor force. These facts are reminiscent of the well-known
observation that volatility in labor market conditions greatly differs for workers of
different age and education levels (see Clark and Summers (1981), Gomme et al.
(2005), and Jaimovich and Siu (2009) among others). Importantly, this latter result
also suggests that modelling skill-specific differences in participation decisions is not
of first-order importance. Overall, the emprical analysis provides strong support for
the main prediction of the model: the left tail of the skill/productivity distribution
is key to understand unemployment dynamics.
1.6 Policy Analysis
In this section, I show that in addition to matching key business cycle moments, the
model also generates a wide range of implications for the design of macroeconomic
policies. For instance, a general prediction of the analysis is that the effectiveness
of macroeconomic policies varies over the business cycle. For instance, policies apt
to decrease matching frictions in the labor market are less effective during recessions
than during booms: programmes designed to give job search assistance to the unem-
ployed (e.g., think of an exogenous increase in matching efficiency) and/or policies
apt to decrease recruiting costs are far less effective in reducing unemployment dur-
ing recessions than expansions. This happens because during recessions, jobs are
rationed: matches with low-skilled workers would generate negative surpluses even
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if the cost to post a job vacancy was zero (i.e., no recruiting costs). Note that the
ineffectiveness of these type of policies in a search-and-matching framework with ra-
tioning has been first discussed by Michaillat (2012). However, in Michaillat’s model
workers are identical and rationing arises in recessions because of decreasing returns
to labor and wage stickiness. In this paper instead, rationing is a by-product of
worker permanent heterogeneity. Hence, differently from Michaillat’s work, I argue
that low-skilled workers are the ones bearing the cost of this policy failure. The main
insight of the analysis is that any policy that leaves un-changed the surplus after the
match has occurred, it is then ineffective in reducing unemployment. This line of
resoning suggests that key to tackle the unemployment problem during recessions
is to restore the profitability of low-productivity firms, or in other words, subsidize
matches with low-skilled workers. Policies restoring firms’ profitability are the most
effective in economic dowturns. Note that also the effectiveness of this latter type of
policies is time varying. Specifically, subsidies to worker-employer low-productivity
matches are much more effective during economic downturns than expansions. The
time-varying effect of labor-market policies derives from the property that the im-
pulse responses to aggregate shocks vary with the state of the economy. Since fiscal
stimulus is tipically timed during recessions, assessing the response of the labor mar-
ket and output to aggregate shocks during recessions is of particular relevance. I
show that in the model unemployment is more responsive to changes in aggregate
conditions during recessions than during normal times.
State-dependent effects of aggregate shocks. As in Section 1.4.3, I derive
the dynamic response to a positive aggregate shock by comparing the expected paths
of two simulated economies. For the IRF in “bad times,” the first simulated economy
starts with the level of the endogenous variable associated with the lowest aggregate
state but is in the median state. The second simulated economy starts with the
same level of the endogenous variable and is in the lowest aggregate state. The
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difference between the two paths is the response over time to a positive impulse
during recessions. For the IRF in “normal times” instead, the first economy starts
with the level of the endogenous variable associated with the median state but is
in the highest state. The second simulated economy starts with the same level of
the endogenous variable and is in the median state. The difference between the two
paths is the response over time to a positive impulse during normal times. In both
cases, I report the average response across 5, 000 replications. Critically, the size
of the shock is the same across scenarios. In Figure 1.14, Panel A shows that the
employment rate is much more responsive to aggregate shocks in bad than in good
times. The difference in responsiveness between bad and good times is instead far less
pronounced for output (see Figure 1.14, Panel B). This latter result is perhaps not
surprising given that the bahavior of output is far less asymmetric than that of the
employment rate (see Sections 1.4.2 and 1.4.3). Overall, the analysis suggests that the
model economy features counter-cyclical IRFs. This property comes entirely from
the asymmetric amplification and propagation of symmetric shocks. In Appendix
B.1, I document that the response of the actual U.S. unemployment rate to shocks
is systematically stronger during recessions than during expansions. To this aim,
I follow Bachmann et al. (2010) and estimate a two-stage time series model. In
the first stage, I astimate an AR(2) process for the U.S. unemployment rate. Then
in the second stage, I regress the absolute value of the first stage residuals on the
average lagged unemployment rate to assess whether residual variance differs during
recessions. The estimates show that the U.S. unemployment rate displays conditional
heteroskedasticity. Specifically, the variance of the reduced-form innovations raise
dramatically during times of high unemployment. However, this finding can be
rationalized in two different ways: (1) the shocks driving fluctuations have constant
variance but U.S. unemployment respond more to these shocks during recessions than
during booms. Note that this is exactly what happens in the model. (2) Aggregate
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shocks are conditionally heteroskedastic with recessions initiated by shocks of larger
size. However, Berger and Vavra (2012) show that there is no evidence of conditional
heteroskedasticity for shocks commonly used in the business cycle literature. These
facts seem to suggests that asymmetric responses, instead of asymmetric shocks, are
responsible for heteroskedasticity in the U.S. unemployment rate.
State-dependent effects of fiscal stimulus. To understand the exact link
between aggregate shocks and exogenous changes in policies, I introduce into the
model four tax instruments: (1) sales tax, τS; (2) labor income tax, τW ; (3) payroll
tax, τF ; and (4) recruiting costs expensing, τK . Equations (1.8) and (1.9) then
become,
Sspxq  max
 
Scspxq, 0
(
(1.27)
with
Scspxq  p1 τSq zsx

1  τF
1 τW


λ  β
¸
s1
pis,s1

1 δs1pxq  ηφspxq

Ss1pxq,
where Πs
 
zsx, λ, τS, τF , τW



p1 τSq zsx

1 τF
1τW
	
λ

denote “profits” accru-
ing to the worker-employer relationship. The free-entry condition for each submarket
is
p1 τKqkpxq  βρspxq
¸
s1
pis,s1
 
1 η

Ss1pxq. (1.28)
Note that: (i) all tax rates affect Sspxq through the profit term Πs
 


. As such cuts
in either tax rate can be seen as “subsidies” to the worker-employer match. Moreover,
since these subsidies act like changes in the aggregate shock, exogenous changes
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in tax rates can be interpreted as shocks to the aggregate state of the economy.
Hence, the dynamics in Figure 1.14 can also be interpreted as responses to exogenous
decreases in either tax rate. This observation implies that fiscal policy is more
effective during recessions than expansions. These predictions are consistent with
the empirical evidence produced by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012); (ii) the
expensing rate of vacancy posting costs only enters the free-entry condition (1.28).
As discussed in Section 1.3.4, changes in the cost to post a job vacancy are irrelevant
for rationing unemployment. As such policies working through that margin are
ineffective in reducing unemployment during recessions.
1.7 Conclusions
I develop a search-and-matching model with heterogeneous workers that accounts
for the asymmetric fluctuations of the U.S. labor market and output. The funda-
mental property of the model is that recessions are initiated by a burst of job losses
and job-finding rates display asymmetries over the cycle. The model generates re-
alistic volatility in unemployment and job vacancies preserving a downward-sloping
Beveridge curve. As a by-product, the model provides stark predictions for the time
series of skill-specific unemployment rates. These predictions hold in CPS micro data
once I sort workers by age and education. The model predicts that the effectiveness
of macroeconomic policies varies over the business cycle. For instance, the effects of
policies that restore the profitability of low-productivity matches are time varying:
these policies are much more effective during economic downturns than expansions.
That is, the economy features impulse responses that vary with the state of the
economy.
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1.8 Tables and Figures
This section contains the main tables and figures of the essay.
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Figure 1.1: Asymmetry in Quarterly U.S. Data, 1948:Q1-2012:Q2
Notes: Panel A and B show the empirical distribution for respectively employment rate
as deviations from the HP trend with smoothing parameter 105 and log-first-differences.
Employment rate is the fraction of the labor force working in a given month, one minus the
unemployment rate. The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate is from the CPS survey of
the BLS. Survey home page http://www.bls.gov/cps/. Panel C and D show the empirical
distribution for respectively industrial production (IP) as deviations from the HP trend with
smoothing parameter 1600 and log-first-differences. All data are logged quarterly averages
of monthly series for the period 1948:Q1-2012:Q2. Data are downloaded from the FRED
website at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
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Table 1.1: Asymmetry in Quarterly U.S. Hours, 1948:Q1-2012:Q2
x Hours Hours per worker
Skewpx˜q 0.329 0.303
(0.028) (0.165)
Skewp∆xq 0.513 0.120
(0.036) (0.225)
Notes: Hours and hours per worker are respectively seasonally-adjusted quarterly hours
worked and hours to employment ratio in the nonfarm business sector. Data are from the
LPC release of the BLS for the period 1948:Q1-2012:Q2. Release home page http://www.
bls.gov/lpc. Nonfarm business sector output (NBSO) excludes from the business sector
the farm sector. Business sector output (BSO) is the annual-weighted index constructed
by the BLS after excluding from gross domestic product (GDP) the following outputs:
general government, nonprofit institutions, paid employees of private households, and the
rental value of owner-occupied dwellings. Data are downloaded from the FRED website
at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. Variables x˜ are in logs as deviations from
the HP trend with smoothing parameter 105. P-values (one-sided test) in parenthesis. **
denote statistical significance at 5% level.
Table 1.2: Asymmetry in Employment Rate Counterfactuals
x eus ese ejfr ejsr
Skewpx˜q 0.581 0.682 0.792 0.330
(0.005) (0.001) (0.061) (0.009)
Skewp∆xq 1.115 0.999 0.328 0.409
(0.001) (0.010) (0.078) (0.000)
Notes: eus is a logged quarterly average of the U.S. employment rate
(fraction of the labor force working in a given month, one minus the
unemployment rate). The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate is
from the CPS survey of the BLS for the period 1948:Q1-2012:Q2.
Survey home page http://www.bls.gov/cps/. Data are down-
loaded from the FRED website at http://research.stlouisfed.
org/fred2/. ese  f{ps  fq is the counterfactual employment series
under stochastic equilibrium. ejfr  f{ps¯   fq is the counterfactual
employment series with job-separation rate fixed at the sample av-
erage. ejsr  f¯{ps  f¯q is the counterfactual employment series with
the job-finding rate fixed at the sample average. x˜’s are in logs as
deviations from the HP trend with smoothing parameter 105. P-
values (one-sided test) in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical
significance respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Figure 1.2: Detrended Quarterly U.S. Employment Rate, 1948:Q1-2012:Q2
Notes: Solid line shows a logged quarterly average of the U.S. employment rate (fraction
of the labor force working in a given month, one minus the unemployment rate) as devia-
tions from the HP trend with smoothing parameter 105. Gray bands indicate NBER-dated
recessions. The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate is from the CPS survey of the BLS
for the period 1948:Q1-2012:Q2. Survey home page http://www.bls.gov/cps/. Data are
downloaded from the FRED website at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
Table 1.3: Calibration
Interpretation Value Source/Target
β Discount factor 0.9959 5% annual interest rate
δ Separation rate 0.0189 JOLTS, 2001:M1-2011:M9
kpxq Vacancy cost [0.0005, . . . , 0.3359] θpxq  1 when z  1
α Matching function: mpv, uq  µvαu1α 0.4 Bru¨gemann (2008)
µ Matching function scale 0.33 Median unemployment rate of 5.6%
η Worker Nash-bargaining weight 0.6 Hosios (1990)’s condition
λ Flow value of unemployment 0.44 62% of mean wage rate
lnpx180{x20q Productivity dispersion, 90-10 pctl range 0.651 Syverson (2011)
ρz Autocorrelation of exogenous state 0.9642 LPC, 1948:Q1-2011:Q3
σ Standard deviation of shocks 0.0055 LPC, 1948:Q1-2011:Q3
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Skewness = 0.108
P−value = 0.297
A. HP−Filtered Participation Rate
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Figure 1.3: Asymmetry in Quarterly U.S. Participation Rate, 1948:Q1-2012:Q2
Notes: Panel A and B show the empirical distribution for respectively participation rate as devi-
ations from the HP trend with smoothing parameter 105 and log-first-differences. Participation
rate is the fraction of the population in the labor force (employed plus unemployed to population
ratio). Data are from the CPS survey of the BLS. Survey home page http://www.bls.gov/cps/.
Data are logged quarterly averages of monthly series for the period 1948:Q1-2012:Q2. Data are
downloaded from the FRED website at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
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Figure 1.4: Frictional and Rationing Unemployment
Notes: On the x-axis, employment is steady-state employment as in equation (1.12). On the
y-axis, net marginal profits and marginal recruiting expenses are respectively the left-hand and
right-hand side of equation (1.13). High-skilled workers have productivity ppxhighq ¡ pˆpxq and low-
skilled workers have productivity ppxlowq ¤ pˆpxq. The threshold pˆpxq is determined by equation
(1.11).
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Figure 1.5: Aggregate Job-Finding Rate in the Segmented Labor Market
Notes: Panels A-D refer to the (segmented) labor market in steady state, i.e., zt  zs for s P
t1, . . . ,Su and all t. The x-axis is the support of the aggregate shock, zs with s P t1, 2, . . . , 9u. I
compute the steady-state values of the endogenous variables numerically with the same parameter
values used for the quantitative analysis of Section 1.4. Details of the calibration are in Section
3.6.1, Table 1.3.
61
0.95 1 1.05
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
A. Job−Contact and Job−Finding Rate
Aggregate Shock
 
 
Job−contact rate
Job−finding rate
0.95 1 1.05
3.4
3.45
3.5
3.55
3.6
B. UE Worker Flows
Aggregate Shock
0.95 1 1.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
C. Share of Rationing Unemployment
Aggregate Shock
0.95 1 1.05
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
D. Share of Frictional Unemployment
Aggregate Shock
Figure 1.6: Aggregate Job-Finding Rate in the Integrated Labor Market
Notes: Panels A-D refer to the (integrated) labor market in steady state, i.e., zt  zs for s P
t1, . . . ,Su and all t. The x-axis is the support of the aggregate shock, zs with s P t1, 2, . . . , 9u. I
compute the steady-state values of the endogenous variables numerically with calibrated parameter
values. I set the vacancy cost to k  0.168 such that θsmppismq  1 (zsm  1 in my normalization).
The rest of the parameters are set as in Section 3.6.1, Table 1.3.
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Figure 1.7: Time-Varying Matching Efficiency
Notes: Panel A refers to the labor market in steady state. The x-axis is the support of the aggregate
shock, zs with s  t1, 2, . . . , 9u. The y-axis is measured matching efficiency relative to the median
state (zsm  1 in my normalization), i.e., ln A˜s{| ln A˜sm |. I compute the steady-state values of
the endogenous variables numerically with the same parameter values used for the quantitative
analysis of Section 1.4. Details of the calibration are in Section 3.6.1, Table 1.3.
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Figure 1.8: Probability Distributions under Stochastic Equilibrium
Notes: The unconditional probability distributions are computed numerically. Details of the
calibration are in Table A.5 in Appendix B.1. Given the calibrated volatility of aggregate
shocks, to induce greater dispersion in the distribution of the tightness ratio, I progressively
increase the value of the worker’s outside option, λ. Specifically, I use λ  73% of mean wage
(red line), λ  80% of mean wage (blu line), λ  90% of mean wage (green line), and λ  95%
of mean wage (purple line). In each case, I calibrate the cost of posting a vacancy to match the
same median value of the variable over all λ’s calibration. The vertical dashed line denotes the
median value of the variable.
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Figure 1.9: Policy Rules under Stochastic Equilibrium
Notes: Policy rules are computed numerically. Details of the calibration are in Table A.5 in
Appendix B.1. Given the calibrated volatility of aggregate shocks, to induce greater dispersion
in the distribution of the tightness ratio, I progressively increase the value of the worker’s
outside option, λ. Specifically, I use λ  73% of mean wage (red line), λ  80% of mean wage
(blu line), λ  90% of mean wage (green line), and λ  95% of mean wage (purple line). In each
case, I calibrate the cost of posting a vacancy to match the same median value of the variable
over all λ’s calibration. The vertical dashed line denotes the median value of the aggregate
shock.
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Figure 1.10: Replacement Ratios
Notes: In Hall-Milgrom-type calibration, the worker’s outside option is set to 73% of steady-
state wage. In Hagedorn-Manovskii-type calibration, the worker’s outside option is set to 95%
of steady-state wage. In this paper calibration, the worker’s outside option is set to 62% of
steady-state wage. See Table 1.3 for further details on calibration.
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Table 1.4: Volatility and Comovement in U.S. Data and Model
Data EJD Model CJD Model
A. Volatility
sdpuq{sdppq 9.851 9.051 1.327
sdpφq{sdppq 7.213 9.232 1.491
sdpvq{sdppq 8.131 5.464 2.484
B. Comovement
corrpu, vq 0.858 0.561 0.812
corrpu, pq 0.412 0.773 0.912
corrpφ, pq 0.383 0.824 0.996
corrpv, pq 0.433 0.830 0.978
Notes: The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate, u, is from the CPS survey
of the BLS. Survey home page http://www.bls.gov/cps/. Labor productiv-
ity, p, is seasonally-adjusted quarterly real output per worker in the nonfarm
business sector constructed by the BLS from the LPC release. Release home
page http://www.bls.gov/lpc. The series are downloaded from the FRED
website at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. Job-finding rates, φ,
are calculated based on Shimer (2012). Vacancies, v, are the composite Help-
Wanted Index constructed by Barnichon (2010). The variables u, φ, and v
are quarterly averages of monthly series. All series cover the period 1948:Q1-
2011:Q3. EJD model refers to the version of the model with endogenous job
destruction. CJD model refer to the version of the model with constant and
exogenous job destruction. Model simulated data are quarterly averages of 765
observations at the monthly frequency. The statistics reported are averages
across 500 replications. All variables are reported in logs as deviations from
the HP trend with smoothing parameter 105.
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Figure 1.11: Dynamic Beveridge Curve
Notes: The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate, u, is from the CPS survey of the BLS. Sur-
vey home page http://www.bls.gov/cps/. The series is downloaded from the FRED website
at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. Vacancies, v, are the composite Help-Wanted
Index constructed by Barnichon (2010). Model refers to the EJD model. Fujita-Ramey model
refers to a stochastic discrete-time version of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)’s model as pre-
sented in Fujita and Ramey (2012).
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Table 1.5: Asymmetry in U.S. Data and Model
Data EJD Model CJD Model
A. Skewness in levels
Skewpeq 0.591 0.877 0.254
Skewpyq 0.345 0.246 0.013
Skewpφq 0.249 0.922 0.230
Skewpvq 0.469 0.542 0.130
B. Skewness in growth rates
Skewp∆eq 0.958 0.794 0.044
Skewp∆yq 0.170 0.055 0.005
Skewp∆φq 0.235 0.319 0.042
Skewp∆vq 0.613 0.670 0.044
Notes: The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate, u, is from the CPS survey of the
BLS. Survey home page http://www.bls.gov/cps/. Labor productivity, p, is seasonally-
adjusted quarterly real output per worker in the nonfarm business sector constructed by
the BLS from the LPC release. Release home page http://www.bls.gov/lpc. Output,
y, is industrial production (IP). The series are downloaded from the FRED website at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. Job-finding rates, φ, are calculated based on
Shimer (2012). Vacancies, v, are the composite Help-Wanted Index constructed by Barni-
chon (2010). The variables u, φ, and v are quarterly averages of monthly series. All series
cover the period 1948:Q1-2011:Q3. EJD model refers to the version of the model with en-
dogenous job destruction. CJD model refers to the version of the model with constant and
exogenous job destruction. Model simulated data are quarterly averages of 765 observations
at the monthly frequency. The statistics reported are averages across 500 replications. In
Panel A, all variables are reported in logs as deviations from the HP trend with smoothing
parameter 105. In Panel B, all variables are reported as 3-months log-differences. ***, **
denote statistical significance at respectively 1% and 5% level.
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Table 1.6: Asymmetry in Employment Rate Counterfactuals
x e ejfr ejsr
A. Skewness in levels
Skewpxq 0.877 0.937 1.068
B. Skewness in growth rates
Skewp∆xq 0.794 1.691 1.075
Notes: EJD model simulations are 765 observations at the
monthly frequency. The statistics reported are averages across
500 replications. e is the employment rate (fraction of the la-
bor force working in a given month, one minus the unemploy-
ment rate), ejfr is the counterfactual employment rate series with
job-separation rates fixed at steady-state values, and ejsr is the
counterfactual employment rate series with job-finding rates fixed
at steady-state values. In Panel A, all variables are quarterly
averages reported in logs as deviations from the HP trend with
smoothing parameter 105. In Panel B, all variables are reported
as 3-months log-differences.
Table 1.7: Asymmetry in Output and its Components
Y z
°
x xepxq
A. Skewness in levels 0.246 0.000 0.858
B. Skewness in growth rates 0.055 0.000 0.761
Notes: EJD model simulated data are quarterly averages of 765 observations
at the monthly frequency. The statistics reported are averages across 500 repli-
cations. In Panel A, all variables are reported in logs as deviations from the
HP trend with smoothing parameter 105. In Panel B, all variables are reported
as 3-months log-differences.
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Figure 1.12: Impulse Responses for the Employment Rate
0 20 40 60
−0.06
−0.05
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
A. Output
Months
R
es
po
ns
e
 
 
Negative shock
Positive shock
0 20 40 60
−0.06
−0.05
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
B. Labor Productivity
Months
R
es
po
ns
e
 
 
Negative shock
Positive shock
0 20 40 60
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
C. "Composition Effect"
Months
R
es
po
ns
e
 
 
Negative shock
Positive shock
0 20 40 60
−0.06
−0.05
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
D. Aggregate Shock
Months
R
es
po
ns
e
 
 
Negative shock
Positive shock
Figure 1.13: Impulse Responses for Output
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Table 1.8: Average Unemployment Rates by Age Group
16-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Percent (%) 12.90 6.16 4.64 4.09 3.92 3.83
Normalized 3.16 1.51 1.14 1 0.96 0.94
Notes: Data are from the CPS micro files for 1976:M1-2013:M2 and downloaded from
the NBER website at http://www.nber.org/data/cps_basic.html. Seasonal adjust-
ment is implemented with a 13-term symmetric moving average. The first row shows
sample averages of unemployment rates by age in percent. The second row reports
average unemployment rates by age relative to that of 45-54 years old.
Table 1.9: Average Unemployment Rates by Education Group
HSD HSG/SC CGPC
Percent (%) 12.72 6.10 2.79
Normalized 4.56 2.19 1
Notes: Data are from the CPS micro files for 1976:M1-
2013:M2 and downloaded from the NBER website at http:
//www.nber.org/data/cps_basic.html. HSD, HSG, SC
and CGPC denote respectively High School Dropouts, High
School Graduates, Some College and College Graduates and
Post-College Degree Holders. Seasonal adjustment is imple-
mented with a 13-term symmetric moving average. The first
row shows sample averages of unemployment rates by educa-
tion in percent. The second row reports average unemploy-
ment rates by education relative to that of CGPC.
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Table 1.10: Average Unemployment Rates by Age/Education Group
16-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
A. Average, percent (%)
HSD 21.01 13.02 9.46 7.57 6.08 5.08
HSG/SC 10.45 6.60 4.87 4.09 3.82 3.77
CGPC 6.05 2.86 2.35 2.31 2.50 2.71
B. Average, normalized
HSD 9.10 5.64 4.10 3.28 2.63 2.20
HSG/SC 4.52 2.86 2.11 1.77 1.65 1.63
CGPC 2.62 1.24 1.02 1 1.08 1.17
Notes: Data are from the CPS micro files for 1976:M1-2013:M2 and downloaded from
the NBER website at http://www.nber.org/data/cps_basic.html. HSD, HSG, SC
and CGPC denote respectively High School Dropouts, High School Graduates, Some
College and College Graduates and Post-College Degree Holders. Seasonal adjustment
is implemented with a 13-term symmetric moving average. Panel A shows sample
averages of unemployment rates by age/education group. Panel B shows average
unemployment rates by age/education relative to that of 45-54 years old with CGPC
education level.
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Table 1.11: Average Unemployment Rates by Skill/Productivity Group
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 px7  x200q
Percent (%) 46.35 34.15 32.94 21.17 12.92 12.13 5.43
Normalized 8.54 6.29 6.07 3.90 2.38 2.23 1
Notes: The statistics reported are average unemployment rates in the EJD model by
skill/productivity group averaged across 500 replications. The second row reports average
unemployment rates by skill/productivity relative to that of px7  x200q group.
Table 1.12: Volatility Shares by Age Group
16-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Cov. not incl. 47.28 25.93 8.87 12.32 5.28 0.33
Cov. incl. 30.84 28.12 13.53 14.69 10.86 1.96
Notes: Data are from the CPS micro files for 1976:M1-2013:M2 and downloaded from the
NBER website at http://www.nber.org/data/cps_basic.html. Seasonal adjustment
is implemented with a 13-term symmetric moving average. The statistics reported are
percentage shares of total U.S. unemployment rate variance attributed to each age group.
“Cov. not incl.” means covariance terms are ignored such that total variation is the sum
of the variables’ variances. “Cov. incl.” means total variation includes covariance terms
such that total variation is the sum of the variables’ variances plus two times their
covariance.
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Table 1.13: Volatility Shares by Education Group
HSD HSG/SC CGPC
Cov. not incl. 24.51 69.39 6.10
Cov. incl. 26.16 62.38 11.46
Notes: Data are from the CPS micro files for 1976:M1-
2013:M2 and downloaded from the NBER website at http:
//www.nber.org/data/cps_basic.html. HSD, HSG, SC and
CGPC denote respectively High School Dropouts, High School
Graduates, Some College and College Graduates and Post-
College Degree Holders. Seasonal adjustment is implemented
with a 13-term symmetric moving average. The statistics re-
ported are percentage shares of total U.S. unemployment rate
variance attributed to each education group. “Cov. not incl.”
means covariance terms are ignored such that total variation
is the sum of the variables’ variances. “Cov. incl.” means
total variation includes covariance terms such that total varia-
tion is the sum of the variables’ variances plus two times their
covariance.
Table 1.14: Volatility Shares by Skill/Productivity Group
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7  x200
Cov. not incl. 29.19 22.81 22.03 13.67 6.34 5.83 0.13
Cov. incl. 19.72 19.37 18.96 13.56 7.79 7.16 13.44
Notes: The statistics reported are percentage shares of total unemployment rate vari-
ance in the EJD model attributed to each skill/productivity group averaged across
500 replications. “Cov. not incl.” means covariance terms are ignored such that total
variation is the sum of the variables’ variances. “Cov. incl.” means total variation in-
cludes covariance terms such that total variation is the sum of the variables’ variances
plus two times their covariance.
75
Table 1.15: Unemployment versus Participation Margin by Age Group
16-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Unemployment margin 98.95 99.81 99.81 99.82 99.67 97.12
Participation margin 1.05 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.33 2.88
Notes: Data are from the CPS micro files for 1976:M1-2013:M2 and downloaded from
the NBER website at http://www.nber.org/data/cps_basic.html. Seasonal ad-
justment is implemented with a 13-term symmetric moving average. Data are logged
and HP-filtered with smoothing parameter 129,000 at the monthly frequency. See
Ravn and Uhlig (2002) for a thorough discussion on the choice of the HP smoothing
parameter and the frequency of observations. The statistics reported are percentage
shares of total unemployment shares variance attributed to the unemployment and
participation margin by each age group. Covariance terms are not included such that
total variation is the sum of the variables’ variances.
Table 1.16: Unemployment versus Participation Margin by Education Group
HSD HSG/SC CGPC
Unemployment margin 98.78 99.94 99.80
Participation margin 1.22 0.06 0.20
Notes: Data are from the CPS micro files for 1976:M1-2013:M2 and
downloaded from the NBER website at http://www.nber.org/data/cps_
basic.html. HSD, HSG, SC and CGPC denote respectively High School
Dropouts, High School Graduates, Some College and College Graduates and
Post-College Degree Holders. Seasonal adjustment is implemented with a
13-term symmetric moving average. Data are logged and HP-filtered with
smoothing parameter 129,000 at the monthly frequency. See Ravn and Uh-
lig (2002) for a thorough discussion on the choice of the HP smoothing
parameter and the frequency of observations. The statistics reported are
percentage shares of total unemployment shares variance attributed to the
unemployment and participation margin by each education group. Covari-
ance terms are not included such that total variation is the sum of the
variables’ variances.
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2Volatility and Slow Technology Diffusion:
The Case of Information Technologies
2.1 Introduction
Does business cycle volatility affect long-run economic growth?1 Despite the num-
ber of empirical and theoretical studies, a definitive answer to this question is still
missing. In a seminal paper, Ramey and Ramey (1995) document a strong empirical
negative relationship between volatility and economic growth. Subsequently, Mar-
tin and Rogers (1997), Acemoglu et al. (2003), Aghion et al. (2009), Aghion et al.
(2010) and Posch (2011) confirm this negative link for other data sources, samples
and estimation strategies. Compared to Ramey and Ramey, these papers add al-
ternative controls such as exchange rate variability, financial development, measures
of openness, institutions, monetary and fiscal policy variability. However, there are
1 This simple question is undoubtedly one of the most relevant in modern macroeconomics. Using
the forceful words of Lucas (1987), “the welfare consequences of ‘small’ changes [in growth rates] are
enormous,” and even more strikingly, Lucas’s calculations imply that “consumers would require a 20
per cent across-the-board consumption increase to accept voluntarily a reduction in the consumption
growth rate from 0.03 to 0.02, and would surrender 42 per cent across the board to obtain an
increase in the growth rate from 0.03 to 0.06.” These provocative results make clear that business
fluctuations can potentially entail large welfare losses if they adversely affect long-run economic
growth.
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several studies suggesting that the volatility-growth link is not as strong when using
the time series dimension of the data.2
The aforementioned literature has invariably focused on average growth rates of
real output and/or labor productivity as a measure of long-run economic perfor-
mance. This paper tackles the same research question from a different angle. We
consider direct measures of technology diffusion and ask a new question: does busi-
ness cycle volatility affect the rate at which new technologies are adopted? We believe
the answer to this question provides new insights on the link between volatility, total
factor productivity (TFP), long-run economic growth and cross-country differences
in incomes per capita. Our specific focus on technology diffusion as opposed to
output-related growth measures is also motivated by the striking fact presented by
Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997) that most of the world income inequality is due
to cross-country differences in TFP. Therefore, in order to understand why some
countries are richer than others we need to understand why they are more produc-
tive. Arguably, an important determinant of these cross-country differences in TFP
is technology.
We demonstrate the existence of a strong negative relationship between volatility
and technology diffusion. We consider three major information and communication
technologies (ICT’s)—personal computers, internet and cell phones per capita—and
show that more volatile countries take more time to adopt newly available technolo-
gies.
The positive relationship between volatility and time diffusion lags is rather ro-
bust and holds after controlling for cross-country differences in growth rates of real
2 For pooled OLS regressions, Grier and Tullock (1989) find a positive relationship between volatil-
ity and growth after controlling for inflation variability and other standard control variables (human
capital, initial capital, etc.). The standard deviation of inflation enters the growth equation with
a negative sign. For fixed-effects regressions, Imbs (2007) and Chong and Gradstein (2009) find
an ambiguous effect—either a positive or negative link—at the industry/sectoral level. Ramey and
Ramey (1995) also run fixed-effects panel data regressions and confirm their cross-country finding
of a negative relationship between volatility and growth.
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GDP per capita. Controlling for output growth is important for two reasons. First,
it allows us to interpret the results in the spirit of a mean-preserving spread across
countries. Countries whose growth rates are relatively riskier are also farther behind
the technological frontier. Second, by having average growth rates as a covariate
in the regression analysis, we indirectly control for all the variables that the vast
literature on cross-country growth regressions has shown to be relevant for growth.
This latter feature is particularly appealing given the large set of variables that the
growth literature has found to be important for economic growth.
To interpret the empirical findings, we offer a simple stochastic model of technol-
ogy adoption in which we derive in closed form the theoretical mapping between time
diffusion lags, growth and volatility. In the model, adoption of a new technology is
irreversible. The problem faced by a firm is equivalent to exercising a call option.
Uncertainty about the future generates a real value of inaction which delays the
adoption of the new frontier technology. In this respect, the model is a real options
theory of technology adoption.
The model provides the stark prediction that uncertainty acts as a barrier to
technology adoption. Hence, it renders a new interpretation to the long-run effects of
volatility. Specifically, relatively small differences in uncertainty are consistent with
large variation in time diffusion lags. In this latter regard, our results are reminiscent
of the findings in Parente and Prescott (1994). In a deterministic environment whose
theoretical structure is completely different than ours, they argue that relatively
small differences in barriers to technology adoption are needed to account for the
large cross-country differences in incomes per capita.
The model also accounts for the negative relationship beetween average growth
rates and diffusion lags which we observe in the data for a large cross-section of devel-
oping and developed countries. Furthermore, it predicts the cross-country dispersion
in incomes per capita to increase at the onset of a technological revolution. This
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is indeed what we document has happened over the so-called IT revolution: major
technological innovations act like shocks to the cross-country distribution of incomes
per capita.
Our empirical findings strengthen the empirical evidence on the negative link
between volatility and economic growth presented by Ramey and Ramey (1995).
Ramey and Ramey show that volatility and growth are negatively correlated after
controlling for a set of variables identified by Levine and Renelt (1992) as important
control variables for cross-country growth regressions (e.g., human capital, initial
physical capital, etc.). The negative relationship is statistically significant at the 5
percent level in a sample of 92 developing and developed countries for 1962-1985.
In the OECD sample for 1952-1988, the negative sign is significantly different than
zero at the 10 percent level. The negative relationship persists and remains al-
most unchanged after controlling for the investment/GDP ratio. This latter result
is important for our purpose because it rules out investment in physical capital and
propensity to save as the main channel through which uncertainty affects growth and
potentially opens the avenue to what Parente and Prescott (1994) name “technology
adoption investment.”3
Following Ramey and Ramey (1995), we measure country-specific growth and
volatility as respectively mean and standard deviation of per-capita real GDP annual
growth rates. We then construct time adoption lags for the three ICT’s following
the approach developed by Comin et al. (2008). Specifically, for each technology
the time adoption lag measures how many years ago the U.S. last had the usage
level that any other country had in a benchmark year, the 2002 in the base case.
These time lags give us a measure of the distance from the technological frontier,
3 A negative relationship between volatility and growth emerges in models with investment irre-
versibilities and fixed costs of adjustment (e.g., Bernanke (1983), Pindyck (1991), Dixit and Pindyck
(2008)). Aizenman (1993) develop a model with investment irreversibilities in which a rise in policy
uncertainty leads to reduced growth.
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the U.S. in our case. We find that more volatile countries are farther behind the
U.S., that is, they have higher time adoption lags. This finding holds even after
controlling for cross-country differences in average growth rates, suggesting that be-
sides the volatility-growth relationship previously documented by Ramey and Ramey
(1995), there is also an independent link between volatility and technology adoption.
Switching the focus from output growth to technology adoption helps to highlight
a specific mechanism, namely technology adoption, through which fluctuations in
economic activity might affect the medium and long-run performance of a country.
Output growth is affected by several factors such as growth in factors of production,
efficiency gains due to reallocation of resources and by technological improvements.
However, each of these determinants would arguably call for a different transmission
mechanism, and certainly have different implications for the medium and long-run.
By focusing on the process of technology diffusion, we do not intend to deny the
importance of either factor accumulation or efficient reallocation of resources, but
we try to explore one potential mechanism we think it is particularly relevant for the
long-run performance of a country.
A potential criticism to the time adoption lags a la’ Comin et al. (2008), particu-
larly relevant for the focus of our paper, is that their computation relies exclusively
on the usage level of a specific technology without adjusting for the quality improve-
ments that technologies experience over time. If a poor country is catching up with
the technological leader, it could be installing better quality machines such that the
time adoption lags would over-estimate the actual distance from the frontier.
To address this issue, we propose a new measure of quality-adjusted time adoption
lags, and show that the negative link between volatility and technology diffusion still
holds. The new measure of time adoption lags is based on the observation that
personal computers are technology-embodying capital goods, and on the assumption
that the frontier technology grows at a constant rate. We take the growth rate of the
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frontier technology as the mean growth rate of the U.S. investment-specific technical
change for 1973-2002. Following Greenwood et al. (1997), we calculate investment-
specific technical change as the ratio of the implicit price deflator for nondurable
consumption goods to the price index for computers and peripheral equipment.
As in the previous empirical studies on volatility and growth, we also find that
the evidence is not as strong when we look at the time-series dimension of the data.
After controlling for country-fixed effects, we find that periods of high volatility are
associated with periods of relatively low investment in personal computers. The same
negative relationship, even though not statistically significant, holds for the number
of internet users per capita in a subsample of OECD countries. However, the sign of
the relationship is reversed when we consider cell phones per capita. We conjecture
that the lack of clear-cut evidence in the time-series is due to: 1) the time-series
dimension of the data it far too short to provide reliable parameter estimates; and
2) the country dummies in the Fixed-Effects model absorb most of the variation of
the data, making relatively hard the identification of the parameters of interest. In
other words, being a “volatile country” is a very persistent characteristic such that
the cross-country variation in the data overwhelms the time-series dimension.
Besides the link between volatility and technology diffusion, we also present new
facts on the joint behavior of technology diffusion and incomes per capita. We doc-
ument that the joint distribution of time adoption lags and per capita incomes is
twin-peaked. While the “twin-peakedness” of the distribution of international in-
comes per capita is now well-known, to our knowledge, the twin-peakedness of the
joint distribution of per capita incomes and time adoption lags is a new fact.4 Coun-
tries are polarized in two clubs: rich countries close to the technological frontier—
low time adoption lags—versus poor countries lagging farther behind—high time
4 In a series of papers, Quah (1993, 1996a,b,c, 1997) show for the first time that international
incomes per capita have a bimodal distribution, introducing in the literature the notions of clubs
convergence, polarization and stratification of the world income distribution.
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adoption lags. Importantly, these empirical observations reassure us that the time
diffusion lags we consider are a sensible measure of long-run economic performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a stochastic
model of technology adoption, in which we derive in closed form the theoretical
mapping between time adoption lags, growth and volatility. Section 2.3 contains
a detailed description of the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 2.4
provides evidence on the link between technology adoption and the cross-country
distribution of incomes per capita. Section 2.5 presents the empirical evidence on
volatility and technology adoption. Section 3.7 concludes.
2.2 A Real Options Model of Technology Adoption
In this section, we propose a simple stochastic model of technology adoption. To
make the analysis as transparent as possible, we model a once-and-for-all adoption of
a new technology, which unexpectedly becomes available to the world and dominates
the current technology in use. We think of this scenario as the arrival of a General
Purpose Technology (GPT), and the transition from the old to the new technology
as a “technological revolution.”5
Specifically, we consider an economy in which a representative agent is initially
endowed with a technology which produces a constant flow of output, i.e., there is
no long-run growth. Unexpectedly, a new technology which ensures positive trend
growth becomes available for adoption. The agent has then the option to adopt
the new technology by paying a cost. Adoption is irreversible. After adoption, the
frontier technology in use and so the income of the representative agent follows an
exogenous stochastic process, which we model as a geometric Brownian motion with a
5 The literature refers to the transition period from the arrival of a GPT to the adoption as a
“technological revolution.” Greenwood and Jovanovic (1999), Jovanovic and Rousseau (2003) and
Pastor and Veronesi (2009) focus on the asset pricing implications of technological revolutions.
Helpman (1998) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005) contain an extensive treatment of GPT’s.
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certain drift and volatility. In the real world, drift and volatility of the income process
after adoption depend not only upon the fundamental properties of the technology
in use but also on all the other features of the economic environment. While of great
relevance, in this paper we do not model explicitly the mechanisms through which
the economic environment affects the drift and volatility of the income process. Real
world countries largely differ by geography, instituions and governments’ policies.
We think of these differences as determinants of both the mean and volatility of
the income process after adoption, and so affecting the profitability of adopting the
frontier technology.
In our model economy, the representative agent trades off the benefits of adopting
a better technology with the cost of adopting it, internalizing that adoption is an
irreversible decision. Not surprisingly, higher adoption costs curtail the incentives to
adopt, and an increase in the drift of the income process after adoption instead leans
towards early adoption. Furthermore, the interaction of uncertainty with sunk costs
of adoption creates a real value of inaction which delays the adoption of the frontier
technology. To this latter respect, the model is a real options theory of technology
adoption.
The ultimate goal of this section is twofold: first, to show that the notion of
time adoption lag, which we use below in the empirical part of the paper, naturally
raises from a model of technology adoption; second, to derive the theoretical mapping
between time adoption lags, growth and volatility. The model provides a closed-form
solution for the time adoption lag as a function of the adoption cost, interest rate,
drift and volatility of the income process after adoption. The theoretical results of
this section inform the empirical analysis of Section 2.4 and 2.5.
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2.2.1 Economic Environment
Time is continuous, and runs forever as indexed by t ¥ 0. A representative agent
has linear preferences over consumption, UpCq  C, and discount future payoffs by
a factor δ P p0, 1q. Each period, the representative agent consumes all her income,
and solves the following maximization problem:6
max
tCptqu8t0
E0
» 8
0
eδtU rCptqs dt

subject to Cptq  ACpT q  Y ptq, (2.1)
where E0 is the expectation conditional on information available at time t  0.
Output Y ptq is produced according to the linear production function Y ptq  A˜ptq,
where A˜ptq denotes technology in use at time t. The representative agent receives
A˜ptq as an endowement. The installed technology is constant over time A˜ptq  A˜0,
such that it produces a constant flow of output. Unexpectedly at time t  0, a
new technology is invented. Let Aptq denote this new frontier technology, which
is available for adoption for all t ¥ 0. After adoption, the dynamics of the frontier
technology Aptq and so the income process Y ptq follows a geometric Brownian motion
with drift µA and volatility σA:
dA  µAAdt  σAAdWA,
where dWA
iid
 N p0, dtq is a Wiener process, and the initial condition is normalized
without loss of generality to A0  1. To make the notation more transparent,
6 An interpretation of linear preferences in consumption is that the representative agent is risk
neutral, such that she does not smooth consumption and each period consumes all her income. An
alternative way to justify the linearity assumption without invoking risk-neutrality, is to consider
a model economy with complete markets in which the agent perfectly insure her consumption risk
against any idiosyncratic income risk through a set of state-contingent Arrow-Debreu securities. In
this model economy, the agent maximizes expected utility by first maximizing income, and then
choosing any consumption stream that costs less than income. Therefore, it is legitimate to study
expected income maximizing behavior abstracting from consumption decisions.
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we suppress time indices, for example, dA  dAptq, etc., unless needed for clarity.
We model the process of technology adoption in an extremely simple fashion: the
representative agent has to choose when to upgrade its technology, that is, the time
at which she switches from the technology currently in use A˜ptq to the new available
frontier technology Aptq. Given the resource constraint Cptq   ACpT q  Y ptq for
all t ¥ 0, the value for the representative agent is the expected discounted value
of output net of the adoption costs ACptq incurred when the representative agent
upgrades its technology:
V pA˜0, A0q  max
γPΓ
E0
» T
0
eδtY ptqdt 
» 8
T
eδtY ptqdt eδTACpT q

, (2.2)
where A˜0 and A0 are respectively the initial conditions for the installed and frontier
technology. The maximization problem (2.2) is an optimal stopping problem, in which
γ  tT,ApT qu is the associated impulse control policy. The agent chooses a stopping
time T , that is, the date at which she upgrades its technology switching from A˜0 to
ApT q. Hence, output is Y ptq  A˜ptq  A˜0 for 0 ¤ t   T , and Y ptq  Aptq for all
t ¥ T . The adoption cost as fraction of output ACpT q  cApT q with c P p0, 1q is
incurred at time T . Modeling the adoption costs as a fraction of output ensures that
the costs do not become negligible relative to the level at which the new technology
is adopted.
2.2.2 Time Adoption Lag
To solve problem (2.2), let Zptq denote the difference between the technology in use
and the frontier technology—latent technology—for t   T ,
Z  lnpA˜q  lnpAq  Z0   µZt  σZWZ (2.3)
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where Z0  lnpA˜0q  lnpA0q is the initial condition, µZ 
1
2
σ2A  µA is the drift, and
σZ  σA is the volatility of the latent technology Z, with WZ  WA. For t ¥ T ,
Z  lnpAq  lnpAq  0.
The latent technology Z is the relevant state variable of the optimal stopping
problem (2.2). As we see below in more detail, the optimal adoption rule is a threshold
policy : adopt the frontier technology as soon as the latent technology Z hits a
threshold and operate it forever for all t ¥ T .
We rewrite problem (2.2) in terms of the variable Z, such that:
V pZ0, A0q  max
b¤Z
E0
#» T pbq
0
eδtY ptqdt 
» 8
T pbq
eδtY ptqdt eδTAC rT pbqs
+
, (2.4)
where Z0 and A0 are respectively the initial conditions for the latent and frontier
technology. Output is now Y ptq  eZptqAptq  A˜ptq for t   T , and Y ptq  eZptqAptq 
Aptq for t ¥ T . We require that: (i) µZ   0, as a necessary and sufficient condition
for adoption, i.e., T   8; and (ii) δ  µA ¡ 0, to have a well defined maximization
problem, i.e., expected present value of output is bounded from above after the switch
to the new technology has occurred. Notice also that in (2.4), value maximization is
over the threshold b ¤ Z, which also pins down the stopping time T pbq. As we will
see next, the state variable relevant for the adoption decision is the latent technology
Z, and the optimal threshold has the form p8, bs. We calculate the optimal
adoption rule by finding the optimal threshold b. To solve (2.4), we first calculate
the value before adoption—inaction value—and then use two bounday conditions,
value matching and smooth pasting, which hold at the time of adoption and pin down
the optimal threshold.
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After some manipulations and applying Itoˆ’s Lemma, the value for the agent in
the inaction region is the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation (omit-
ting time subscripts):
ρV pZ,Aq  eZA  µZVZpZ,Aq  
1
2
σ2ZVZZpZ,Aq   µAAVApZ,Aq  
1
2
σ2AA
2VAApZ,Aq.
(2.5)
Following Alvarez and Stokey (1998), we exploit the homogeneity of the utility
function to rewrite the HJB equation (2.5) in intensive form. Since the utility func-
tion is linear in A, UpZ,Aq  U˜pZqA, the value function has the same properties
such that V pZ,Aq  vpZqA. It is now possible to fully characterize the optimization
problem of the agent in the space of Z. Using the homogeneity property of the value
function, the HJB equation in intensive form is the following,
ρvpZq  eZ   µvZpZq  
1
2
σ2vZZpZq, (2.6)
where ρ  δµA ¡ 0 is the “dividend rate” which, if positive as required for a well-
defined maximization problem, generates an opportunity cost of keeping the option
to adopt the new technology alive rather than exercise it. The other two parameters
of the HJB equation are µ  p2µA σ
2
Aq   0 and σ
2  4σ2A ¡ 0. The HJB equation
in intensive form (2.6) is a second-order linear differential equation whose general
solution has the form,
vpZq 
eZ
ρ µ 1
2
σ2
  C1e
ξ1Z , (2.7)
where C1 is an unknown constant to be determined, and the parameter ξ1 is the
negative root of the quadratic equation,
89
fpξq 
1
2
σ2ξ2   µξ  ρ  0.
The boundary conditions imposed at the time of adoption determine the constant
C1 and the rule for optimally adopting the new technology. The adoption rule is
a threshold policy p8, bs, that is, as long as the latent technology Z is in the
inaction region pb, 8q the new available technology is not adopted. When instead
the variable Z crosses the threshold b and enters the action region p8, bs then the
new technology is adopted. The first boundary condition is value matching, which
requires that as the state Z approaches the threshold b, the value for the agent
approaches to the expected present value of future output flows net of the costs of
adoption:
lim
ZÑb
vpZq 
1
δ  µA
 c, (2.8)
where pδ  µAq
1 is the expected present value of output immediately after the new
technology Aptq is adopted, and c P p0, 1q is the share of output paid as cost of
adoption. After substituting the value of the firm (2.7) into the value matching
condition (2.8), we simplify to obtain the boundary condition in terms of the latent
technology Z and the threshold b:
vpZ, bq 
eZ
ρ µ 1
2
σ2
 

1
ρ
 c



eb
ρ µ 1
2
σ2

eξ1pZbq. (2.9)
Finally, the smooth pasting condition requires that
lim
ZÑb
vbpZ, bq  0,
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that is, we maximize the value (2.9) by choosing the optimal threshold b. The
maximization of (2.9) with respect to b yields the optimal threshold:
b  ln r1 ρcsloooomoooon
DC
  ln

1
σ2
J  µ

loooooooomoooooooon
SC
  0, (2.10)
where ρ  δµA ¡ 0, µ  p2µA σ
2
Aq   0, σ
2  4σ2A ¡ 0, and J  pµ
2   2ρσ2q
1
2 ¡
0. The optimal threshold b consists of a deterministic component DC  ln r1 ρcs
and a stochastic component SC  ln r1 σ2{pJ  µqs. The deterministic component
DC is exactly equal to the optimal threshold that one would get in a deterministic
model in which σA  0.
Equation (2.10) is the closed-form solution for the optimal adoption threshold,
which allows us to derive the following comparative statics:
Bb
BµA
¡ 0,
Bb
BσA
  0,
Bb
Bc
  0,
Bb
Bδ
  0. (2.11)
The comparative statics is intuitive. On the one hand, as the drift of the income
process after adoption µA increases, the threshold b
 increases too, leading to earlier
adoption. The representative agent trades off the benefits with the costs of adoption.
An increase in the drift corresponds to an increase in expected income growth after
adoption, leaning then towards earlier adoption. On the other hand, if the volatility
σA increases, the threshold b
 instead decreases implying later adoption. This latter
result is the standard delaying effect of uncertainty at the core of any real options
theory of investment. In our context, the adoption decision corresponds to exercising
a call option, whose value increases with the volatility of the underlying asset, which is
the frontier technology in our case. From equation (2.10), it is clear that uncertainty
91
about the future—as summarized by the parameter σ  2σA—effectively acts as a
barrier to technology adoption.
Finally, as the adoption cost c and the time discount factor δ increases, the
threshold b moves leftward implying later adoption. Clearly, if the fraction c of
forgone output paid as adoption cost increases then the agent waits longer to adopt
the new technology. With a higher time discount factor, the agent attaches relatively
more weight to the present, such that she prefers to postpone the payment of the
cost and so adoption.
The solution of the model can also be written in terms of expected time needed
for the new technology to be adopted. Given the threshold (2.10) and the stochastic
process for the latent technology Z in (2.3), the expected optimal stopping time is
E rT pbqs 
b
µZ
, (2.12)
where µZ 
1
2
σ2A  µA   0, and we normalize the initial condition to Z0  0. The
optimal stopping time rule (2.12) tells how much time it takes for the new technology
to be adopted—time adoption lag.
To summarize, this section shows that the notion of time adoption lags naturally
raises from a simple model of technology adoption. The model provides a closed-form
solution for the time adoption lag as a function of adoption costs, discount rate, drift
and volatility of the income process after adoption.
2.2.3 Numerical Comparative Statics
In this section, we conduct a numerical comparative statics exercise to understand the
relative importance of the various forces at work in the model. We assign numerical
values to the parameters of the model and analyse the sensitivity of the model-
implied time adoption lag in (2.12) to a specific parameter. Table 3.1 contains the
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baseline parameter values.
Recall that in the model the drift and volatility pµA, σAq of the stochastic process
for the technology in use correspond to the drift and volatility of output. Specifically,
the values µA  1.6% and σA  4.4% are chosen based on our estimates of respec-
tively mean and standard deviation of annual growth rates of real GDP per capita in
a sample of 60 countries for 1973-2002 [see Table 2.2, column (1)]. A value of δ  5%
corresponds to a 5% annual interest rate. We set the adoption cost c P p0, 1q to 0.5
of output at the time of adoption. We do not have any reference value guiding our
choice of the adoption cost so we set it at the middle of the possible range.
Figure 2.1 contains the results of the numerical comparative statics. In Panel A,
the model predicts a strong positive relationship between volatility and time adoption
lags. This positive relationship speaks of a large real value of inaction. Notice how
sensitive is the time adoption lag to variations in volatility: going from a standard
deviation of 4% to 8% per year leads to a more than three times larger time adoption
lag, specifically it goes from approximatively 7 to 26 years. Importantly, such a
variation in volatilities—4% to 8%—is only a conservative range if compared to cross-
country data. For instance, in a sample of 60 developing and developed countries
[Table 2.2, column (1)], the least and most volatile countries have respectively a
standard deviation of annual growth rates of real GDP per capita of 1.4% and 12.1%.
Taken at face values, the comparative statics results suggest that uncertainty
about the future income process has quantitatively large negative effects on the
adoption of a new technology. Moreover, volatility is by far the most relevant margin
for the adoption decision. We aknowledge that, at first glance, the adoption lags
implied by the model seem enourmous. However, our own empirical evidence [see
Tables B.1, B.2 and B.3] and many authors have documented adoption lags of this
order of magnitude. For instance, Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005) report that the
process of Electrification took roughly 35 years, and the IT revolution started in the
93
early 70’s and still now pervades modern economies.7
Panel B portrays a negative relationship between the drift of the income process
after adoption and the time adoption lag. As the drift increases, future income
growth outweighs the adoption cost and the uncertainty about future income such
that the time adoption lag decreases. This latter result implies a negative relationship
between mean growth and time adoption lags.
Notice that volatility has not only an adverse effect on the diffusion of the new
technology but, as a consequence, also a clear negative effect on growth. By delaying
the adoption of the new technology, volatility adversely affects the growth opportu-
nities generated by the arrival of the new technology. This negative effect would be
identified in the data by exploiting the cross-country variation in volatility and mean
growth, which is exactly the estimation strategy put forward by Ramey and Ramey
(1995).
Finally, Panel C and D depict the relationship between time adoption lag, adop-
tion cost and time discount factor, respectively. In Panel C, as the adoption cost
increases the incentives for early adoption are curtailed, such that the time adop-
tion lag increases accordingly. In Panel D, a positive relationship also holds for the
time adoption lag and the time discount rate δ. If the representative agent cares
relatively more about the present than the future—higher δ—then she has incentives
to postpone the payment of the cost and adopt the new technology later in time.
Interestingly, the model predicts that both adoption costs and discount rates are
quantitatively far less important than volatility.
7 Rosenberg (1976), Devine (1983), David (1990), and Atkeson and Kehoe (2007) report similar
numbers.
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2.2.4 Empirical Predictions
In this section, we detail the empirical predictions of the model. Later in Section 2.4
and 2.5 of the paper, we present empirical evidence for a large sample of developing
and developed countries which speaks to each of the following implications of the
model.
Prediction 1. There is a positive relationship between time adoption lags and volatil-
ity. In the model, the interaction of uncertainty about the future income process with
irreversibilities in technology adoption investment generates a real value of inaction
which delays the switch to the new technology. Hence, we would expect countries
with more volatile growth rates of real GDP per capita to have higher time adoption
lags. As Section 2.5 below shows, this is indeed the case in the data.
Prediction 2. There is a negative relationship between volatility and growth. In the
model under our simplifying assumptions, there is no output growth before adoption
of the new technology. Instead, the new frontier technology guarantees a positive
trend growth. This implies as volatility delays adoption of the new technology, it
also adversely affects the average growth rate of output.8 Hence, we would expect
countries with more volatile growth rates of real GDP per capita to have lower
average growth rates of real GDP per capita. As Section 2.5 below shows, this is
indeed the case in the data.
Prediction 3. There is a negative relationship beetwen time adoption lags and
growth. In the model, an increase in the drift of the income process after adoption
leans towards early adoption. Hence, we would expect countries with higher growth
rates of real GDP per capita to have lower time adoption lags. As Section 2.5 below
shows, this is indeed the case in the data.
8 This conclusion still holds if we allow for a positive drift of the old technology as long as the
new frontier technology dominates the old one in use.
95
The three predictions combined convey an important message. In a model in
which technology adoption is the decision of forward-looking agents, technology dif-
fusion, growth and volatility are jointly determined as an equilibrium outcome. The
relevant driving force are agents’ expectations about the benefits they can reap after
new technology is adopted.
The model also has stark predictions on the dynamics of the cross-country dis-
persion of income levels.
Prediction 4. After a new technology is introduced, international income levels
start to diverge until the diffusion process is completed. Suppose we index the time
of adoption T by country, i.e., tTiu
I
i1. We envision a world economy composed by
I independent economies. Furthermore, suppose countries differ by their structural
parameters pµiA, σ
i
A, ci, δiq
I
i1. As a new technology is introduced, parameter hetero-
geneity leads to cross-country dispersion in time adoption lags and so dispersion in
output levels. Hence, we would expect the cross-country dispersion in incomes per
capita to increase at the onset of a technological revolution. As Section 2.4 below
shows, this is indeed the case of personal computers.
2.3 Data Description
This section provides the description of the variables and the sources of all the data
used in the following empirical analysis. Our measure of country-specific volatility is
the standard deviation of per capita real GDP annual growth rates. We define the
real growth rate as git  ∆lnpyitq, where yit is the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
converted GDP per capita measured at 2005 constant prices. For each country i in
our sample, we calculate the mean and the standard deviation of the real growth
rate as gi 
1
T
°T
t1 git and σi 

1
T
°T
t1pgit  giq
2
1{2
. Data on real GDP per capita
are from the Penn World Tables (PWT) Version 7.0. Regarding the diffusion of
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major technologies, we focus on three Information and Communication Technologies
(ICT’s). The information technologies (IT’s) considered are personal computers and
internet, the communication technology (CT) is cell phones. All technology data are
from the Cross-country Historical Adoption of Technology (CHAT) dataset whose
detailed description can be found in Comin and Hobijn (2009).
The exact definition of the technology variables is the following: 1) personal
computers is the number of self-contained computers designed for use by one person.
Invention date: 1973; 2) internet is the number of people with access to the worldwide
web. Invention date: 1983; and 3) cell phones is the number of portable cell phones.
Invention date: 1973. We measure the intensity of usage of these three technologies
in per capita terms. Data on population counts are from PWT Version 7.0.
The three ICT’s we consider in this paper represent an ideal starting point for
an empirical study of technology diffusion for at least three reasons. First, they
have been introduced recently such that we can match data on their diffusion with
reliable GDP data from PWT. Second, computers and cell phones are a clear case of
embodied technology: a country can not adopt the computing and communication
power embodied in these technologies without physically installing computers or
buying cell phones. The internet is a technology closely related to the adoption of
computers such that we regard the number of internet users as another measure of
diffusion of embodied technical change. Third, computers and internet are General
Purpose Technologies (GPT’s).
Since the seminal work of Griliches (1957), one of the main obstacles to the study
of technology diffusion has been data availability. Most of the applied microeconomic
literature on technology diffusion focused on the estimation of reduced-form diffusion
curves for a relatively small number of technologies and countries. Moreover for data
availability reasons, the focus of this early literature has been exclusively on the
extensive margin of technology adoption. The CHAT dataset allows us to expand
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the set of countries included in the sample and to consider both the extensive and
intensive margin of technology adoption. Unfortunately given the focus of this work
and despite the availability of better refined data, for most countries the time series
dimension of the three ICT’s is still too short to conduct a full-blown time series
empirical exercise. For the latter reason, we will mainly rely on the cross-sectional
variation of the data.
The main dependent variable of our cross-sectional exercise is a measure of time
adoption lags proposed by Comin et al. (2008). This measure has two clear ad-
vantages: 1) time lags are independent of the units of measurement; and 2) the
calculations of these lags only require a long time series for the country leader in a
specific technology. For two of our technologies, computers and internet users per
capita, the U.S. is the country leader. For cell phones per capita, even though the
U.S. is not the leader, we keep it as the country benchmark in order to consistently
compare time usage lags across technologies. We believe that measuring technology
diffusion lags in years is quite intuitive and gives a clear picture of what being a
laggard country means.
Time Adoption Lags. Let kit be the per capita usage level of a given technol-
ogy in country i at the benchmark year t. We compare the observation kit with
the time series for the U.S., kUS,s where s indexes the observations. Let S denote
the set of observations available in the time series for the U.S. Then, we define the
following two observations in the U.S. time series. The first observation s is the last
time the U.S. passed usage level kit :
s  arg min
sPS
ts|kUS,s1 ¥ kitu
for all s1 P S and s1 ¥ s. The second observation s is the last time the U.S. recorded
a technology usage level lower than or equal to kit :
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s  arg max
sPS
ts|kUS,s1 ¤ kitu .
We impute the time that the U.S. last had the technology usage level kit , say τ ,
by linear interpolation:
τ 

kit  kUS,s
kUS,s  kUS,s


s¯ 

kUS,s  kit
kUS,s  kUS,s


s.
The technology usage lag between the U.S. and country i at the benchmark year
is then given by Lagi  t
  τ . Specifically, we use t  2002 as the benchmark
year for all three technologies. Hence, the variable Lagi measures how many years
ago the U.S. last had the usage technology level that country i had in 2002. Finally,
one last note on the method used to construct time adoption lags is needed. The
method described above exploits only the time series dimension of the U.S. series
arising then the possibility of right-truncated adoption lags: for some countries, the
technology usage per capita levels in the benchmark year 2002 are lower than any
available observation for the U.S.9 These countries are those that operate way inside
the technology frontier. For these countries time adoption lags cannot be calculated.
However, we know that their adoption lags are larger than the maximum adoption
lag we observe in our sample (i.e. right-truncated lags) and that these countries are
relatively poor countries in terms of GDP per capita. We do not take any action to
formally handle right-truncation and we restrict our sample to countries for which we
can calculate adoption lags. For cell phones per capita instead, time adoption lags
are censored because the U.S. never reaches the usage level that some countries have
in the benchmark year 2002. This happens because the U.S. is not the technological
leader for cell phones.
9 The first available observation for the U.S. is dated 1981 for personal computers, 1984 for internet
users and 1984 for cell phones.
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A criticism to the time adoption lags described above, particularly relevant for
the focus of the paper, is that their calculation hinges entirely on the usage level
of a specific technology without any adjustment for the quality improvements that
technologies experience over time. For example, a personal computer bought in
the 2002 has much more computing power than one installed in the early eighties.
Since the focus of the paper is also on cross-country differences in productivity,
we calculate quality-adjusted time adoption lags. Furthermore, if relatively poorer
countries are catching up with the technological leader, they could be installing
better quality machines (i.e. newer vintages) such that unadjusted time adoption
lags would over-estimate the actual distance from the frontier. Among the three
technologies we consider, computers and cell phones are embodied technologies such
that it would be sensible to calculate their adjusted adoption lags. However, due to
data availability, we are able to calculate quality-adjusted time adoption lags only
for personal computers.
Quality-Adjusted Time Adoption Lags. The only difference from the calcu-
lations described before is the benchmark per capita usage level kit . For instance in
the computers case, the unadjusted usage level kit was simply the number of per-
sonal computers per capita. Let kadjit denote the quality-adjusted stock of computers
per capita. For each country i, we calculate kadjit as,
kadjit  kit0  
tt0¸
j1
γjIt0 j,
where It0 j  kt0 jp1δqkt0 j1, γ is the (gross) growth rate of embodied technical
change, t  2002 and t0  1981 are respectively the benchmark year and the date
of the first available U.S. observation for personal computers. We have normalized
the t0’s quality level at 1. The growth rate of the technological frontier is calibrated
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to the mean growth rate of the U.S. investment-specific technical change over the
period 1973-2002, that is, γ  p1   9.15%q.10 We are then taking the U.S. as the
technological frontier and assuming that the best vintage is freely available to all
countries. Hence, cross-country differences in quality-adjusted stocks of machines
emerge because of cross-country differences in diffusion lags. We set the depreciation
rate δ  12.4%.11
In calculating the quality-adjusted time adoption lag, we make the following as-
sumptions: (i) all new machines, It0 j, are of the latest vintage, that is, they are
frontier technology-embodying capital goods; (ii) for each country, personal comput-
ers of the first available observation are all frontier machines, that is, computers at
time t0 j ¥ t0 have quality γ
j, no matter whether t0 j is the date of the first avail-
able observation for the country. Assumption (i) is obviously wrong if firms invest in
vintages older than the frontier vintage. However, this would create problems only if
there are cross-country differences in firms investment behavior.12 If relatively poor
countries tend to purchase older vintages more frequently than rich countries then
our quality-adjusted time adoption lags would underestimate their actual distance
from the frontier (i.e. the U.S.) creating then issues in the cross-country comparison
of the time adoption lags. If on the other hand, poor countries buy older machines
less often than rich countries, circumstance we think unlikely, then we would overes-
timate their distance from the technological frontier. Assumption (ii), instead, tends
to underestimate the technological gap of laggard countries. This happens because
10 Following Greenwood et al. (1997), we calculate investment specific technical change as qt 
pct{p
i
t, where p
c
t is the implicit price deflator for nondurable consumption goods and p
i
t is the price
index for computers and peripheral equipment. Both price series are from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). As reported in Greenwood et al. (1997) and Cummins and Violante (2002), the
BEA provides one of the most reliable constant-quality price indexes for personal computers.
11 Greenwood et al. (1997) obtain a physical depreciation rate of δ  12.4% for equipment. They
use capital stock data from BEA.
12 The empirical evidence on this regard is scarce. Goolsbee (1998) documents that some sub-
Sahara African countries purchased old vintage airplanes during the period 1988-1993.
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laggard countries are also those whose time series starts later in time.
For the cross-country regressions of Section 2.5, we have three separate samples:
1) 60-country sample from 1973 to 2002 (Computers Sample); 2) 61-country sample
from 1983 to 2002 (Internet Sample); and 3) 68-country sample from 1973 to 2002
(Cell Phones Sample). The three data samples do not necessarily contain the same
countries and their respective sample periods start from the invention year of the
specific technology under consideration and end in the benchmark year 2002. More
precisely, to build these samples we follow two steps. First, we start from a panel
of countries that has a complete time series for the real GDP per capita since 1960.
According to this criterion the PWT produces a balanced sample of 110 countries
over the time span 1960-2009. Second, we construct time adoption lags starting from
the derived sample of 110 countries. The smaller number of countries present in the
three final samples is entirely due to the impossibility to calculate adoption lags for
some of the countries. Tables B.1, B.2 and B.3 in Appendix B.1 contain respectively
computers, internet and cell phones time adoption lags for every country in each of
the three data samples.
When we use quality-adjusted time adoption lags, the Computer Sample con-
tains a larger number of countries, 83 instead of 60. This happens because quality
adjustment alleviates the right-truncation problem we discussed previously in this
section.
2.4 Technology Diffusion and International Incomes
In this section, we present evidence on the link between technology diffusion and
international incomes per capita. The aim of this section is to demonstrate that
time adoption lags are a sensible measure of long-run economic perfomance. Figure
2.2 shows a strikingly strong cross-country negative relationship between personal
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computers adoption lags (x-axis) and 2002 real GDP per capita (y-axis). Relatively
poor countries are also laggards in the diffusion process of personal computers.
Figure 2.3 shows that the distributions of incomes per capita and computers time
adoption lags are twin-peaked. While bimodality is now a well-known property of
the cross-country income distribution, to the best of our knowledge, polarization in
the distribution of diffusion lags is a new fact.
However, what is relevant for the aim of this section are the properties of the joint
density of international incomes per capita and time adoption lags. Importantly,
Figure 2.4 shows that also the joint distribution is bimodal. Hence, there is not
only a linear negative relationship between standard of living and diffusion lags (see
Figure 2.2), but countries are polarized in two clubs also in the income-diffusion
dimension: rich countries closer to the technological frontier (lower time adoption
lags) versus poor countries lagging farther behind (higher time adoption lags).
Figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 are a static picture of the relationship between diffusion
lags and cross-country differences in incomes per capita. However, cross-country
differences in technology diffusion should also affect the dynamics of the cross-country
dispersion in incomes per capita. Figure 2.5 tracks the cross-country dispersion of
international incomes per capita over time.
Figure 2.5 plots the cross-country standard deviation of the logarithm of real
GDP per capita (red solid line) and real GDP per worker (labor productivity, blu
dashed line) over time. Specifically, we calculate the cross-country mean as µt 
1
I
°I
i1 lnpyitq, where yit is the PPP converted GDP per capita and GDP per worker,
measured at 2005 constant prices. I=60 is the total number of countries in the
computer sample. We then calculate the cross-sectional standard deviation as σcst 
1
I
°I
i1plnpyitq  µtq
2
1{2
, for t  1960, . . . , 2002.
The dynamics of the cross-sectional standard deviations in Figure 2.5 show in-
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teresting patterns. For the real GDP per capita (red solid line), the cross-sectional
standard deviation has been fairly stable from the 1960 to the early 80’s and starts
to sharply increase since the mid 80’s. A similar pattern also emerges for the real
GDP per worker (blu dashed line). The cross-sectional standard deviation of labor
productivity is fairly stable from the 1960 to late 70’s, it then steadily decreases
(i.e., sigma-convergence) reaching the trough in 1981, and finally it starts to sharply
increase since 1981 to the end of the sample. The dynamics shown in Figure 2.5
are particularly interesting since the turning point, that is the year 1981, is in the
middle of the IT revolution, and arguably the beginning of the diffusion process of
personal computers.13 For most countries in our sample, the diffusion of comput-
ers has been extremely limited between the 70’s and 90’s. We conjecture that the
increasing dispersion in incomes per capita and labor productivity across countries
is the the result of the cross-country differences in the speed of diffusion of the IT
revolution.
Major technological innovations, such as the IT revolution, act like shocks to the
cross-country distribution of incomes per capita.
2.5 Evidence on Volatility and Technology Adoption
This section provides cross-country and time series evidence on the link between
volatility and technology diffusion. As in Ramey and Ramey (1995), we use the
standard deviation of output growth as our measure of volatility. We acknowledge
that other volatility measures can be considered. Volatility in the national stock mar-
kets and measures of macro policy variability are all good candidates. Stock market
volatility has been used by Bloom (2009) to capture macroeconomic uncertainty. In
a context of cross-country growth regressions, Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and
Grier and Tullock (1989) use respectively the standard deviation of money supply
13 Interestingly, the first available observation for computers is for the U.S. and it is dated 1981.
104
shocks and inflation as a proxy for monetary policy variability. Ramey and Ramey
(1995) derive a measure of fiscal policy variability from a government spending fore-
casting equation. Tabova and Burnside (2010) look at the exposure to global factors
as a source of country-specific risk. However, all these different sources of volatility
eventually affect output, such that our analysis can be interpreted as assessing the
combined effect that all these sources of volatility have on technology adoption.
Cross-country differences in technology adoption are measured by time adoption
lags in the diffusion of three major ICT’s: personal computers, internet and cell
phones.
2.5.1 Cross-Country Evidence
This section presents the empirical strategy and discusses the findings from the cross-
sectional regressions. The estimating equation is the following:
Lagji  αj   βjGrowthi   γjVolatilityi   
j
i . (2.13)
We estimate equation (2.13) by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) separately for
each technology j P tcomputers, internet, cell phonesu. The dependent variable Lagji
denotes the time adoption lag of country i for technology j. It measures how many
years ago the U.S. last had the usage level of technology j that country i had in
2002. The variables Growthi and V olatilityi are respectively country i mean, gi,
and standard deviation, σi, of per capita real GDP growth rates over the sample
period from the invention date of a specific technology and the benchmark year
2002. ji is a country i, technology j unexplained error term. Table 2.2 contains
descriptive statistics for the three variables included in equation (2.13).
Even though we are interested in the coefficient on Volatility, we control for cross-
country differences in mean growth for two reasons: first, we would like to interpret
our results in the spirit of a mean-preserving spread across countries. As shown
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by Ramey and Ramey (1995), there is a robust negative cross-country relationship
between the mean and standard deviation of output growth in a 92-country sample
and over the period 1962-1985. By controlling for Growth in equation (2.13), we
estimate the coefficient of interest γj netting out the direct effect that volatility has
on growth. To check whether in our three samples there is the same statistically
significant relationship between volatility and growth, we re-estimate the volatility-
growth regressions of Ramey and Ramey (1995). Table 2.3 confirms the previous
findings of a negative relationship between volatility and growth and in facts justifies
our specification.
Second, by having the variable Growth on the right hand side of equation (2.13),
we are implicitly controlling for all the covariates that have been shown to matter in
cross-country growth regressions. This is a very appealing feature of the estimating
equation (2.13) since the literature on cross-country growth regressions is vast, and
so the number of relevant covariates is extremely large.14
Tables 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 show our main empirical findings. Table 2.4 shows the
parameter estimates of equation (2.13) for personal computers per capita. Columns
(1)-(3) are for the full Computer Sample of 60 countries, columns (4)-(6) are for a
subsample of 24 OECD countries. We focus our discussion on our favorite speci-
fication, that is, columns (3) and (6). The coefficient on Volatility has a positive
sign in both samples and it is highly statistically significant with a probability value
of zero. More volatile countries have higher time adoption lags in computers per
capita, that is, they are relatively farther behind the technological frontier. Impor-
tantly, the positive sign persist even after controlling for cross-country differences
in mean growth, suggesting that volatility has a direct adverse effect on technology
diffusion independently of the adverse effect it has through diminished growth. This
14 Levine and Renelt (1992) implement an extensive sensitivity analysis of the cross-country growth
regressions.
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latter observation is important since it highlights a potential level effect as opposed
to a growth effect of volatility, which to the best of our knowledge has not been doc-
umented by the literature. By level effect, we mean the adverse effect that volatility
has on a country’s TFP through the delaying effect it has on the adoption of better
technologies.
The coefficient on Volatility, γcomputers  137.222 implies that a 1 percentage
point increase in volatility is associated to an increase in the time adoption lag of
approximatively 1.37 years.
By looking at Table 2.2 [Panel C, column (1)], we see that in the Computer
Sample the difference between the volatility of the highest (Nicaragua) and lowest-
Volatility country (France) is approximatively 8 percentages points. This difference
in volatility implies a difference in adoption lags of almost 11 years. A difference
of 11 years in time lags between the highest and lowest volatility country, net of
growth effects, seems considerable in magnitude and points toward a potentially
quantitatively important mechanism to investigate. The high statistical significance
of the volatility coefficient also holds in the OECD sample. Moreover, the magnitude
of the estimated coefficient is even larger than that estimated in the full sample
of 60 countries. The estimates suggest that in the OECD sample a 1 percentage
point increase in volatility is associated with an increase in the lag of technology
adoption of approximatively 3.25 years. The maintained positive sign, statistical
significance and an even larger magnitude of the volatility coefficient suggests that the
positive link between volatility and time adoption lags persist within a relatively more
homogeneous set of countries. This latter finding is comforting since the regressions
in the OECD sample can be interpreted as controlling for an OECD-fixed effect.
The positive relationship between volatility and time adoption lags is found also
for the other two technologies we consider. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 show the results
for respectively internet and cell phones per capita. Since a negative statistically
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significant relationship between volatility and growth is found also in the Internet
and Cell Phones Sample [see Table 2.3, columns (2)-(3)], as before we only discuss the
results of the specification with both Growth and Volatility as explanatory variables.
The volatility coefficient, γinternet is statistically significant at the 1 percent level in
the full sample of 61 countries, and at the 5 percent level in the OECD sample of
23 countries. As in the computers per capita case, the magnitude of the volatility
coefficient in the OECD sample is larger than that in the full sample.
Finally, Table 2.6 shows that similar results hold for cell phones per capita. In
this latter case, we only show results for the full sample of 68 countries. As already
discussed in Section 2.3, because of censoring, the Cell Phones Sample contains only
4 OECD countries. This happens because the U.S. is not the country leader in this
specific technology. Given the OECD results for computers and internet users per
capita, the lack of OECD countries in the Cell Phones sample could also explain the
weaker statistical significance and smaller magnitude of the coefficient on volatility.
However, the coefficient remains positive and still significant at the 10 percent level.
Past Volatility and Time Adoption Lags. As in any reduced-form estima-
tion like that of equation (2.13), any attempt to make causal inference is irremediably
flawed because of endogeneity issues. Conscious of this issue, we re-assess the empir-
ical link between volatility and technology adoption by calculating a measure of past
growth and volatility performance. The only difference with the estimating equation
(2.13) is that now the explanatory variables Growth and Volatility are calculated over
the period prior to the invention of the specific technology. More precisely, for each
country i, we calculate the mean and the standard deviation of the real GDP growth
rates as gi 
1
T j1960
°T j
t1960 git and σi 

1
T j1960
°T j
t1960pgit  giq
2
1{2
, where T j is
the invention year of technology j P tcomputers, internet, cell phonesu. As force-
fully shown by Table 2.7, the coefficient on volatility is statistically significant at
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the 1 percent level for all three technologies. The magnitudes of the coefficients are
comparable to those estimated and discussed previously in this section. Remarkably,
these latter results confirm and actually strengthen the case of a positive relationship
between volatility and time lags in the diffusion of new technologies.
Volatility and Quality-Adjusted Time Adoption Lags. The empirical find-
ings we presented so far are all based on a measure of time diffusion lags that neglects
improvements in the quality of the new available machines. To address this potential
drawback, we re-estimate equation (2.13) with quality-adjusted time adoption lags
(QA-Lag’s) as dependent variable:
QA Lagi  α   βGrowthi   γVolatilityi   i. (2.14)
The superscript j is omitted since we estimate (2.14) only for personal computers.
The estimates in Table 2.8 confirm the previous findings of a positive and highly
statistically significant relationship between volatility and time adoption lags. The
volatility coefficient γ has a probability value of zero in both the full sample of
83 countries, column (3), and the OECD sample of 24 countries, column (6). The
magnitude of the volatility coefficients, 94.686 and 218.498 respectively in the full and
OECD sample, is smaller than that estimated with the un-adjusted time adoption
lags [Table 2.4, column (3) and (6)]. This is consistent with our criticism of the
un-adjusted time adoption lags over-estimating the actual distance form the frontier
technology. Importantly, the negative relationship between volatility and technology
diffusion remains highly statistically and economically significant also with our new
measure of quality-adjusted time adoption lags.
Robustness. We now briefly discuss two additional sets of results that further
corroborate the robustness of our empirical findings. So far mean and standard de-
viation of real GDP growth rates have been calculated over the period that starts
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from the invetion year of each specific technology to the benchmark year 2002. Now
instead, we use an extended time horizon that starts from the first available observa-
tion in our dataset, that is 1960. Besides this small change, the estimating equation
(2.13) is left unchanged. Tables B.4, B.5 and B.6 in the Appendix B.1 report the
results for all three technologies and, when possible, separate estimates for the full
and the OECD sample. Maybe not surprisingly, this first robustness check confirms
our previous findings.
The second robustness check consists in changing, from 2002 to 1995, the bench-
mark year for the calculation of the time adoption lags. One important shortcoming
in changing the benchmark year to 1995 is the diminished number of observations. By
switching the benchmark year far back in the past, we aggravate the right-truncation
problem in adoption lags that we previously discussed in Section 2.3: we are unable
to calculate time adoption lags for those countries whose diffusion process occurred
largely after the new benchmark year 1995. Specifically, the sample that suffers the
most from the change in the benchmark year is the Internet Sample that after the
change only contains 19 countries. The other two data samples, Computers and Cell
Phones Sample, lose respectively 20 and 21 observations relative to the 2002 bench-
mark case. Table B.7, in the Appendix ?? at the end of the paper, contains the
results of the second robustness check. For computers and cell phones per capita,
respectively column (1) and (3), the coefficients on volatility are statistically signifi-
cant at the 1 percent level and with the right positive sign. For internet per capita,
column (2), instead none of the coefficients is statistically significant even though
the coefficient on volatility still maintains the positive sign. We conjecture that a
potential explanation for the lack of statistical significance in the Internet sample
could be its reduced size.
To summarize, we have shown that: (i) there is a highly statistically significant
negative relationship between volatility and technology diffusion—volatile countries
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are also laggards in the adoption of new technologies; (ii) the positive relationship
between volatility and time adoption lags holds for each of the three major infor-
mation and communications technologies we consider; (iii) countries that have been
relatively more volatile prior to the invention of a specific technology are also the
ones farther behind in the diffusion process of that specific technology; and (iv) the
empirical findings are quite robust to changes in the benchmark year of the time
adoption lags, and in the sample period over which mean growth and volatility are
calculated.
2.5.2 Time Series Evidence
This section presents the empirical findings from panel regressions. In Section 2.5.1
above, the identification of the link between volatility and technology diffusion is en-
tirely based upon the cross-country variation in volatility, growth rates and diffusion
lags. In this section instead, we exploit the time series dimension of the data after
netting out country-fixed effects.
The dependent variable is no longer the time adoption lags of Section 2.5.1, but
simply the growth rate in the usage level of a specific technology. Let Iji denote
the usage level of technology j P tcomputers, internet, cell phonesu in country i. We
define the growth rate of technology usage as Ijit  ∆lnpk
j
itq, where k
j
it is the usage
level in per capita terms of technology j in country i at time t. Since computers and
cell phones are two examples of technologies embodied in capital goods, we measure
their usage level as the number of machines per capita embodying those technologies,
that is, number of personal computers and cell phones per capita. For the internet,
instead, we measure its usage level as the ratio of the number of users to population.
For almost all the countries in our samples, the diffusion of all three technologies is
extremely limited between the invention year and early nineties. Hence, we calculate
the growth rates of technology usage, our dependent variable, over the shorter sample
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period 1995-2002. One obvious shortcoming of this choice is that the time-series
dimension is too short to provide reliable parameter estimates, and consequently
largely limiting the scope of the panel regression analysis. Regarding the explanatory
variables, we calculate time varying measures of mean growth and volatility. For
each country i, we compute time varying means and standard deviations of the real
per capita GDP growth rate as: (i) 5-year rolling (asymmetric) moving averages of
the real growth rate as grollit 
1
5
°4
j0 gitj for t  1995, . . . , 2002, and (ii) σ
roll
it 
1
5
°4
j0pgit  g
roll
it q
2
1{2
for the same sample period t  1995, . . . , 2002. Among the
right-hand-side variables we also include a set of year dummies Dt.
The estimating equation is the following:
Ijit  αj   βjg
roll
it   γjσ
roll
it   δjDt   
j
it. (2.15)
We estimate equation (2.15) by Fixed Effects (FE) separately for each technology
j. The error term jit  ηi  uit consists of a country fixed-effect ηi and a disturbance
uit independently and identically distributed among countries and years.
Table 2.9 shows the results from the FE model. In the computers case, γcomputers
is negative and statistically significant only at the 10 percent level in the full sample
of 60 countries, column (1), but not in the OECD sample of 24 countries, column
(2). After controlling for country-fixed effects, periods of relatively high volatility
are associated with periods of lower growth rates in the usage level of computers
per capita. The coefficient on time-varying volatility is negative but not statistically
significant also in the internet OECD sample, column (5). For the internet full
sample and cell phones, the coefficient on our rolling measure of volatility is positive
even though never statistically significant. The evidence form panel data regressions
is not clear-cut. We propose two reasons for the weak evidence in the time series: 1)
the time-series dimension of the data it far too short to provide reliable parameter
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estimates; and 2) the country dummies in the FE model absorb most of the variation
in the data, making relatively hard the identification of the parameters of interest.
Previous empirical studies have already documented that the relationship between
volatility and economic growth is not as strong in the time series as in the cross-
section of countries. To this regard, our results using direct measures of technology
diffusion confirm this finding.
2.6 Conclusions
I present novel cross-country evidence on the link between volatility and the diffu-
sion of three major information and communication technologies (ICT’s)—personal
computers, internet and cell phones. First, we show there exists a strong negative re-
lationship between cross-country diffusion lags and international incomes per capita.
Maybe not surprisingly, poor countries in the income dimension are producing in-
side the technological frontier. Furthermore, the joint distribution of international
incomes per capita and diffusion lags is twin-peaked. While after Danny Quah’s
influential work the “twin-peakedness” of the cross-country distribution of incomes
per capita is now well-known, the twin-peakedness of the joint distribution of inter-
national incomes and diffusion lags is a new fact. This finding is important because
demonstrates that the time adoption lags of the three ICT’s we consider in this
paper are a sensible measure of long-run economic perfomance. After establishing
the existence of a close link between the technologies we consider and the world in-
come distribution, we document a highly statistically and economically significant
cross-country negative relationship between volatility and technology diffusion. More
volatile countries are farther behind the technological frontier, the U.S. in our case.
The empirical findings corroborate the negative relationship between volatility and
economic growth first documented by Ramey and Ramey (1995). Moreover, by fo-
cusing on direct measures of technology, we highlight a potential mechanism through
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which business cycle volatility adversely affects the long-run economic performance
of a country. We also offer a simple real options model of technology adoption that
is qualitatively consistent with the facts documented. In the model, the interaction
of uncertainty and sunk costs of adoption creates a real value of inaction which de-
lays the adoption of new technologies with the consequent adverse effect on long-run
economic growth.
2.7 Tables and Figures
This section contains the main tables and figures of the essay.
Table 2.1: Baseline Parameters
σA µA c δ
4.4% 1.6% 0.5 5%
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Figure 2.1: Numerical Comparative Statics
Notes: Panel A, B, C and D differ only for the comparative statics parameter on the x-axis.
The calibration is at an annual frequency: time discount rate δ  5%, adoption cost as share of
output c  0.5, drift and volatility of the geometric Brownian motion for the income process are
respectively µA  1.6% and σA  4.4%. Time Adoption Lag is the optimal stopping time (2.12)
implied by the stochastic model of technology adoption in Section 3.2.
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Figure 2.2: Time Adoption Lags and Incomes per Capita
Notes: Time Adoption Lag measures how many years ago the United States last had the usage
level of computers per capita that each country had in the benchmark year 2002. Real GDP per
capita is the PPP converted GDP per capita measured at 2005 constant prices.
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Figure 2.3: Cross-Country Distribution of Time Adoption Lags and Incomes Per
Capita
Notes: Time Adoption Lag measures how many years ago the United States last had the usage
level of computers per capita that each country had in the benchmark year 2002. Real GDP per
capita is the PPP converted GDP per capita measured at 2005 constant prices.
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Figure 2.4: Cross-Country Joint Distribution of Time Adoption Lags and Incomes
Per Capita
Notes: Time Adoption Lag measures how many years ago the United States last had the usage
level of computers per capita that each country had in the benchmark year 2002. Real GDP per
capita is the PPP converted GDP per capita measured at 2005 constant prices.
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Figure 2.5: Sigma-Convergence — Computer Sample, 60 Countries
Notes: Real GDP per capita (per worker) is the PPP converted GDP per capita (per worker) mea-
sured at 2005 constant prices. On the y-axis, the cross-sectional standard deviation is calculated
as σcst 

1
I
°I
i1plnpyitq  µtq
2
1{2
with µt 
1
I
°I
i1 lnpyitq, where yit is the real GDP per capita
(per worker) of country i  1, . . . , 60 for t  1960, . . . , 2002.
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Table 2.2: Time Adoption Lag, Growth and Volatility — Descriptive Statistics
Computers Sample Internet Sample Cell Phones Sample
(60 countries, 1973-2002) (61 countries, 1983-2002) (68 countries, 1973-2002)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A:
Mean Lag 14.131 6.651 9.450
Std. Dev. Lag 7.081 3.344 4.390
Lowest-Lag country 1.097 0.294 1.350
(Sweden) (Australia) (Chile)
Highest-Lag country 20.850 11.764 17.661
(Indonesia) (Lesotho) (Ethiopia)
Panel B:
Mean Growth 0.016 0.015 0.010
Lowest-Growth country -0.023 -0.026 -0.031
(Nicaragua) (Nicaragua) (Zambia)
Highest-Growth country 0.050 0.052 0.088
(Botswana) (Botswana) (Equatorial Guinea)
Panel C:
Mean Volatility 0.044 0.037 0.058
Lowest-Volatility country 0.014 0.010 0.018
(France) (Netherlands) (Sri Lanka)
Highest-Volatility country 0.121 0.107 0.229
(Nicaragua) (Guinea-Bissau) (Equatorial Guinea)
Notes: Lag stands for Time Adoption Lag and measures how many years ago the U.S. last had
the technology usage level that each country had in the benchmark year 2002. The variables
Growth and the Volatility are respectively mean and standard deviation of per capita real GDP
annual growth rates for each country and calculated over the relevant sample period. In the Cell
Phones Sample, column (3), the second highest-Growth country is Botswana.
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Table 2.3: The Relationship between Mean and Volatility of Growth
Computers Sample Internet Sample Cell Phones Sample
(60 countries, 1973-2002) (61 countries, 1983-2002) (68 countries, 1973-2002)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Volatility 0.229 0.277 0.196
(0.078) (0.108) (0.059)
Constant 0.027 0.025 0.020
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
R2 0.142 0.123 0.106
Observations 60 61 67
Notes: The dependent variable Growth and the explanatory Volatility are respectively mean
and standard deviation of per capita real GDP annual growth rates calculated over the
relevant sample period for each country. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in paren-
theses. Equatorial Guinea is excluded from the Cell phones sample because it is an influential
observation. ***, ** indicate respectively statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent level.
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Table 2.4: Volatility and Time Adoption Lags — Computers per Capita
Full Sample OECD Sample
(60 countries, 1973-2002) (24 countries, 1973-2002)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Volatility 155.025 137.222 272.463 325.530
(27.134) (31.590) (71.549) (62.672)
Growth 162.726 -77.576 -208.031 390.315
(53.435) (57.089) (185.786) (139.156)
R2 0.298 0.122 0.322 0.303 0.043 0.442
Observations 60 60 60 24 24 24
Notes: The dependent variable Time Adoption Lag measures how many years ago the U.S. last
had the usage level of computers per capita that each country had in the benchmark year 2002.
Growth and Volatility are respectively the mean and standard deviation of per capita real GDP
annual growth rates over the sample period 1973-2002 for each country. Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include a constant. ***, ** indicate respectively
statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent level.
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Table 2.5: Volatility and Time Adoption Lags — Internet per Capita
Full Sample OECD Sample
(61 countries, 1983-2002) (23 countries, 1983-2002)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Volatility 70.401 52.844 114.990 116.433
(14.273) (16.264) (48.381) (52.889)
Growth 86.939 63.391 13.438 -7.128
(19.737) (19.751) (35.841) (30.587)
R2 0.207 0.196 0.298 0.251 0.004 0.252
Observations 61 61 61 23 23 23
Notes: The dependent variable Time Adoption Lag measures how many years ago the U.S.
last had the usage level of internet per capita that each country had in the benchmark
year 2002. Growth and Volatility are respectively the mean and standard deviation of per
capita real GDP annual growth rates over the sample period 1983-2002 for each country.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include a constant.
***, ** indicate respectively statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent level.
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Table 2.6: Volatility and Time Adoption Lags — Cell Phones per Capita
Full Sample
(68 countries, 1973-2002)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Volatility 19.787 25.963
(13.633) (13.647)
Growth 94.344 99.686
(30.229) (21.941)
R2 0.023 0.155 0.193
Observations 68 68 68
Notes: The dependent variable Time Adoption Lag measures how many years ago the
U.S. last had the usage level of cell phones per capita that each country had in the
benchmark year 2002. Growth and Volatility are respectively the mean and standard
deviation of per capita real GDP annual growth rates over the sample period 1973-
2002 for each country. The OECD sample is not shown because it would include
only four countries: time adoption lags for cell phones are censored because the U.S.
never reaches the usage level that most OECD countries have in the benchmark year
2002. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include
a constant. ***, * indicate respectively statistical significance at the 1 and 10 percent
level.
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Table 2.7: Past Volatility Performance and Time Adoption Lags
Computers Internet Cell Phones
(Full Sample, 60 countries) (Full Sample, 61 countries) (Full Sample, 68 countries)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Volatility 99.598 57.960 32.500
(24.097) (10.372) (10.860)
Growth 56.178 40.694 85.750
(33.365) (20.229) (18.002)
R2 0.156 0.308 0.264
Observations 60 61 68
Invention Year 1973 1983 1973
Notes: The dependent variable Time Adoption Lag measures how many years ago the U.S. last
had the technology usage level that each country had in the benchmark year 2002. Growth and
Volatility are respectively the mean and standard deviation of per capita real GDP annual growth
rates calculated over the sample period from 1960 to the invention year for each technology and
country. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include a constant.
***, **, * indicate respectively statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
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Table 2.8: Volatility and Quality-Adjusted Time Adoption Lags — Computers per
Capita
Full Sample OECD Sample
(83 countries, 1973-2002) (24 countries, 1973-2002)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Volatility 89.924 94.686 182.199 218.498
(27.796) (19.226) (55.372) (50.259)
Growth 133.819 143.600 -144.630 266.981
(57.516) (34.067) (117.346) (95.878)
R2 0.165 0.117 0.299 0.324 0.050 0.479
Observations 83 83 83 24 24 24
Notes: The dependent variable QA-Time Adoption Lag measures how many years ago the U.S.
last had the quality-adjusted usage level of computers per capita that each country had in the
benchmark year 2002. Growth and Volatility are respectively the mean and standard deviation
of per capita real GDP annual growth rates over the sample period 1973-2002 for each country.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include a constant. ***,
** indicate respectively statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent level.
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Table 2.9: Volatility and Technology Usage per Capita — Fixed-Effects Model
Computers Internet Cell Phones
Full Sample OECD Sample Full Sample OECD Sample Full Sample
Independent Variable (1) (2) (4) (5) (6)
σroll 0.784 -0.272 2.302 -2.687 1.694
(0.450) (1.430) (2.959) (3.182) (1.551)
groll -0.988 0.275 2.750 -0.865 3.727
(0.683) (0.685) (2.623) (1.600) (1.751)
R2 0.063 0.253 0.167 0.333 0.047
Countries 60 24 61 23 68
Observations 447 190 456 184 472
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of the usage level of a specific technology. The
explanatory variables groll and σroll are respectively the 5-year rolling mean and standard deviation
of per capita real GDP annual growth rates over the sample period 1991-2002. Standard errors
clustered by country in parentheses. Regressions include a constant and a set of year dummies. *
indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
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3Commodity Prices, Long-Run Growth and Fiscal
Vulnerability (with Pietro Peretto)
3.1 Introduction
Oil prices and more generally commodity prices exhibit long-lasting declines and
prolonged periods of rises. Figure 3.1 depicts the annual series of the real oil price
(solid line) from 1861 to 2011 with a smooth trend (dotted line) estimated by fitting a
second-order polynomial to the series.1 The figure shows a striking U-shape pattern
in the trend, which captures a period of roughly 100 years of declining prices replaced
by 40 years of price increases. Notice also the 20 years pattern of steadily price
declines from 1980 to 2000, which reverts roughly 10 years of price increases from
1970 to 1980. Similar patterns emerge in several other commodities, e.g., agricultural
raw materials, metals, food and beverage. This figure is suggestive of long waves
of price declines and raises. Overall, the evidence suggests that commodity price
movements are large both at high and low frequency.2
1 Data source: British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy Report 2012.
2 See Jacks (2013) for an extensive treatment of long-run trends, medium-run cycles, and short-run
boom/bust episodes in commodity prices.
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It is also widely recognized that many real world economies, both developing
and developed, depend for their exporting sector income on a narrow range of com-
modities. For these countries, long periods of commodity price declines are often
associated with large tax revenue shortfalls and deteriorating public finances. Only
few examples are the fiscal crisis occurred in Nigeria in 1991 and Kenya in the early
1980’s when the prices of oil and coffee reverted to their previous levels prior to
respectively the oil price boom at the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the
1976-1979 coffee price boom. Overall, the existing evidence suggests that exten-
sive reliance on the tax base of the commodity-exporting sector makes the country’s
fiscal stance particularly vulnerable to variations in world commodity prices.3 We
think of this phenomenon as fiscal vulnerability. The issue of fiscal dependence on
commodity-linked revenues in commodity-rich countries has long been and still is a
relevant matter for policy making. Quoting the 2013 Nigeria Economic Report by
the World Bank, “As oil revenues comprise 75 percent of budgetary revenues and 95
percent of exports in Nigeria, the effective management of the country’s oil wealth
is critical to stability and fiscal sustainability in the country.” Hence, the current
debate points to the interaction of fiscal policy with conditions in the commodity
market as a mechanism particularly relevant for the economics of commodity-rich
countries. Motivated by the empirical observations above and the renewed interest
in the policy debate, this paper tackles, from a theoretical prospective, the following
questions: absent fiscal considerations, how do commodity-exporting economies re-
spond to commodity price changes? How does the economy dynamic response depend
on the tax code in place? And how should governments react to world commodity
price changes in the wake of tax revenue shortfalls? To answer these questions, we
develop a Schumpeterian small open economy (SOE) model of endogenous growth.
3 See Sinnott (2009) for a detailed discussion of fiscal dependence on hydrocarbon revenues in
Latin America and the Caribbean.
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We study both the short- and long-run effects of commodity price changes and how
fiscal policy interacts with the amplification and propagation of external shocks to
these prices. In the spirit of the SOE tradition, we assume that commodity prices
are taken parametrically by agents inside our model and determined in the world
commodity market.
The paper studies the joint role of commodity prices and distortionary taxation
in an environment where technological change is endogenous. We think endogenous
growth theory is the natural framework to study these issues for two main reasons:
first, there is now a large literature on the “curse of natural resources” which hints
at very long-run effects of natural resources. However, as exemplified by the title of
the Journal of Economic Literature survey paper by Van der Ploeg (2011), “Natu-
ral Resources: Curse or Blessing?”, the outcome of this research effort is far from
conclusive, with mixed empirical evidence.4 In this latter regard, a model where
steady-state growth is the endogenous equilibrium outcome of activities undertaken
by economic agents, allows us to take seriosuly the notion of the curse of natural
resources and provide theoretical predictions about conditions in the commodity
market (and/or natural resources) and economic growth. Second, since historically
governments have reacted differently in the wake of commodity prices booms and
busts, we are interested in studying the effects of different tax policies, with a special
focus on the differences between short- and long-run effects. Ultimately, our analysis
provides insights on how to design welfare-enhancing tax policies for commodity-
exporting countries.
Specifically, our theoretical framework is a Schumpeterian model of endogenous
growth featuring both horizontal (expanding variety) and vertical (quality upgrad-
ing and/or cost reducing) innovation. Market structure is endogenous in that both
firm size and the mass of firms are jointly determined in equilibrium. In fact, it
4 On a similar note see Gelb (1988).
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is the interaction of the entry and quality margin of innovation—a variety-quality
frontier—that drives the equilibrium dynamics of the model. A key property of our
theoretical structure is that the model economy features different growth regimes,
with transitions from one regime to the other being endogenous. We believe this is an
appealing feature of the model since it allows us to derive predictions for economies
that are at different stages of economic development. We provide results for both
the transitional dynamics and the steady state of the model economy. A distinctive
feature of the model is that long-run growth is independent of the scale of economic
activity, i.e., there is no scale effect.5 This feature is essential for the purpose of
the paper for at least two reasons. First, commodity price changes interact with the
scale of the economy by the induced income effect. This implies that sterilization
of the scale effect is needed to have a balanced growth path consistent with varying
commodity prices. Second, analyses of fiscal policy under scale effects are subject
to the Stokey and Rebelo (1995)’s critique. Models of endogenous growth exhibiting
scale effects predict effects of fiscal policy that are too large compared to the available
empirical evidence. Few examples of this evidence are Easterly and Rebelo (1993)
and Mendoza et al. (1997) for cross-country growth regressions, Easterly et al. (1993)
and Jones (1995) for time series evidence.
The results of the paper can be summarized as follows. 1) Commodity prices
affect the short-run equilibrium dynamics of the model economy. Spending on man-
ufacturing goods is increasing in the commodity price if the domestic demand for
the commodity is inelastic. It is instead decreasing if the demand is elastic. The
persistence of these short-run effects depends on the parameters of the model that
determine the speed of reversion to the steady state. 2) Commodity price changes
have no long-run growth effects, i.e., the steady-state growth rate of the model econ-
5 See Peretto (1998) for a detailed analysis of the mechanism driving the sterilization of the scale
effect in this class of models.
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omy is fully insulated from the conditions in the commodity market, that is, from
commodity prices and endowments. This happens because endogenous entry makes
the steady-state growth rate independent of the size of the manufacturing sector. It
is exactly in this latter regard that the co-existence of the entry and quality margin
of innovation plays a crucial role: the process of entry induces product proliferation
which fragments the aggregate market into sub-markets whose size does not increase
with the size of the manufacturing sector. The sterilization of this market size effect
results in the sterilization of the scale effect, that is, the sterilization of the steady-
state growth effects of parameters that drive the size of the economy. Finally, 3) the
economy dynamic response to commodity price changes depends on both the struc-
ture of the tax code in place and on the policy response necessary to balance the
government budget. Specifically, a distortionary tax on asset income (dividends plus
capital gains) amplifies the effects of a given commodity price change and slows down
the reversion to the steady state after a commodity price shock. Furthermore, if the
government raises the tax rate on asset income in response to a resource revenue
shortfall, then the commodity price has an indirect adverse effect on the steady-state
growth rate of the model economy. This happens because tax rates affecting the equi-
librium rate of return to cost reduction and entry have steady-state growth effects.6
Notice that, in this latter case, the negative steady-state growth effects are to be
exclusively imputed to the (misguided) reaction of the government to a commodity
price decrease, which, by changing the tax rate on asset income, it is distorting the
effective return to innovation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we discuss the setup of the
model. In Section 3.3, we discuss the equilibrium of the market economy. Section
3.4 discusses the effects of commodity price changes. In Section 3.5, we introduce dis-
6 See Peretto (2003) for a previous discussion of level and steady-state growth effects of taxation
in models of endogenous growth without scale effects.
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tortionay taxation into the model. Section 3.6 contains a simple numerical exercise.
Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Overview
We consider a small open economy (SOE) populated by a representative household
that supplies labor services inelastically in a competitive labor market. The house-
hold faces a standard expenditure-saving decision such that it optimally chooses the
path of expenditures (home and foreign goods) and savings by freely borrowing and
lending in a competitive market for financial assets at the prevailing interest rate.7
The household’s income consist of returns on asset holdings, labor income, profits and
resource income. Resource income is the (constant) commodity endowment valued
at the world commodity price.
The production side of the economy consists of three sectors: 1) consumption
goods; 2) intermediate goods or manufacturing; and 3) materials. The consumption
goods sector consists of a representative competitive firm which combines differ-
entiated intermediate goods to produce an homogeneous final good. Upon entry,
manufacturing firms combine labor services and materials to produce differentiated
intermediate goods. They also engage in activities aimed to reduce their costs of
production, and consequently, improve efficiency. Entry requires the payment of a
sunk cost. Finally, materials are supplied by a separate competitive sector which
demands as inputs labor services and the commodity paying the world commodity
price. At this stage, there is no government sector, which we introduce into the
model later in Section 3.5.
7 It is possible to think of our model economy as taking the world interest rate parametrically.
Since the model has the property that the domestic interest rate jumps to its steady-state level,
given by the domestic discount rate, as long the SOE has the same discount rate as the rest of the
world, the equilibrium discussed in the paper displays the same properties as an equilibrium with
free financial flows.
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The intermediate goods is the key sector of our model economy in that it is the
engine of endogenous growth. Precisely, the economy starts out with a given range of
intermediate goods, each supplied by one firm. Entrepreneurs compare the present
value of profits from introducing a new good to the entry cost. They only target
new product lines because entering an existing product line in Bertrand competition
with the existing supplier leads to losses. Once in the market, firms devote labor
to cost-reducing (or, equivalently, productivity enhancing) projects. As each firm
strives to figure out how to improve efficiency, it contributes to the pool of public
knowledge that benefits the future cost reduction activity of all firms. This allows
the economy to grow at a constant rate in steady state, which is reached when entry
stops and the economy settles into a stable industrial structure.
3.2.2 Households
The representative household maximizes lifetime utility
Uptq 
» 8
t
eρpstq log u psq ds, ρ ¡ 0 (3.1)
where
log u  ϕ log

YH
PHL


  p1 ϕq log

YF
PFL


, 0   ϕ   1 (3.2)
subject to the flow budget constraint
9A  rA WL  ΠH   ΠM   pΩ YH  YF , Ω ¡ 0 (3.3)
where ρ is the discount rate, ϕ controls the degree of home bias in preferences, A
is assets holding, r is the rate of return on financial assets, W is the wage, L is
population size, which equals labor supply since there is no preference for leisure, YH
is expenditure on a home consumption good whose price is PH , and YF is expenditure
on a foreign consumption good whose price is PF . In addition to asset and labor
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income, the household receives the dividends paid out by the producers of the home
consumption good, ΠH , the dividends paid out by firms in the material sector, ΠM ,
and the revenues from sales of the domestic endowment of the commodity, Ω, at
the world commodity price p. The solution to this problem consists of the optimal
consumption-expenditure allocation rule
ϕYF  p1 ϕqYH , (3.4)
and the Euler equation governing saving behavior
r  rA  ρ 
9YH
YH
 ρ 
9YF
YF
. (3.5)
3.2.3 Trade Structure
The foreign good is imported at the constant world price PF . The economy can be
either an importer or an exporter of the commodity. In the first case, it sells the
home consumption good to buy the commodity in the world market; in the second
case, it accepts the foreign consumption good as payment for its commodity exports.
Only final goods and the commodity are tradable. The balanced trade condition,
which is also the market clearing condition for the consumption good market, is
YH  YF   p pO  Ωq  Y , where Y is the aggregate value of production of the home
consumption good. Using the consumption expenditure allocation rule (3.4), we can
rewrite the balance trade condition as,
1
ϕ
YH   p pO  Ωq  Y, (3.6)
where O is home use of the commodity.
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3.2.4 The Consumption Good Sector
The home homogeneoeus consumption good is produced by a representative com-
petitive firm with the technology
CH  N
χ
» N
0
1
N
X
1

i di
 
1
, χ ¡ 0,  ¡ 1 (3.7)
where  is the elasticity of product substitution, Xi is the quantity of the non-durable
intermediate good i, and N is the mass of goods. We follow Ethier (1982) and
separate the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods from the degree of
increasing returns to the variety of intermediate goods, χ. The final good producer
maximizes,
ΠH  PHCH 
» N
0
PiXidi
subject to (3.7). This structure yields the demand curve for each intermediate good
as
Xi  Y
Pi³N
0
P 1i di
, (3.8)
where Y  PHCH . Because this sector is perfectly competitive, ΠH  0.
3.2.5 The Intermediate Goods Sector
The typical firm produces one differentiated good with the technology
Xi  Z
θ
i  F pLXi  φ,Miq , 0   θ   1, φ ¡ 0 (3.9)
where Xi is output, LXi is production employment, φ is a fixed labor cost, Mi is
use of materials, and Zθi is the firm’s total factor productivity (TFP), a function of
the stock of firm-specific knowledge Zi. The function F pq is a standard production
function homogeneous of degree one in its arguments. The associated total cost is,
Wφ  CXpW,PMqZ
θ
i Xi, (3.10)
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where CX pq is a standard unit-cost function homogeneous of degree one in its ar-
guments. Hicks-neutral technological change internal to the firm shifts this function
down. The elasticity of unit cost reduction with respect to firm-specific knowledge
is the constant θ.
The firm accumulates knowledge according to the technology
9Zi  αKLZi , α ¡ 0 (3.11)
where 9Zi is the flow of firm-specific knowledge generated by a project employing LZi
units of labor for an interval of time dt, and αK is the productivity of labor in such
a project as determined by the exogenous parameter α and by the stock of public
knowledge, K. Public knowledge accumulates as a result of spillovers.
When a firm generates a new idea to improve the production process, it also
generates general-purpose knowledge which is not excludable and that other firms can
exploit in their own research efforts. Firms appropriate the economic returns from
firm-specific knowledge but cannot prevent others from using the general-purpose
knowledge that spills over into the public domain. Formally, a project that produces
9Zi units of proprietary knowledge also generates 9Zi units of public knowledge. The
productivity of research is determined by some combination of all the different sources
of knowledge. A simple way of capturing this notion is to write
K 
» N
0
1
N
Zidi,
which says that the knowledge frontier is determined by the average knowledge of
all firms.8
3.2.6 Materials
A representative competitive firm combines labor services, LM , and commodities, O,
to produce materials M , used as inputs in the manufacturing sector. The technology
8 For a detailed discussion of a spillovers function of this class, see Peretto and Smulders (2002).
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is M  G pLM , Oq, where G pq is a standard production function homogeneous of
degree one in its arguments. The associated total cost is
CM pW, pqM, (3.12)
where CM pq is a standard unit-cost function homogeneous of degree one in the wage
W and the commodity price p. This is the simplest way to model the materials
sector for the purposes of this paper. Materials are produced with labor and the
commodity purchased or sold at a given price in the world commodity market. The
sector for materials competes for labor with the manufacturing sector. This captures
the fundamental inter-sectoral allocation problem faced by this economy.
3.3 Agents’ Behavior and Equilibrium Dynamics
This section constructs the equilibrium of the manufacturing sector. It then charac-
terizes the equilibrium of the sector producing materials. Finally, it imposes general
equilibrium conditions to determine the aggregate dynamics of the model economy.
3.3.1 The Manufacturing Sector
The typical intermediate firm maximizes the present discounted value of net cash
flows,
Vi ptq 
» 8
t
e
³s
t rrpvq δsdvΠipsqds, δ ¡ 0
where δ is a death shock. Using the cost function (3.10), instantaneous profits are
Πi  rPi  CXpW,PMqZ
θ
i sXi WφWLZi ,
where LZi is labor devoted to cost-reducing projects. Vi is the value of the firm,
the price of the ownership share of an equity holder. The firm maximizes Vi subject
to the cost-reduction technology (3.11), the demand schedule (3.8), Ziptq ¡ 0 (the
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initial knowledge stock is given), Zjpt
1q for t1 ¥ t and j  i (the firm takes as given
the rivals’ knowledge accumulation paths), and Zjpt
1q ¥ 0 for t1 ¥ t (knowledge
accumulation is irreversible). The solution of this problem yields the (maximized)
value of the firm given the time path of the number of firms.
To characterize entry, we follow Peretto and Connolly (2007) and assume that
upon payment of a sunk cost pβY {Nq W , an entrepreneur can create a new firm
that starts out its activity with productivity equal to the industry average.9 Once
in the market, the new firm solves a problem identical to the one outlined above for
the incumbent firm. A free entry equilibrium, therefore, requires Vi  W  pβY {Nq.
The Appendix shows that the equilibrium thus defined is symmetric and is char-
acterized by the factor demands:
WLX  Y
 1

SLX  WφN ; (3.13)
PMM  Y
 1

SMX , (3.14)
where the shares of the firm’s variable costs due to labor and materials are respec-
tively:
SLX 
WLXi
CXpW,PMqZ
θ
i Xi

B logCXpW,PMq
B logW
;
SMX 
PMMi
CXpW,PMqZ
θ
i Xi

B logCXpW,PMq
B logPM
.
Note that SLX   S
M
X  1. Associated to these factor demands are the rates of return
to cost reduction and entry, respectively:
r  rZ 
α
W

Y
N
θp 1q W
LZ
N

 
9W
W
 δ; (3.15)
9 See Peretto and Connolly (2007) for an interpretation of this assumption.
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r  rN 
N
WβY

Y
N
WφW
LZ
N

 
9W
W
 δ  
9Y
Y

9N
N
. (3.16)
Neither the return to cost reduction in (3.15) nor the return to entry in (3.16)
depend on factors related to the commodity market. Why is this the case? The
production technology (3.9) yields a unit-cost function that depends only on input
prices and is independent of the quantity produced and thus of inputs use. Since the
optimal pricing rule features a constant markup over unit cost, the firm’s gross-profit
flow (revenues minus variable costs), Y {N , is independent of input prices. Equations
(3.15) and (3.16), then, capture the idea that investment decisions by incumbents
and entrants do not respond directly to conditions in the commodity market because
they are guided by the gross-profit flow. Conditions in the commodity market have
an indirect effect through aggregate spending on intermediate goods, Y .
3.3.2 Materials
Given the cost function (3.12), competitive materials producers that purchase com-
modities at the given world price p operate along the infinitely elastic supply curve
PM  CM pW, pq . (3.17)
In equilibrium, then, materials production is given by (3.14) evaluated at the price
PM . Defining the commodity share in material costs as
SOM 
pO
CM pW, pqM

B logCMpW, pq
B log p
,
we can write the associated demands for labor and commodity as:
WLM M
BCMpW, pq
BW
 Y
 1

SMX
 
1 SOM

; (3.18)
and
pO M
BCMpW, pq
Bp
 Y
 1

SMX S
O
M . (3.19)
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3.3.3 General Equilibrium
The model consists of the returns to saving (3.5), to cost reduction (3.15), and to
entry (3.16), the labor demands in the manufacturing sector (3.13), materials (3.18),
and the household’s budget constraint (3.3).10 Assets market equilibrium requires
equalization of all rates of return, r  rA  rZ  rN , and that the value of the
household’s portfolio equal the value of the securities issued by firms, A  NV 
βWY . We choose labor as the numeraire, i.e., W  1. A convenient implication of
this normalization is that all expenditure terms are constant.
Proposition 12. At any point in time, the value of home manufacturing production
and the balanced trade condition, respectively, are:
Y ppq 
L
1 ξ ppq  ρβ
, with ξ ppq 
 1

SMX ppqS
O
M ppq ; (3.20)
1
ϕ
YH ppq  pΩ  Y ppq p1 ξ ppqq . (3.21)
The associated expenditures on the home and foreign consumption goods, respectively,
are:
YH ppq  ϕ

L p1 ξ ppqq
1 ξ ppq  ρβ
  pΩ

; (3.22)
YF ppq  p1 ϕq

L p1 ξ ppqq
1 ξ ppq  ρβ
  pΩ

. (3.23)
Because YH ppq and YF ppq are constant, the interest rate is r  ρ at all times.
Proof. See the Appendix.
10 The household’s budget constraint (3.3) and the balance trade condition (3.6) imply the labor
market clearing condition L  LN   LX   LZ   LM , where LN is aggregate employment in en-
trepreneurial activity, LX LZ is aggregate employment in production and cost-reducing operations
of existing firms, LM is aggregate employment in materials producing firms. See the Appendix at
the end of the paper for the derivations.
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Given this structure of expenditures, the equilibrium dynamics are as follows.
Proposition 13. Let x  Y {N denote the gross profit rate. The general equilibrium
of the model reduces to the following piece-wise linear differential equation in the gross
profit flow:
9x 
$'''&'''%
δL{N0
p1ξppqq 1

if φ ¤ x ¤ xN
φ
β


1
β
 pρ  δq

x if xN   x ¤ xZ
φ ρ δ
α
β


1θp1q
β
 pρ  δq

x if x ¡ xZ .
Assuming
φ pρ  δq {α
1 θ p 1q  β pρ  δq
¡
ρ  δ
αθ p 1q
,
The economy converges to:
x 
φ pρ  δq {α
1 θ p 1q  β pρ  δq
. (3.24)
The associated steady-state rate of cost-reduction is
Zˆ 
pφα  ρ δq θ p 1q
1 θ p 1q  β pρ  δq
 pρ  δq . (3.25)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the dynamics. Proposition 13 states a strong “long-run
commodity price super-neutrality” result: the steady-state growth rate of the
economy is independent of conditions in the commodity market and therefore of
the commodity price p. In other words, the long-run economic growth performance
of the model economy is insulated from external commodity price shocks. This
happens because the sterilization of the market size effect through entry implies that
steady-state growth does not depend on the size of the manufacturing sector and
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therefore on the inter-sectoral allocation of labor. The resulting sterilization of the
scale effect is a key property of the model coming from the interaction of the entry
and quality margins of innovation. As new firms enter, the expansion in product
variety fragments the aggregate market in sub-markets whose size does not increase
with the size of the manufacturing sector. It is worth stressing that the same forces
that yield the sterilization of the scale effect insulate the steady-state growth rate of
the model economy from the commodity price.
3.3.4 Productivity, Utility and Welfare
Since the home consumption good sector is competitive, PH ppq  PY ppq. Accord-
ingly,
PH ppq  N
χ

1
N
» N
0
pPj ppqq
1 dj
 1
1
 NχZθ


 1


CX p1, CM p1, pqq ,
where to simplify the notation, we define c ppq  CX p1, CM p1, pqq. We also define
aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) as
T  NχZθ. (3.26)
Accordingly,
Tˆ ptq  χNˆ ptq   θZˆ ptq .
Using (3.25) in steady state this gives
Tˆ   θZˆ  θ

pφα  ρ δq θ p 1q
1 θ p 1q  β pρ  δq
 pρ  δq

 g. (3.27)
Observe how g is independent of conditions in the commodity market and of pop-
ulation size. In steady state, x  Y {N is invariant to the commodity price p. We
study the economy in the region x ptq ¡ xZ and write the differential equation for x
as
9x  ν px  xq ,
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where
ν 
1 θ p 1q  β pρ  δq
β
and x 
φ pρ  δq {α
1 θ p 1q  β pρ  δq
.
We thus work with the solution
x ptq  x0e
νt   x
 
1 eνt

, (3.28)
where x0 is the initial condition. The following states the key result.
Proposition 14. Consider an economy starting at time t  0 with initial condition
x0. At any time t ¡ 0 the log of TFP is
log T ptq  log
 
Zθ0N
χ
0

  gt 
γ
ν
  χ
	
∆
 
1 eνt

, (3.29)
where
∆ 
x0
x
 1.
The instantaneous utility flow is
log u ptq  logϕ

1 ξppq
1 ξppq  ρβ
 
pΩ
L


ϕ log c ppq ϕgt ϕ
γ
ν
  χ
	
∆
 
1 eνt

.
(3.30)
The resulting level of welfare is
U p0q 
1
ρ

logϕ

1 ξppq
1 ξppq  ρβ
 
pΩ
L


 ϕ log c ppq  
ϕg
ρ
 
ϕ
 
γ
ν
  χ

ρ  ν
∆
ff
.
(3.31)
Proof. See the Appendix.
This structure identifies three main effects: 1) the windfall effect through pΩ;
2) the cost of living effect through c ppq; and 3) the curse or blessing effect through
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g and the transitional dynamics associated to ∆, the initial displacement from the
steady state. These effects drive welfare as follows. The first two terms in (3.31)
capture the role of steady-state utility calculated holding technology, T , constant;
the third term captures the role of steady-state growth, g; the fourth terms is the
contribution from the acceleration/deceleration of TFP growth along the transition.
The first two static components capture forces that the literature has discussed
at length. An economy with a positive endowment of a commodity that sells for a
higher price experiences a windfall. In our model this shows up as a rise in com-
modity income, which, given our assumptions, is formally equivalent to a lump-sum
transfer from abroad. The cost of living effect is due to the fact that the economy
uses the commodity for home production and, therefore, an increase in the world
commodity price works its way through the home vertical structure of production –
from upstream materials production to downstream manufacturing – and shows up
as a higher price of the home consumption good.
The last two dynamic components capture forces that are the focus of modern
endogenous growth theory. While the role of steady-state growth is well understood,
this model allows us to investigate in detail the less studied role of the transitional
dynamics. The reason is that we have a closed-form solution for the model’s dynam-
ics. Specifically, the fourth effect runs through the TFP operator in (3.29), which has
two transitional components: the first is the cumulated gain/loss from the accelera-
tion/deceleration of the rate of cost reduction; the second is the cumulated gain/loss
from the acceleration/deceleration of product variety expansion. What these accel-
erations/decelerations do, is amplify the change in manufacturing expenditure due
to a change in the commodity price. We discuss this mechanism in the next section.
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3.4 The Dynamic Effects of World Price Shocks
In this section, we analyze the effects of commodity price changes on the transi-
tional dynamics of the model economy. In Section 3.3.3 above, we argued that the
steady-state growth rate is independent of the conditions in the commodity market.
In a nutshell, the long-run economic growth performance of the model economy is
insulated from external price shocks. However, conditions in the commodity market
still matter for the short-run and the transition to the steady state.
An important building block of our theory is that the commodity, which is a
fixed endowment of the economy, is used as input into production of materials.
Hence, the demand of the commodity is endogenous and it responds to variations
in the exogenous price p. This implies that the status of commodity importer or
exporter is determined within the model as a function of the endowment Ω, price p,
technological properties subsumed in the term ξppq, and other relevant parameters
of the model. The following proposition characterizes the commodity-exporting or
commodity-importing regions, and the effects of commodity price changes on manu-
facturing expenditure. We begin with the effect on manufacturing activity.
Lemma 15. Let:
MX  
B logM
B logPM
 1
B logSMX
B logPM
 1
BSMX
BPM
PM
SMX
;
RM  
B logR
B log p
 1
B logSRM
B log p
 1
BSRM
Bp
p
SRM
.
Then,
ξ1 ppq 
 1

B
 
SOM ppqS
M
X ppq

Bp
 Γ ppq
ξ ppq
p
,
where
Γ ppq 
 
1 MX ppq

SOM ppq   1 
O
M ppq . (3.32)
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The key object in this lemma is the function Γ ppq, which is the elasticity of
ξ ppq  1

SOM ppqS
M
X ppq with respect to p. According to (3.19), therefore, it is the
elasticity of the home demand for the commodity with respect to the world price,
holding constant manufacturing expenditure. It thus captures the partial equilibrium
effects of price changes in the commodity and materials markets for given market
size. Differentiating (3.20), rearranging terms and using (3.19) yields
d log Y ppq
dp

ξ1 ppq
1 ξ ppq  βρ
 Γ ppq ,
which says that the effect of changes in the resource price on expenditure on manu-
facturing goods depends on the overall pattern of substitution that is reflected in the
price elasticities of materials and commodity demand and in the commodity share
of materials production costs. The following proposition states the results formally.
Proposition 16. Depending on the properties of the function Γ ppq, there are four
cases.
1. Global complementarity. Suppose that Γ ppq ¡ 0 for all p. Then, manu-
facturing expenditure Y ppq in (3.20) is a monotonically increasing function of
p.
2. Cobb-Douglas-like economy. Suppose that Γ ppq  0 for all p. This occurs
when SOM and S
M
X are exogenous constants. Then, manufacturing expenditure
Y ppq in (3.20) is independent of p.
3. Global substitution. Suppose that Γ ppq   0 for all p. Then, manufacturing
expenditure Y ppq in (3.20) is a monotonically decreasing function of p.
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4. Endogenous switch from complementarity to substitution. Suppose
that there exists a price pv where Γ ppq changes sign, from positive to negative.
Then, manufacturing expenditure Y ppq in (3.20) is a hump-shaped function of
p with a maximum at pv.
The Cobb-Douglas-like case is quite common in the literature as it occurs when
both technologies are Cobb-Douglas with MX  
O
M  1. We mention this case but not
discuss it further since it is a knife-edge specification in which the world commodity
price has no effect on home manufacturing activity. Proposition 16 says that the
sign of the effect of the world commodity price on manufacturing activity depends
on the substitution possibilities between labor and materials in manufacturing and
between labor and the commodity in materials production. The most interesting
case is when Γ ppq changes sign at pv and the model generates the endogenous switch
from substitution to complementarity. We focus on this specification because it nests
the two cases of monotonic effect of the price as we let pv Ñ 0 or pv Ñ 8.
This analysis says that a commodity price boom raises home manufacturing ac-
tivity when the economy exhibits overall complementarity between labor and the
commodity. When the economy exhibits overall substitution, instead, a price boom
results into a contraction of manufacturing activity. What about import/export
behavior? We state the key result as follows.
Proposition 17. The economy is an exporter of the commodity when
Ω
L
¡
1
1 ξ ppq  βρ
ξ ppq
p
. (3.33)
Proposition 17 contains several important results. 1) It provides an intuitive no-
tion of “commodity supply dependence” that captures the traditional view that
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a country that imports a key commodity is dependent on foreign supply and thus
subject to external shocks. In our model, for a given commodity price p ¡ 0, there
exists a threshold of the endowment ratio Ω{L such that for Ω{L below this threshold
the economy is an importer, i.e., O ¡ Ω, and for Ω{L above it the economy is an
exporter, i.e., O   Ω. An extreme case of dependence is when Ω  0 such that by
assumption the country must import the commodity. 2) Another way to see the link
between the commodity price and the importer/exporter status is to note that, for a
given relative endowment Ω{L, there exists a price threshold pd such that for p   pd
the economy is an importer whereas for p ¡ pd the economy is an exporter. 3) The
proposition also provides an intuitive notion of “dynamic commodity vulnera-
bility” captured by the property that Γ ppq » 0 determines whether the economy
gains or loses from its dynamic response to a higher commodity price. Specifically,
if Γ ppq ¡ 0 home manufacturing expenditure increases in response to a commod-
ity price increase. If Γ ppq   0, instead, home manufacturing expenditure decreases
with a commodity price increase. How persistent these effects are depends on the
parameters of the model. 4) As stated earlier, we focus on the case in which the
upstream materials sector and the downstream manufacturing sector have opposite
substitutability/complementarity properties. Specifically, we assume that materials
production exhibits labor-commodity complementarity while manufacturing exhibits
labor-materials substitution. Accordingly, there exists a threshold of the commodity
price where the economy switches from overall complementarity to overall substi-
tutability. More precisely, there exists a threshold price pv such that Γ ppq   0 for
p   pv and Γ ppq ¡ 0 for p ¡ pv. The reason is that when p is low the cost share
SOM ppq is small and Γ ppq is dominated by the term 1 
O
M ppq, which is positive since
complementarity implies OM ppq   1. In contrast, when p is high, the cost share
SOM ppq is large and Γ ppq is dominated by the term 1 
M
X ppq, which is negative since
substitution implies MX ppq ¡ 1.
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Definition 18. An economy is dependent on the world commodity supply if Ω   O,
that is, if it consumes more of the commodity than it has. An economy is vulnerable
to increases in the world commodity price p if its demand for the commodity is elastic.
Notice that dependence and vulnerability are not the same. The reason is that
home demand is endogenous and adjusts to the world price of the commodity. Figure
3.3 illustrates the determination of the threshold prices pd and pv. The threshold
price pd is increasing in the endowent ratio L{Ω and goes to infinity as L{Ω Ñ 8.
Thus, economies with zero endowment, Ω  0, are dependent for all p. Interestingly,
an economy with a positive endowment can gain from a higher world commodity
price even if it is dependent. The reason is that the revenues from sales of the en-
dowment Ω go up one-for-one with p while import costs go up less than linearly
since home commodity consumption O responds negatively to p. Intuitively, this
specialization effect is stronger the more elastic is home commodity demand. More
importantly, however, what potentially matters most for welfare is not whether the
country experiences an improvement in its commodity trade balance, but whether
it is dynamically vulnerable in the sense defined above. And for dynamic vulnera-
bility, elastic commodity demand is bad news. The reason is that the contraction of
home commodity demand is just the other side of the contraction of manufacturing
activity associated to the specialization effect. The Schumpeterian mechanism at
the heart of the model amplifies such a contraction – the instantaneous fall in Y ppq
– into a deceleration of the rate of TFP growth. The economy eventually reverts
to the steady-state growth rate g, but the temporary deceleration has a potentially
substantial negative effect on welfare.
With these considerations in mind, now imagine a permanent change in the com-
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modity price. For p1 ¡ p we can write
∆ 
x0
x
 1 
Y pp1q {N ppq
Y pp1q {N pp1q
 1.
This is the percentage displacement of the state variable x from its steady state that
occurs at time 0 when the commodity price jumps up from p to p1. The numerator is
the value of profitability holding constant the mass of firms; the denominator is the
value of profitability at the end of the transition, when the mass of firms has fully
adjusted to the new market size. Consider the case of a vulnerable exporter, that is,
an exporter of the commodity with Γ ppq   0.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the path of log u pt; p1q. On impact, technology T is pre-
determined and does not jump, while the price index spike and the windfall effect
work in opposite directions and yield an initial jump in consumption that has an
ambiguous sign. Thereafter, the transitional effects of endogenous TFP take over.
The permanent fall in Y produces a slowdown of TFP growth due to a slowdown of
entry and a reduction in cost-reducing activity internal to the firm. It is apparent
then, that the world commodity price boom benefits this economy if and only if the
windfall effect through pΩ is large enough to compensate for the cost of living effect
through c ppq and the curse effect through ∆   0. Our explicit solution (3.31) in
Proposition 14 shows how the model’s parameters determine the weights of these
effects.
3.5 Fiscal Policy
In this section, we introduce distortionary taxation into the model and study how
the interaction of taxes and conditions in the commodity market shapes the dynamic
response of the model economy to unexpected variations in the commodity price. The
government taxes asset income, rA, at rate τA, commodity income, pΩ, at rate τΩ
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and consumption expenditures, YH  YF , at rate τC . We consider the policy scenario
in which all tax proceeds are rebated in lump-sum form. Hence, we abstract from
income effects and focus exclusively on the pure distortions introduced by ad-valorem
taxes. We compare both steady-state growth rates and transitional dynamics.
The household budget constraint now reads,
9A  p1 τAqrA WL  ΠH   ΠM   p1 τΩqpΩ p1  τCqpYH   YF q  R,
where R  τArA  τCpYH  YF q  τΩpΩ are the proceeds collected from income taxa-
tion.11 Specifically, τArA and τCpYH YF q are revenues from taxing respectively asset
income and consumption expenditures and τΩpΩ are commodity-linked revenues. We
abstract from taxation of profits. In our context, this choice is innocuous for two
reasons: first, from the prospective of the government budget constraint, profits
taxation does not generate any revenues. Since home consumption goods (H) and
materials (M) sectors are both competitive, in equilibrium ΠH  ΠM  0; second,
in the current formulation, a positive tax rate on profits would have no distortionary
effect on the equilibrium optimal allocations. We also abstract from labor income
taxation since we assume labor services are inelastically supplied by the represen-
tative household. Taxing labor income would generate revenues to the government.
However, this latter margin is irrelevant since we focus on the scenario in which tax
revenues are lump-sum rebated to the household.
Because the tax rate on consumption expenditures τC is constant over time, the
optimal expenditure sharing rule remains unaltered such that ϕYF  p1  ϕqYH .
However, the Euler equation governing the intertemporal consumption-saving deci-
sion changes,
p1 τAqr  rA  ρ 
9YH
YH
 ρ 
9YF
YF
. (3.34)
11 In this formulation of the tax code, the tax base for τA is asset income, that is, the sum of
dividends and capital gains. This is equivalent to tax dividends and capital gains at the same rate.
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Intuitively, the tax rate on asset income τA decreases the rate of return to savings.
Since in equilibrium both 9YH{YH  9YF {YF  0, Equation (3.34) implies p1τAqr  ρ.
For notational simplicity, let ρ˜  ρ{p1  τAq denote the effective discount rate, and
notice that an increase in the tax rate τA leads to an increase in ρ˜, such that the
effective discount rate is actually increasing in the tax on asset income.
3.5.1 Growth Effects of Taxation
This section focuses on the effects of taxation on the steady-state growth rate and
the transitional dynamics of the model.
Proposition 19. Let x  Y {N denote the gross profit rate. The general equilibrium
of the model with taxes reduces to the following piece-wise linear differential equation
in the gross profit flow:
9x 
$'''&'''%
δL{N0
p1ξppqq 1

if φ ¤ x ¤ xN
φ
β


1
β
 pρ˜  δq

x if xN   x ¤ xZ
φ ρ˜ δ
α
β


1θp1q
β
 pρ˜  δq

x if x ¡ xZ .
Assuming
φ pρ˜  δq {α
1 θ p 1q  β pρ˜  δq
¡
ρ˜  δ
αθ p 1q
,
the economy with taxes converges to
x 
φ pρ˜  δq {α
1 θ p 1q  β pρ˜  δq
.
The associated steady-state rate of cost-reduction is
Zˆ 
pφα  ρ˜ δq θ p 1q
1 θ p 1q  β pρ˜  δq
 pρ˜  δq ,
which is decrasing in the tax rate on asset income τA.
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Proof. The proof follows the same steps of Proposition 13 with ρ replaced by ρ˜. The
comparative statics with respect to τA follows by simply differentiating the steady-
state growth rate of quality innovation with respect to ρ˜ and recognizing that ρ˜ is
increasing in the tax rate τA.
Proposition 19 provides two important results. 1) Asset income taxation has an
adverse effect on the steady-state growth rate of quality innovation, which is the only
driver of long-run growth in TFP. This happens because the asset income tax distorts
the return to savings, and through the no arbitrage condition r  rA  rZ  rN ,
it negatively affects the effective return to innovation. 2) Tax rates on consump-
tion expenditures and commodity income have instead no effect on the steady-state
growth rate of the model economy. This latter result is not special to the case with
lump-sum tax rebates but it applies generally also with unproductive government
spending.
The following lemma characterizes the effects of taxation on the dynamics of the
gross profit flow x.
Lemma 20. Let x  Y {N denote the gross profit rate, and consider the solution
to the general equilibrium of the model xptq  x0e
ν˜t   xp1  eν˜tq where x0 is
the initial condition, x is the steady state value of x, and the eigenvalue of the
differential equation for x is
rν  # 1β  prρ  δq  rνN if xN   x ¤ xZ1θp1q
β
 pρ˜  δq  rνZ if x ¡ xZ .
The eigenvalue rν is decreasing in the tax rate on asset income τA.
Proof. The comparative statics with respect to τA follows by simply differentiating
the eigenvalue ν˜ with respect to ρ˜ and realizing that ρ˜ is increasing in the tax rate
τA.
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Lemma 20 provides an important result. A positive tax rate on asset income
slows down the transional dynamics towards the steady state. This happens because
the tax rate on asset income τA reduces the eigenvalue of the dynamical system which
is the only driver of the transitional dynamics of the model.
3.5.2 Level Effects of Taxation
This section focuses on the level effects of taxation. The following proposition char-
acterizes the effects of taxation on the level of manufacturing expenditure.
Proposition 21. Under lump-sum rebate of tax proceeds, R  τArA τΩpΩ τCpYH 
YF q, manufacturing expenditure is
Y ppq 
L
1 ξppq  βρ˜
.
Manufacturing expenditure is increasing in the tax rate on asset income, τA, i.e.,
B log Y ppq{BτA ¡ 0.
Moreover, a positive tax on asset income, τA ¡ 0, acts as an automatic amplifier of
commodity price changes,
d2 log Y ppq
dpdτA

#
ρβξ1ppq{p1τAq
2
r1ξppqβρ˜s2
¥ 0 if ξ1ppq ¥ 0
ρβξ1ppq{p1τAq
2
r1ξppqβρ˜s2
¤ 0 if ξ1ppq ¤ 0.
Proof. The proof of the proposition follows the same steps of Proposition 12.
Proposition 21 contains three results. 1) Manufacturing expenditure is increasing
in the tax rate on asset income τA. This happens because a higher tax on asset
income leads a reallocation from savings towards consumption expenditures which
in equilibrium translates into larger expenditure on manufacturing goods. 2) A
positive tax rate on asset income, τA ¡ 0, is an automatic amplifier of commodity
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price changes. 3) Only the tax rate τA enters the determination of manufacturing
expenditures. This happens because both tax rates on consumption expenditures
and commodity income are, for different reasons, not distortionary. The tax rate τC
is not distortionary because it is by assumption constant over time, as such it does not
interfere with the intertemporal consumption allocations. Moreover, since we assume
an inelastic supply of labor services, τC has also no intratemporal distortionary effect
on the consumption-leisure optimal allocation. The tax rate levied on commodity
income τΩ is not distortionary because the commodity is in fixed supply and the
price is assumed constant and exogenous. Recall also that by focusing on the case
of lump-sum rebates, we abstract from potential income effects of taxation.
3.5.3 Further Discussion
The combined of Propositions 19 and 21, and Lemma 20 conveys the main message
of this section: asset income taxation has both level and growth effects. Furthermore,
it acts as an automatic amplifier of commodity price changes and slows down the
transitional dynamics of the model.
From a more general viewpoint, this section also suggests that in this class of
models, the effects of taxation fall in two separate categories: tax instruments that
have only level effects and no growth effects ; tax instruments that have both level
and growth effects.12 By distorting the rate of return through the no arbitrage
condition r  rA  rZ  rN , the tax rate on asset income τA affects the equilibrium
steady-state growth rate of the model economy because it alters the incentives to
innovation. To this category belong not only taxes on asset income, but also any
other tax that creates a wedge in the Euler equation, e.g., time-varying consumption
taxes. Tax rates not interfering with the return to savings and innovation have no
steady-state growth effects but have level effects on the endogenous variables of the
12 See Peretto (2003) for an early discussion of this argument.
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model. To this category belong commmodity income taxes, constant consumption
taxes, and labor income taxes when tax revenues are no longer lump-sum rebated
to the household. In our context, consumption and commodity income taxes have
no level effects because their potential income effect is neutralized by the lump-sum
transfer to the household.
3.6 Numerical Analysis
To further understand the mechanics of the model and how the tax code in place
affects the dynamic properties of our model economy, we conduct a simple numerical
exercise. We assign numerical values to the relevant parameters of the model and
let the tax rate on asset income τA take values that range from 20 to 50 percent.
Notably, this wide range of tax rates is consistent with the available evidence on
cross-country capital income tax rates provided by Mendoza et al. (1994).
3.6.1 Calibration
One period is one year. Table 3.1 contains the baseline parameter values that are
kept constant over the following analysis.
We set   4.33 to match a price markup of 30 percent. Overall, the available
evidence for the U.S. provides estimates of markups in value added data that range
from 1.2 to 1.4.13 Hence, we target a markup in the manufactuting sector of µ 
{p1q  1.3 that is at the middle of the available range of estimates. The condition
for a symmetric equilibrium, θp  1q   1, imposes a restriction on the calibration
of θ, i.e., θ P p0, 1{p  1qq. Furthermore, given the calibrated value of   4.33, we
have an upper bound on θ such that θ P p0, 0.3q. Since we have no reference value
guiding our choice, we set θ  0.15 at the middle of the possible range. The death
13 See Hall (1988), Morrison (1992), Norrbin (1993), Roeger (1995), and Basu and Fernald (1997,
2001).
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rate is set to δ  0.035 to match the average closing rate of establishments in the
U.S. manufacturing sector for 1992-2012. Data for closing establishments are from
the Business Employment Dynamics (BED) survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). The requirement of positive eigenvalues over all the state space of the model
imposes a restriction on the calibration of the entry cost β. Specifically, rνZ ¡ 0
implies β P

0, 1θp1q
prρ δq
	
. Notice that rνZ  rνN  θp  1q{β   rνN guarantees that
the restriction on β is a sufficient condition to have both eigenvalues always greater
than zero. We normalize the entry cost at β  1, which is within the set identified
by the above restrictions. Finally, the time discount rate is set to the conventional
value of 2 percent.
In Figure 3.5 below, we consider a wide spectrum of tax rates that ranges from
20 to 50 percent. Importantly, such a variation in tax rates—20% to 50%— is
consistent with empirical estimates of capital income tax rates. For example, look
at the updated estimates of effective tax rates for a sample of seven OECD countries
over the period 1965-1996, calculated with the method proposed in Mendoza et al.
(1994) and available on Mendoza’s website.
Table 3.2 reports the updated estimates of capital income tax rates for two sample
years. In the data, capital income tax rates display large cross-country variation. In
1980, they range from a minimun of 20 percent for Italy to a maximum of 64.32
percent for the U.K. In 1996, from approximatively a 24 percent for Germany to 51
percent for Canada.
3.6.2 Dynamic Response to a ”Profit Rate Shock”
In this section, we compute the dynamic response of the gross profit rate, x 
Y ppq{Nppq, to a shock that temporarily displaces x from its steady-state value. In
other words, we force the model to be in transition and study how the reversion to the
original steady state depends on the value of the asset income tax τA. To this aim, we
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keep the relevant parameters of the model fixed and vary the tax rate on asset income.
Recall that the gross profit rate x is the key state variable of the model regulating
the incentives to innovate and hence driving the relevant equilibrium dynamics.
Figure 3.5 plots the time path of
xptq
x
 1  ∆erνt
where xptq  x0e
rνt   x
 
1 erνt

, the eigenvalue of the differential equation for x
is
rν 
$&%
1
β


ρ
1τA
  δ
	
 rνN if xN   x ¤ xZ
1θp1q
β


ρ
1τA
  δ
	
 rνZ if x ¡ xZ
and the initial percentage displacement from the steady state is ∆  x0
x
 1—we
call this a “profit rate shock.” Given an initial displacement of ∆  1%, we assess
how the speed of reversion to the steady state differs at different levels of asset
income taxation. Since the equilibrium gross profit flow x follows a linear differential
equation, the speed of reversion to the steady state is governed by the magnitude of
the eigenvalue rν, which depends on the tax rate τA and other parameters. Precisely,
the eigenvalue rν is decreasing in τA, i.e., higher asset income taxation leads to a
slower reversion to the steady state for a given displacement ∆. Furthermore, rνZ rνN  θp1q{β   rνN such that the dynamics in the “entry and quality regime” (i.e.
for x ¡ xZ) are slower than those in the “entry only regime” (i.e. for xN   x ¤ xZ).
Notice also that, as stated in Proposition 19, the steady-state values of x vary
across taxation levels such that the dynamic responses in Figure 3.5 depict the rever-
sion to the steady state associated with each tax rate τA. Moreover, we shock directly
the state variable x and keep a displacement of ∆  1% in all cases we consider.
In other words, we take the impact response of the economy to a commodity price
shock as given, and focus exclusively on how asset income taxation affects the speed
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of reversion to the steady state due to the dynamics of the profit rate regardless of
what causes its initial displacement. Later in this section, we discuss instead how the
tax on asset income affects the impact response of the profit rate x to a commodity
price shock.
Figure 3.5 contains three results. 1) The transitional dynamics are unambiguously
slower in the “entry and quality regime,” i.e. for x ¡ xZ , compared to the “entry
only regime,” i.e. for xN   x ¤ xZ . This result holds irrespective of the specific
value taken by the tax rate on asset income. Even in the benchmark case with no
distortionary taxation, i.e. τA  0, the difference in the speed of reversion to the
steady state across regimes is quite striking. In the “entry only regime,” the gap
from the steady state is vitually closed 30 years after the shock. In the “entry and
quality regime” instead, it takes more than 50 years to close the same initial gap of 1
percent. Importantly, the latter observations implicitly suggest that the persistence
of the effects of unexpected commodity price changes greatly varies across growth
regimes. 2) In each regime, the speed of reversion is decreasing in the tax rate τA.
This is not surprising given the content of Lemma 20, which holds for all values that
the asset income tax rate takes on the possible range, i.e., τA P r0, 1q. 3) Asset income
taxation has larger effects in the “entry and quality regime” than in the “entry only
regime.” This latter result and the different persistence of shocks across the two
regimes highlight a distinctive and appealing feature of our theoretical structure.
The dynamics of the model and so the interaction of asset income taxation with
commodity prices have quantitatively different effects at different stages of economic
development.
Up to now, we studied the speed of reversion to the steady state taking as given
the initial displacement in x. However, asset income taxation also affects the impact
response of the profit rate x to a commodity price shock. As formally stated in
Proposition 21, the change in manufacturing spending Y ppq induced by a change in
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the commodity price p is increasing in the tax rate τA. This implies that for a given
commodity price shock, the impact response of x  Y ppq{Nppq is larger at higher
levels of asset income taxation. Hence, we next show that the initial displacement
∆ induced by a commodity price change—impact response—is increasing in the tax
rate on asset income τA. To understand why this is the case, lets consider a scenario
in which there is a permanent fall in the commodity price, i.e, p1   p, and the
economy operates under “global substitution,” such that ∆Y  Y pp
1q  Y ppq ¡ 0
for all p1   p (see Proposition 16 for more details on global substitutability). Recall
that the “long-run commodity price super-neutrality” result stated in Proposition 13
implies that xpp1q  xppq. Moreover, Proposition 21 states that ∆Y pτ
1
Aq ¡ ∆Y pτAq
for all τ 1A ¡ τA. With these results in mind, lets write the initial displacement ∆ as
∆ 
x0
x
 1 
Y pp1q{Nppq
Y pp1q{Npp1q
 1 
Npp1q
Nppq
 1  ∆N ¡ 0. (3.35)
The combined of Propositions 13, 16, and 21 then implies that ∆Npτ
1
Aq ¡ ∆NpτAq
for all τ 1A ¡ τA. Therefore, the impact response ∆ to a commodity price shock is
increasing in the asset income tax τA.
To summarize, after an unexpected fall in the commodity price—p to p1—output
in the manufacturing sector Y ppq spikes to the new steady-state level Y pp1q. After the
initial spike ∆, the reversion to the new steady state x  Y pp1q{Npp1q is governed
by positive net entry of firms—Nppq to Npp1q with Npp1q ¡ Nppq. The magnitude
and duration of each phase is affected by the level of asset income taxation.
Overall, the model suggests that taxation of asset income affects the entire re-
sponse to a commodity price shock, i.e., impact response and steady-state reversion.
Specifically, higher levels of asset income taxation imply a larger response on im-
pact with a slower reversion to the steady state. In this latter respect, the analysis
points to the interaction of fiscal policy with conditions in the commodity market
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as an important mechanism through which external shocks to commodity prices are
amplified and transmitted through the economy.
3.6.3 Policy Response to a Commodity Price Decline
In Section 3.6.2 above, we discussed the dynamic properties of the model in response
to a commodity price permanent change keeping the level of asset income taxation
fixed to a specified level. In this section instead, we discuss the scenario in which
the government changes the tax rate on asset income in response to a decline in
commodity prices.
Using equations (3.34) and (3.6), and the free-entry condition A  NV  βWY ,
we rewrite government revenues R  τArA  τΩpΩ  τCpYH   YF q as,
Rppq 

ρβτA
1 τA
  τC

Y ppq   τΩpΩ  τCp pΩOq . (3.36)
Lets consider the case in which pΩOq ¡ 0, i.e., the economy is a net commodity
exporter. We believe this is the most relevant case for the current policy debate on
commodity-rich countries. Equation (3.36) identifies three channels through which
commodity prices affect government revenues: 1) the indirect effect through manufac-
turing expenditure Y ppq; 2) the direct windfall effect through taxation of commodity
income pΩ; and 3) the direct expenditure effect, which through the balance trade con-
dition YH   YF   ppO  Ωq  Y , manifests itself as taxation of exports ppΩ  Oq.
Notice that the sign of the first effect depends on how manufacturing expenditure
Y ppq responds to commodity price changes. Specifically, a commodity price decline
has a positive effect if the economy operates under “global substitution,” a nega-
tive effect under “global complementarity,” and it is neutral in a “Cobb-Douglas-like
economy.”14 The sign of the second and third effect is instead unambiguous.
14 See Proposition 16 for more details on the properties of Y ppq.
162
At this stage, the notion of fiscal dependence is operational: if commodity-linked
revenues, τΩpΩ, represent a large fraction of total fiscal revenues R, then government
revenues are vulnerable to commodity price movements.
Lets consider now a scenario in which there is a permanent fall in the commodity
price, i.e., p1   p, and government revenues fall such that Rpp1q   Rppq. If the
government let the lump-sum rebate to the household decrease accordingly then all
the dynamics would be those described in Section 3.6.2. However, if the government
raises the tax rate on asset income to τ 1A ¡ τA in response to the tax revenue shortfall
then the dynamic response to the shock change along two dimensions: 1) according to
the discussion of Section 3.6.2, the shock to the commodity price is further amplified
and its effects made more persistent; and 2) according to Proposition 19, the steady-
state growth rate of TFP decreases. Thus, the commodity price change has an
indirect adverse effect on long-run growth. This happens exclusively because of the
government’s reaction to the tax revenue shortfall. Overall, the analysis suggests
that the short- and long-run performance of commodity-rich economies depends on
the policy response implemented in the aftermath of the commodity price decline.
3.7 Conclusions
We develop a Schumpeterian small-open-economy model of endogenous growth. We
focus on three policy relevant questions for commodity-exporting countries. How
does the economy respond to external shocks to commmodity prices? How is the
dynamic response to commodity price changes affected by the structure of the tax
code in place? And, how should governments adjust taxation in response to declining
commodity income? The model is analytically transparent in that we derive closed-
form solutions for the transitional dynamics. This allows us to compute welfare and
disentangle the short- and long-run effects of distortionary taxation.
The results can be summarized as follows. 1) “Long-run commodity price super-
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neutrality.” Commodity price changes affect the transitional dynamics of the model
but have no effect on the steady-state growth rate of the economy. This is an impor-
tant results since it suggests that, absent fiscal considerations, the long-run growth
performance of an economy like ours is completely insulated from the conditions in
the commodity market. 2) An increase in the tax on asset income has a positive level
effect on manufacturing expenditure but it has an adverse effect on the steady-state
growth rate of the economy. This implies if the government endogenously raises the
tax rate on asset income in response to a shortfall of resource revenues then commod-
ity price changes can still have indirect adverse effects on the steady-state growth
rate of the economy. Notice that these negative long-run effects are exclusively the
result of the (misguided) government’s response to changes in the economic envi-
ronment. Finally, 3) a positive tax rate on asset income amplifies external shocks
to the commodity price and slows down the reversion to the steady state after a
commodity price shock. Overall, the theoratical analysis suggests that, in the af-
termath of commodity price declines, the short- and long-run economic performance
of a country is sensitive to the structure of the tax code in place and to the policy
response implemented. In this sense, countries are fiscally vulnerable.
3.8 Tables and Figures
This section contains the main tables and figures of the essay.
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Table 3.1: Baseline Parameters
Parameter Interpretation Value
{p 1q Mfg price markup 1.3
θ Mfg prod. function: Xi  Z
θ
i F pLXi  φ,Miq 0.15
ρ Discount rate 0.02
δ Death rate 0.035
β Mfg entry cost: Vi  β 
WY
N
1
Table 3.2: Capital Income Tax Rates by Mendoza et al. (1994)
Year Canada France Germany Italy Japan U.K. U.S.
1980 37.60 27.31 32.11 20.02 35.98 64.32 46.88
1996 50.66 26.11 23.91 33.86 42.61 47.17 39.62
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Figure 3.5: Dynamic Response to a “Profit Rate Shock”
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Data Sources
The seasonally-adjusted monthly U.S. unemployment rate, participation rate (frac-
tion of the population in the labor force), unemployment rates by age, gender,
education, employment (thousands of persons), unemployment (thousands of per-
sons), and short-term unemployment level (thousands of persons, number of unem-
ployed persons for less than five weeks) are constructed by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Survey home page
http://www.bls.gov/cps/. Seasonally-adjusted monthly employment (thousands
of persons) by major sectors is constructed by the BLS from the Current Employ-
ment Statistics (CES). Survey home page http://www.bls.gov/ces/. Following
Yedid-Levi (2013), I classify natural resources and mining, construction, durable
goods manufacturing, and a half of professional and business services as investment
sector, and the rest as consumption sector. State-level employment rates are from
the Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) survey of the BLS for the pe-
riod 1976:Q1-2012:Q2. Survey home page http://www.bls.gov/lau/. CPS micro
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data for 1976:M1-2013:M2 are downloaded from the NBER website at http://www.
nber.org/data/cps_basic.html. Seasonally-adjusted quarterly hours, hours per
worker, and real output per worker in the nonfarm business sector is constructed
by the BLS from the Labor and Productivity Costs (LPC) release. Release home
page http://www.bls.gov/lpc. BLS definitions: Business sector output (BSO)
is the annual-weighted index constructed by the BLS after excluding from gross
domestic product (GDP) the following outputs: general government, nonprofit in-
stitutions, paid employees of private households, and the rental value of owner-
occupied dwellings. Nonfarm business sector output (NBSO) excludes from the
business sector the farm sector. The series are downloaded from the FRED web-
site at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. Monthly job-finding and job
separation rates are calculated based on Shimer (2012). Vacancies are the monthly
composite Help-Wanted Index constructed by Barnichon (2010).
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A.2 Tables and Figures
Table A.1: Asymmetry in Employment Rates by Age
25-34 35-44 45-54 55+
Skewpe˜q 0.728 0.690 0.610 0.407
(0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.009)
Skewp∆eq 1.033 0.866 0.775 0.434
(0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.075)
Notes: e is a logged quarterly average of the seasonally-adjusted monthly U.S. em-
ployment rate (fraction of the labor force working in a given month, one minus the
unemployment rate) by age group. e˜ is the HP-filtered counterpart of e with smoothing
parameter 105. Data are from the CPS survey of the BLS for the period 1948:Q1-
2013:Q1. Survey home page http://www.bls.gov/cps/. Data are downloaded from
the FRED website at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. P-values (one-sided
test) in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote statistical significance respectively at 1%, 5%
and 10% level.
Table A.2: Asymmetry in Employment Rates by Education
HSD HSG SC CGPC
Skewpe˜q 0.553 0.675 0.396 0.140
(0.032) (0.022) (0.073) (0.298)
Skewp∆eq 1.582 1.527 1.537 1.088
(0.090) (0.076) (0.082) (0.065)
Notes: e is a logged quarterly average of the seasonally-adjusted monthly U.S. employ-
ment rate (fraction of the labor force working in a given month, one minus the unemploy-
ment rate) by education gropus. e˜ is the HP-filtered counterpart of e with smoothing
parameter 105. HSD, HSG, SC and CGPC denote respectively High School Dropouts,
High School Graduates, Some College and College Graduates and Post-College Degree
Holders. Data are from the CPS survey of the BLS for the period 1992:Q11-2013:Q1.
Survey home page http://www.bls.gov/cps/. Data are downloaded from the FRED
website at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. P-values (one-sided test) in
parenthesis. **, * denote statistical significance respectively at 5% and 10% level.
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Table A.3: Asymmetry in Employment Rates By Gender
Men Women
Skewpe˜q 0.690 0.417
(0.004) (0.012)
Skewp∆eq 0.938 1.372
(0.002) (0.009)
Notes: e is a logged quarterly average of the seasonally-adjusted monthly U.S. em-
ployment rate (fraction of the labor force working in a given month, one minus the
unemployment rate) by gender. e˜ is the HP-filtered counterpart of e with smoothing
parameter 105. Data are from the CPS survey of the BLS for the period 1948:Q1-
2012:Q2. Survey home page http://www.bls.gov/cps/. Data are downloaded from
the FRED website at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. P-values (one-sided
test) in parenthesis. ***, ** denote statistical significance respectively at 1% and 5%
level.
Table A.4: Asymmetry in Employment by Sector
Consumption Investment
Skewpe˜q 0.271 0.266
(0.055) (0.075)
Skewp∆e˜q 0.820 0.530
(0.003) (0.065)
Notes: e is a logged quarterly average of seasonally-adjusted monthly employment
(thousands of persons) as deviations from the HP trend with smoothing parameter 105.
Data are from the CES survey of the BLS for the period 1948:Q1-2012:Q2. Survey
home page http://www.bls.gov/ces/. Following Yedid-Levi (2013), I classify natural
resources and mining, construction, durable goods manufacturing, and a half of profes-
sional and business services as investment sector, and the rest as consumption sector.
Data are downloaded from the FRED website at http://research.stlouisfed.org/
fred2/. P-values (one-sided test) in parenthesis. ***, * denote statistical significance
respectively at 1% and 10% level.
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Figure A.1: Deepness Asymmetry in Quarterly U.S. Output, 1948:Q1-2012:Q2
Notes: All series are in logs as deviations from the HP trend with smoothing parameter 1600.
In Panel A, business sector output (BSO) is the annual-weighted index constructed by the BLS
after excluding from gross domestic product (GDP) the following outputs: general government,
nonprofit institutions, paid employees of private households, and the rental value of owner-occupied
dwellings. In Panel B, nonfarm business sector output (NBSO) excludes from the business sector
the farm sector. In Panel C, real GDP is in billions of chained 2005 dollars. Data are seasonally-
adjusted at the quarterly frequency for the period 1948:Q1-2012:Q2. BSO and NBSO data are from
the LPC release of the BLS. Release home page http://www.bls.gov/lpc. BSO and NBSO data
are downloaded from the FRED website at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. Real
GDP data are from the NIPA Table 1.1.6. and downloaded from the BEA website at http:
//www.bea.gov/index.htm.
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Figure A.2: Steepness Asymmetry in Quarterly U.S. Output, 1948:Q1-2012:Q2
Notes: All series are in log-first-differences. In Panel A, business sector output (BSO) is the annual-
weighted index constructed by the BLS after excluding from gross domestic product (GDP) the
following outputs: general government, nonprofit institutions, paid employees of private house-
holds, and the rental value of owner-occupied dwellings. In Panel B, nonfarm business sector
output (NBSO) excludes from the business sector the farm sector. In Panel C, real GDP is in
billions of chained 2005 dollars. Data are seasonally-adjusted at the quarterly frequency for the
period 1948:Q1-2012:Q2. BSO and NBSO data are from the LPC release of the BLS. Release home
page http://www.bls.gov/lpc. BSO and NBSO data are downloaded from the FRED website
at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. Real GDP data are from the NIPA Table 1.1.6.
and downloaded from the BEA website at http://www.bea.gov/index.htm.
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Figure A.3: Asymmetry in Employment Rates by State
Notes: In Panel A, red dot indicates the value of the skewness coefficient for the U.S. state-
level employment rate (fraction of the labor force working in a given month, one minus the
unemployment rate) as deviations from the HP trend with smoothing parameter 105. In Panel
B, red dot indicates the value of the skewness coefficient for the first-difference of the U.S.
state-level employment rate. Employment rate is the logged quarterly average of the monthly
series. On the x-axis, U.S. states are in alphabetical order. Data are from the LAUS survey of
the BLS for the period 1976:Q1-2012:Q2. Survey home page http://www.bls.gov/lau/. Data
are downloaded from the FRED website at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
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Figure A.4: Quarterly U.S. Employment Rate and Stochastic Equilibrium,
1948:Q1-2012:Q2
Notes: Solid line shows a quarterly average of the U.S. employment rate (fraction of the labor
force working in a given month, one minus the unemployment rate) for the period 1948:Q1-
2012:Q2. The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate is from the CPS survey of the BLS
for the period 1948:Q1-2012:Q2. Survey home page http://www.bls.gov/cps/. Data are
downloaded from the FRED website at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. Dashed
line shows the counterfactual employment rate series under stochastic equilibrium. See Section
1.2.2 for details.
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Table A.5: Calibration of the Standard DMP Model
Interpretation Value Source/Target
β Discount factor 0.9959 5% annual interest rate
δ Separation rate 0.036 JOLTS, 2001:M1-2011:M9
k Vacancy cost 0.1669 θ  1 when z  1
α Matching function: mpv, uq  µvαu1α 0.4 Bru¨gemann (2008)
µ Matching function scale 0.607 Median unemployment rate of 5.6%
η Worker Nash-bargaining weight 0.6 Hosios (1990)’s condition
λ Flow value of unemployment 0.7221 0.73% of mean wage rate
ρz Autocorrelation of exogenous state 0.9642 LPC, 1948:Q1-2011:Q3
σ Standard deviation of shocks 0.0055 LPC, 1948:Q1-2011:Q3
Notes: The separation rate, δ, is the monthly average of seasonally-adjusted total separa-
tions to employment in the nonfarm business sector. Data are from the JOLTS survey of
the BLS for the period 2001:M1-2011:M9. Survey home page http://www.bls.gov/jlt/.
To calibrate the stochatic process for labor productivity, I estimate an AR(1) process
for the HP-filtered seasonally-adjusted quarterly real output per worker in the nonfarm
business sector constructed by the BLS from the LPC release, for 1948:Q1-2011:Q3:
lnpzt 1q  ρz lnpztq   σt 1 with t
iid
 N p0, 1q. The HP-filter smoothing parameter is
105. With quarterly data, we obtain an autocorrelation of ρˆz  0.8963 and a residual
standard deviation of σˆ  0.0091, which yields ρˆz  0.8963
1{3  0.9642 and σˆ  0.0055
at monthly frequency. Following Tauchen (1986), I approximate the continuous-valued
AR(1) process for lnpztq through a S-state Markov chain, having a discrete state space
tz1, . . . , zSu and transition probabilities pis,s1  Pr tzt 1  zs1 |zt  zsu. I set the number
of grid points for the state space to S  9. Release home page http://www.bls.gov/lpc.
Nonfarm business sector output (NBSO) excludes from the business sector the farm sec-
tor. Business sector output (BSO) is the annual-weighted index constructed by the BLS
after excluding from gross domestic product (GDP) the following outputs: general gov-
ernment, nonprofit institutions, paid employees of private households, and the rental
value of owner-occupied dwellings. Data are downloaded from the FRED website at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
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Table A.6: Volatility and Comovement in U.S. Data and DMP Model
Data DMP Model DMP Model
λ  0.73  ω¯ λ  0.95  ω¯
A. Volatility
sdpuq{sdppq 9.851 1.303 7.864
sdpφq{sdppq 7.213 1.401 8.599
sdpvq{sdppq 8.131 2.284 14.167
B. Comovement
corrpu, vq -0.858 -0.900 -0.880
corrpu, pq -0.412 -0.958 -0.934
corrpφ, pq 0.383 0.999 0.974
corrpv, pq 0.433 0.986 0.954
Notes: The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate, u, is from the CPS survey of the BLS.
Survey home page http://www.bls.gov/cps/. Labor productivity, p, is seasonally-adjusted
quarterly real output per worker in the nonfarm business sector constructed by the BLS from
the LPC release. Release home page http://www.bls.gov/lpc. Nonfarm business sector
output (NBSO) excludes from the business sector the farm sector. Business sector output
(BSO) is the annual-weighted index constructed by the BLS after excluding from gross
domestic product (GDP) the following outputs: general government, nonprofit institutions,
paid employees of private households, and the rental value of owner-occupied dwellings.
The series are downloaded from the FRED website at http://research.stlouisfed.org/
fred2/. Job-finding rates, φ, are calculated based on Shimer (2012). Vacancies, v, are the
composite Help-Wanted Index constructed by Barnichon (2010). The variables u, φ, and v
are quarterly averages of monthly series. All series cover the period 1948:Q1-2011:Q3. DMP
model refers to the standard DMP model with Nash-Bargaining and a constant exogenous
rate of job destruction. λ and ω¯ denote respectively the flow value of unemployment and
the mean wage rate. Model simulated data are quarterly averages of 765 observations at
the monthly frequency. The statistics reported are averages across 500 replications. All
variables are reported in logs as deviations from the HP trend with smoothing parameter
105.
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Table A.7: Asymmetry in U.S. Data and DMP Model
Data DMP Model DMP Model
λ  0.73  ω¯ λ  0.95  ω¯
A. Skewness in levels
Skewpeq 0.591 -0.105 -0.898
Skewpyq 0.345 -0.000 -0.267
Skewpφq 0.249 -0.068 -0.649
Skewpvq 0.469 -0.081 -0.760
B. Skewness in growth rates
Skewp∆eq 0.958 0.018 0.158
Skewp∆yq 0.170 0.002 0.089
Skewp∆φq 0.235 0.000 0.007
Skewp∆vq 0.613 0.012 0.110
Notes: Employment rate, e, is the fraction of the labor force working in a given month, one
minus the unemployment rate. The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate is from the CPS
survey of the BLS. Survey home page http://www.bls.gov/cps/. Output, y, is industrial
production (IP). The series are downloaded from the FRED website at http://research.
stlouisfed.org/fred2/. Job-finding rates, φ, are calculated based on Shimer (2012).
Vacancies, v, are the composite Help-Wanted Index constructed by Barnichon (2010). The
variables e, y, φ, and v are quarterly averages of monthly series. All series cover the period
for period 1948:Q1-2011:Q3. DMP model refers to the standard DMP model with Nash-
Bargaining and a constant exogenous rate of job destruction. λ and ω¯ denote respectively
the flow value of unemployment and the mean wage rate. Model simulated data are quarterly
averages of 765 observations at the monthly frequency. The statistics reported are averages
across 500 replications. In Panel A, all variables are reported in logs as deviations from the
HP trend with smoothing parameter 105. In Panel B, all variables are reported as 3-months
log-differences. ***, ** denote statistical significance respectively at 1% and 5% level.
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Table A.8: Volatility Shares by Age/Education Group
16-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
A. Cov. not incl.
HSD 17.90 2.56 1.03 1.31 0.92 0.04
HSG/SC 26.57 22.27 7.44 10.93 4.18 0.25
CGPC 0.16 0.85 0.94 1.49 1.08 0.08
B. Cov. incl.
HSD 9.43 5.18 3.79 4.38 2.96 0.42
HSG/SC 19.87 19.15 7.70 8.66 5.98 1.03
CGPC 1.55 3.80 2.04 1.65 1.92 0.50
Notes: Data are from the CPS micro files for 1976:M1-2013:M2 and downloaded from
the NBER website at http://www.nber.org/data/cps_basic.html. HSD, HSG,
SC and CGPC denote respectively High School Dropouts, High School Graduates,
Some College and College Graduates and Post-College Degree Holders. Seasonal
adjustment is implemented with a 13-term symmetric moving average. The statistics
reported are percentage shares of total U.S. unemployment rate variance attributed
to each age-education group. “Cov. not incl.” means covariance terms are ignored
such that total variation is the sum of the variables’ variances. “Cov. incl.” means
total variation includes covariance terms such that total variation is the sum of the
variables’ variances plus two times their covariance.
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Table A.9: Unemployment versus Participation Margin by Age/Education Group
16-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
A. Unemployment margin
HSD 93.36 97.41 98.23 97.72 98.92 93.75
HSG/SC 98.76 99.71 99.70 99.66 99.67 97.51
CGPC 95.27 99.56 99.63 99.26 98.18 97.21
B. Participation margin
HSD 6.64 2.59 1.77 2.28 1.08 6.25
HSG/SC 1.24 0.29 0.30 0.34 0.33 2.49
CGPC 4.73 0.44 0.37 0.74 1.82 2.79
Notes: Data are from the CPS micro files for 1976:M1-2013:M2 and downloaded from
the NBER website at http://www.nber.org/data/cps_basic.html. HSD, HSG,
SC and CGPC denote respectively High School Dropouts, High School Graduates,
Some College and College Graduates and Post-College Degree Holders. Seasonal ad-
justment is implemented with a 13-term symmetric moving average. Data are logged
and HP-filtered with smoothing parameter 129,000 at the monthly frequency. See
Ravn and Uhlig (2002) for a thorough discussion on the choice of the HP smoothing
parameter and the frequency of observations. The statistics reported are percentage
shares of total unemployment shares variance attributed to the unemployment and
participation margin by each education group. Covariance terms are not included
such that total variation is the sum of the variables’ variances.
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Figure A.5: Conditional Heteroskedasticity in Quarterly U.S. Unemployment Rate,
1959:Q1-2012:Q2
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A.3 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 6. Standard reasoning provides the reservation productivity,
zx  λ 
ηk
1 η
 θ  ξβp1 δq 
» xM
x
SpyqdGpyq. (A.1)
Rearrange equation (A.1) to get,
θ 
1 η
ηk


zx λ  ξβp1 δq 
» xM
x
SpyqdGpyq

. (A.2)
In equation (A.2), as long as the term in square brackets is larger than zero,
limk×0 θpkq   8 and limk×0 epkq  1. On the other hand, as the term in square
brackets falls below zero, limk×0 θpkq  0 and limk×0 epkq  0. 
Lemma 22 (Convexity of market tightness). At any stochastic equilibrium con-
sistent with a constant exogenous rate of job destruction, the tightness ratio, θ, is a
strictly increasing and convex function of the exogenous state, z, i.e., θ  ϕ pzq with
ϕ1 pq ¡ 0 and ϕ2 pq ¡ 0.
Proof of Lemma 22. At any stochastic equilibrium consistent with a constant
exogenous rate of job destruction, the total match surplus Ss is,
Ss 
zs  λ
1 β

1 δ  ηφpθsq

for s  1, . . . ,S. After substituting Ss into the free-entry condition, k  βρ pθsq p1 ηqSs,
using φ pθq  µθα, and rearranging terms,
k

1 β p1 δq
loooooooomoooooooon
A¡0
 βµ p1 ηqloooomoooon
B¡0
pz  λq θα1  kβµηlomon
C¡0
θα,
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where we omit the state subscript, s, for notational convenience. I can further
rearrange the equation above to get θ as an implicit function F pθ, zq of z,
F pθ, zq  Aθ1α   Cθ  Bz  Bλ.
By applying the implicit function theorem,
dθ
dz
 
BF pθ, zq {Bz
BF pθ, zq {Bθ

B
A p1 αq θα   C ¡ 0,
implying that θ is strictly increasing in z. To further characterize the shape of the
relationship between the market-tightness ratio and the exogenous state, I compute
d2θ{dzdθ,
d2θ
dzdθ

α p1 αqAθp1 αqA p1 αq θα   C2 ¡ 0 (A.3)
such that θ is strictly convex in z, and this proves the lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 8. Part (i). From Lemma 22, the tightness ratio is a
strictly increasing and convex function of the exogenous state z, i.e., θ  ϕ pzq with
ϕ1 pq ¡ 0 and ϕ2 pq ¡ 0. By Jensen’s inequality,
E rθs  E rϕ pzqs ¡ ϕ pE rzsq .
By Assumption 3, E rzs  zsm such that ϕ pE rzsq  ϕ pzsmq and E rϕ pzqs ¡
ϕ pzsmq. Hence,
∆θMMD  E rθs  θsm ¡ 0
and this proves part (i) of the proposition. Part (ii). At any stochastic equilib-
rium consistent with a constant exogenous rate of job destruction, the employment
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rate, job-finding rate, vacancies, and log output are strictly increasing and concave
functions of the tightness ratio θ. Consider a generic increasing and concave func-
tion ξ pθq, with ξ1 pq ¡ 0 and ξ2 pq   0. By Jensen’s inequality, we know that
E rξ pθqs   ξ pE rθsq, and by adding and subtracting ξ pθsmq on the right hand side of
the inequality, we get
∆ξMMD  E rξ pθqs  ξ pθsmq   ξ pE rθsq  ξ pθsmq   ξ1pθsmq∆θMMD ¡ 0.
The second term on the right hand side, ξ pE rθsq  ξ pθsmq, is larger than zero
given that ∆θMMD  E rθs  θsm ¡ 0 and ξ1 pq ¡ 0. The second inequality on the
right hand side is a fundamental property of concave functions. Finally, the third
term on the right hand side, ξ1pθsmq∆θMMD, is larger than zero given ξ
1pq ¡ 0 and
∆θMMD ¡ 0 from part (i), and this completes the proof of the proposition. 
Proof of Corollary 9. The symmetry and uni-modality of the stationary distri-
bution of the exogenous state, z, (Assumption 3), and the linear support of the
distribution of the tightness ratio θ,
θs  θsm  
ps smq
pS  smq ∆,
imply that ∆θMMD  E rθs  θsm  0. From Proposition 8, it follows that for any
incrasing and concave function of the tightness ratio ξpθq (i.e., employment rate,
job-finding rate, vacancies, log output), ∆ξMMD  E rξ pθqs  ξ pθsmq   0, and this
proves the corollary. 
Proof of Proposition 10. Part (i). The state space of the tightness ratio θ
is the finite set Θ  tθ1, . . . , θSu. In order to isolate the effects of an increase in
volatility, let’s assume that θs P Θ takes on values, θ1   . . .   θsm   . . .   θS , that
are symmetrically spaced around the median θsm , satisfying the condition:
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θs  θsm  
ps smq
pS  smq ∆
for s P t1, . . . ,Su and ∆ ¡ 0. The parameter ∆ controls the range of variation of
the support of the distribution of θ. Notice that by construction, changes in ∆ have
no effect on the median value θsm . Given the symmetry assumption pi
s
8  pi
Ss 1
8
for s  1, . . . , sm (Assumption 3), also the expected value of θ under the stationary
distribution pi8 is invariant to changes in ∆ and equal to the median value θsm ,
i.e., E rθs 
°S
s1 pi
s
8θs  θsm for all ∆ ¥ 0. Hence, the parameter ∆ acts like a
mean-median-preserving spread in the distribution of θ.
In any equilibrium of the model consistent with a constant exogenous rate of job
destruction δ, the unemployment rate follows a S-state Markov chain with stochastic
equilibrium
us 
δ
δ   φpθsq
(A.4)
for s P t1, . . . ,Su. The function fpθq  δ
δ φpθq
is differentiable, decreasing, f 1pq   0,
and convex, f2pq ¡ 0, with fp0q  1 and limθÑ8 fpθq  0.
Let ∆uMMD  E rus  usm denote the difference between the expected and the
median value of unemployment, and use u  fpθq to write ∆uMMD as:
∆uMMD 
°S
s1 pi
s
8fpθsq  fpθsmq  ppi
sm
8  1q fpθsmq   pi
1
8f pθsm ∆q   . . .
. . .  pism18 f

θsm 
∆
Ssm
	
  . . .  pism 18 f

θsm  
∆
Ssm
	
  . . .  piS8f pθsm  ∆q .
By using the symmetry assumption pis8  pi
Ss 1
8 for s  1, . . . , sm (Assumption
3), we can rewrite the expression above as,
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∆uMMD  ppi
sm
8  1q fpθsmq   pi
1
8 rf pθsm ∆q   f pθsm  ∆qs   . . .
. . .  pism18

f

θsm 
∆
S  sm


  f

θsm  
∆
S  sm


.
We are interested in how ∆uMMD changes as ∆ increases:
B∆uMMD
B∆
 pi18 rf
1pθsm  ∆q  f
1pθsm ∆qs   . . .
. . . 
pism18
S  sm

f 1

θsm  
∆
S  sm


 f 1

θsm 
∆
S  sm


.(A.5)
Using f 1pq   0, we rewrite (A.5) is a slightly different way,
B∆uMMD
B∆
 pi18 rf
1 pθsm ∆q  f
1 pθsm  ∆qs   . . .
. . . 
pism18
S  sm
f 1θsm  ∆S  sm

 f 1θsm   ∆S  sm

 .(A.6)
Since f 1pq   0 and f2pq ¡ 0, f 1 pθsm  q ¡ f
1 pθsm   q for all  ¡ 0, and all
terms in square brackets on the right hand side of (A.6) are strictly positive,
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f 1 pθsm ∆q ¡ f
1 pθsm  ∆q
f 1θsm  psm  2q∆S  sm

 ¡ f 1θsm   psm  2q∆S  sm


...
...
...
...
...
...
f 1θsm  ∆S  sm

 ¡ f 1θsm   ∆S  sm

,
such that B∆uMMD{B∆ ¡ 0 for all ∆ ¡ 0. Given es  1  us for s P t1, . . . ,Su,
∆eMMD  ∆uMMD. Hence, B∆eMMD{B∆  B∆uMMD{B∆   0, and this proves
part (i) of the proposition. Part (ii). In any equilibrium of the model consistent
with a constant exogenous rate of job destruction, the job-finding rate φpθq follows
a S-state Markov chain with state space Φ  tφpθ1q, . . . , φpθSqu. Given Assumption
1, the function φpθq is differentiable, increasing, φ1pq ¡ 0, and concave, φ2pq   0.
Let ∆φMMD  E rφpθqs  φpθsmq denote the difference between the expected and
the median value of the job-finding rate. Following the same steps as before for the
unemployment rate, we rewrite ∆φMMD as:
∆φMMD  ppi
sm
8  1qφpθsmq   pi
1
8 rφ pθsm ∆q   φ pθsm  ∆qs   . . .
. . .  pism18

φ

θsm 
∆
S  sm


  φ

θsm  
∆
S  sm


.
We are interested in how ∆φMMD changes as ∆ increases:
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B∆φMMD
B∆
 pi18 rφ
1pθsm  ∆q  φ
1pθsm ∆qs   . . .
. . . 
pism18
S  sm

φ1

θsm  
∆
S  sm


 φ1

θsm 
∆
S  sm


.(A.7)
Since φ1pq ¡ 0 and φ2pq   0, φ1 pθsm   q   φ
1 pθsm  q for all  ¡ 0, such that all
terms in square brackets on the right hand side of (A.7) are strictly negative. Hence,
B∆φMMD{B∆   0 for all ∆ ¡ 0, and this proves part (ii) of the proposition. Part
(iii). In any equilibrium of the model consistent with a constant exogenous rate of
job destruction, vacancies follow a S-state Markov chain with stochastic equilibrium
vs  θsus, for s P t1, . . . ,Su. Let’s write vacancies as vs  θsfpθsq, where the function
fpθq is differentiable, decreasing, f 1pq   0, and convex, f2pq ¡ 0.
Let ∆vMMD  E rvs  vsm denote the difference between the expected and the
median value of vacancies. By using the symmetry assumption pis8  pi
Ss 1
8 for
s  1, . . . , sm (Assumption 3), we can write ∆vMMD as,
∆vMMD  ppi
sm
8  1q θsmfpθsmq  
 pi18 rpθsm ∆q f pθsm ∆q   pθsm  ∆q f pθsm  ∆qs   . . .
. . .  pism18

θsm 
∆
Ssm
	
f

θsm 
∆
Ssm
	
 

θsm  
∆
Ssm
	
f

θsm  
∆
Ssm
	
.
We are interested in how ∆vMMD changes as ∆ increases:
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B∆vMMD
B∆
 pi18rfpθsm  ∆q  fpθsm ∆q  
 pθsm  ∆qf
1pθsm  ∆q  pθsm ∆qf
1pθsm ∆qs   . . .
. . .  pi
sm1
8
Ssm

f

θsm  
∆
Ssm
	
 f

θsm 
∆
Ssm
	
 
 

θsm  
∆
Ssm
	
f 1

θsm  
∆
Ssm
	


θsm 
∆
Ssm
	
f 1

θsm 
∆
Ssm
	
. (A.8)
Notice that each term in square brackets on the right hand side of (A.8) takes
the form,
E  fpθsm   q  fpθsm  q   pθsm   qf 1pθsm   q  pθsm  qf 1pθsm  q.
By substituing the expressions for fpq and f 1pq in E , one can show that E   0
for all  ¡ 0, such that all terms on the right hand side of (A.8) are strictly negative.
Hence, B∆vMMD{B∆   0 for all ∆ ¡ 0, and this proves part (iii) of the proposition.
Part (iv). In any equilibrium of the model consistent with a constant exogenous
rate of job destruction, output follows a S-state Markov chain with state space
Y  ty1, . . . , ySu. At the stochastic equilibrium, output is ys  zses, where the
employment rate es is a strictly increasing and concave function of the tightness ratio,
ξpθq with ξ1pq ¡ 0 and ξ2pq   0. From Lemma 22, we know that in equilibrium
the tightness ratio is strictly increasing and convex in the aggregate shock z, i.e.,
θ  ϕpzq with ϕ1pq ¡ 0 and ϕ2pq ¡ 0. By inverting the function ϕpq, it follows
that z  φpθq1  ψpθq, with ψ1pq ¡ 0 and ψ2pq   0. Let’s rewrite output as
ys  ψpθqξpθq, and ln ys  lnψpθq   ln ξpθq. It is easily established that log output
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is strictly increasing and concave in the tightness ratio θ, as such following the same
steps of parts (ii) and (iii) one can show that B∆yMMD{B∆   0 for all ∆ ¡ 0, and
this completes the proof of the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 11. Part (i). Consider a mean-median-preserving spread ∆
in the distribution of the generic endogenous variable x˜ with stochastic equilibrium,
x˜s  x˜sm  
ps smq
pS  smq ∆ (A.9)
for s P t1, . . . ,Su and ∆ ¡ 0. An increase in the parameter ∆ raises the variance of
x˜, leaving unaltered both the mean and the median of the stochastic process. Let
∆x˜s,s1  px˜s1  x˜sq denote the change in the variable x˜ from the current state s to
the next period state s1. From equation (A.9):
∆x˜s,s1 
ps1  sq
pS  smq ∆ (A.10)
such that ∆x˜i,j  ∆x˜j,i ¡ 0, for all j ¡ i, and ∆x˜s,sm  ∆x˜Ss 1,sm , for all
s P t1, . . . , sm  1u. Since the model is stationary, µ∆x˜  Er∆x˜s  0, and the skew-
ness coefficient of ∆x˜, Skewr∆x˜s  E

p∆x˜  µ∆x˜q
3

{σ3∆x˜, reduces to Skewr∆x˜s 
E

∆x˜3

{σ3∆x˜. Because the sign of Skewr∆x˜s is determind by the sign of the numer-
ator, I focus without loss of generality on NSkewr∆x˜s  E

∆x˜3

:
NSkewr∆x˜s 
S¸
s1
pis8
S¸
s11
pis,s1∆x˜
3
s,s1 
S¸
s1
pis8

pis,sm∆x˜
3
s,sm   pism,s∆x˜
3
sm,s

 
 
sm1¸
s1
pis8

pis,Ss 1∆x˜3s,Ss 1   piSs 1,s∆x˜
3
Ss 1,s

. (A.11)
190
Using Assumption 3 on the symmetry of transition probabilities pis,s1 , and that
by definition ∆x˜s,s  0, for all s P t1, . . . ,Su, I rewrite equation (A.11) as,
NSkewr∆x˜s 
sm1¸
s1
pis8pis,sm

∆x˜3s,sm  ∆x˜
3
Ss 1,sm

 
 
sm1¸
s1
pis8pism,s

∆x˜3sm,s  ∆x˜
3
sm,Ss 1,

  (A.12)
 
sm1¸
s1
pis8pis,Ss 1

∆x˜3s,Ss 1  ∆x˜
3
Ss 1,s

.
Using equation (A.10) for the support of ∆x˜, I rewrite equation (A.12) as,
NSkewr∆x˜s 
∆3
pS  smq3
sm1¸
s1
pis8pis,sm

sm  s

3
 

sm  S   s 1

3ff
 
 
∆3
pS  smq3
sm1¸
s1
pis8pism,s

s sm

3
 

S  s  1 sm

3ff
  (A.13)
 
∆3
pS  smq3
sm1¸
s1
pis8pis,Ss 1

S  s  1 s

3
 

s S   s 1

3ff
.
After substituting the expression for the median state, sm  pS   1q{2, into
equation (A.13), it is straightforward to check that all terms in square brackets on
the right hand side equal zero, such that NSkewr∆x˜s  0, for all ∆ ¡ 0. Hence,
regardless of the mean-median-preserving spread ∆, the unconditional distribution of
∆x˜s,s1 is symmetric, and this proves part (i) of the proposition. Part (ii). Assume
the support of the distribution of x˜ is left-skewed, such that ∆x˜s,sm ¡ ∆x˜Ss 1,sm ,
for s P t1, . . . , sm  1u. Let’s write again equation (A.12),
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NSkewr∆x˜s 
sm1¸
s1
pis8pis,sm

∆x˜3s,sm  ∆x˜
3
Ss 1,sm

 
 
sm1¸
s1
pis8pism,s

∆x˜3sm,s  ∆x˜
3
sm,Ss 1,

  (A.14)
 
sm1¸
s1
pis8pis,Ss 1

∆x˜3s,Ss 1  ∆x˜
3
Ss 1,s

.
Since ∆x˜i,j  ∆x˜j,i, for all j ¡ i, the third term in square brackets on the right
hand side of equation (A.14) equals zero. We can further rearrange equation (A.14),
NSkewr∆x˜s 
sm1¸
s1
pis8

pis,sm  pism,s

∆x˜3s,sm  ∆x˜3Ss 1,sm 

¡ 0. (A.15)
In equation (A.15), the inequality NSkewr∆x˜s ¡ 0, holds because pis,sm ¡ pism,s,
for s P t1, . . . ,Su, which is the condition that the stationary distribution of the
Markov chain is uni-modal (Assumption 3), and ∆x˜3s,sm ¡ ∆x˜
3
Ss 1,sm , for s P
t1, . . . , sm  1u, and this proves part (ii) of the proposition. Part (iii). Assume the
support of the distribution of x˜ is right-skewed, such that ∆x˜s,sm   ∆x˜Ss 1,sm , for
s P t1, . . . , sm  1u. Following the same steps of part (ii),
NSkewr∆x˜s 
sm1¸
s1
pis8

pis,sm  pism,s

∆x˜3s,sm  ∆x˜3Ss 1,sm 

  0, (A.16)
and this completes the proof of the proposition. 
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A.4 Integrated Labor Market
This section details the building blocks of the integrated labor market version of the
model presented in Section 3.2. I consider the labor market in steady state, i.e.,
zt  zs for s P t1, . . . ,Su and all t. As in the segmented labor market version of the
model, there are M types of workers index by x P tx1, . . . , xMu. Total match surplus
from being matched with a worker of type x if the economy is in state s P t1, . . . ,Su
is
Sspxq  max tS
c
spxq, 0u (A.17)
with
Scspxq  zsx λ  β

1 δspxq  ηφ
 
θsppisq

Sspxq. (A.18)
Scspxq is the value of continuing the match. The free-entry condition for employers
is
k  ρ
 
θsppisq

βp1 ηq
¸
x
pispxqSspxq, (A.19)
where the probability to come in contact with a worker of type x is pispxq 
uspxq{Us where Us 
°
x uspxq is aggregate unemployment.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Tables and Figures
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Table B.1: Computers per Capita — Time Adoption Lags
Country Lag Ranking Country Lag Ranking
Argentina 18.07275 (29) Mauritania 20.84607 (59)
Australia 2.036133 (5) Mauritius 16.53137 (26)
Austria 5.858276 (16) Mexico 18.00513 (28)
Belgium 10.5116 (19) Morocco 19.98181 (50)
Bolivia 20.0188 (51) Namibia 18.30847 (30)
Botswana 19.42114 (40) Netherlands 3.682251 (8)
Brazil 18.31384 (31) New Zealand 4.631592 (13)
Canada 3.389893 (7) Nicaragua 19.78955 (46)
Chile 16.39294 (25) Norway 2.643188 (6)
Colombia 18.91455 (37) Panama 19.50916 (43)
Costa Rica 13.38269 (21) Papua New Guinea 18.67932 (35)
Denmark 1.885254 (4) Paraguay 19.63745 (44)
Ecuador 19.73718 (45) Peru 19.29553 (39)
Egypt 20.51685 (55) Philippines 19.91785 (49)
El Salvador 19.86792 (48) Portugal 15.91223 (24)
Finland 4.146606 (10) Romania 18.40564 (34)
France 6.747559 (17) Senegal 20.26416 (52)
Gabon 20.29541 (53) Singapore 1.136475 (2)
Greece 17.95654 (27) South Africa 18.32104 (32)
Guatemala 20.59973 (56) Spain 13.43213 (22)
Honduras 20.68445 (57) Sri Lanka 20.74939 (58)
Hong Kong 4.521729 (11) Sweden 1.096558 (1)
Iceland 4.089233 (9) Syria 20.32605 (54)
Indonesia 20.84692 (60) Thailand 19.45422 (42)
Iran 18.37402 (33) Togo 19.85657 (47)
Ireland 4.606201 (12) Turkey 19.24939 (38)
Israel 10.05469 (18) United Kingdom 4.941895 (14)
Italy 11.26416 (20) Zimbabwe 18.83337 (36)
Japan 5.432739 (15)
Jordan 19.43225 (41)
Luxembourg 1.727661 (3) Mean Lag 14.13115
Malaysia 15.33167 (23) Std. Dev. Lag 7.080635
Notes: 60 countries. Personal computer invention year: 1973. Lag measures
how many years ago the United States last had the usage level of computers
per capita that each country had in the benchmark year 2002.
195
Table B.2: Internet Users per Capita — Time Adoption Lags
Country Lag Ranking Country Lag Ranking
Algeria 10.28662 (53) Malaysia 3.794067 (15)
Argentina 6.824463 (25) Mauritius 6.882202 (26)
Australia 0.294189 (1) Mexico 6.969482 (28)
Austria 2.390869 (10) Morocco 8.960205 (47)
Belgium 3.636719 (14) Namibia 8.857544 (45)
Bolivia 8.640015 (44) Netherlands 0.894165 (5)
Botswana 8.585815 (43) New Zealand 1.196045 (7)
Brazil 7.352173 (30) Nicaragua 9.872314 (50)
Canada 0.857910 (4) Norway 4.008545 (17)
Chile 4.796753 (20) Pakistan 11.67236 (59)
Colombia 7.974365 (36) Panama 7.759399 (35)
Costa Rica 5.601318 (23) Papua New Guinea 10.58838 (54)
Denmark 0.780395 (2) Paraguay 10.12036 (51)
Ecuador 8.244019 (39) Peru 7.089111 (29)
El Salvador 7.982544 (37) Philippines 8.312256 (40)
Finland 0.829468 (3) Portugal 5.5448 (21)
France 4.065430 (18) Romania 6.948608 (27)
Gabon 9.673218 (49) Senegal 11.37109 (57)
Greece 6.384277 (24) Singapore 1.021118 (6)
Guatemala 8.565063 (42) South Africa 7.612793 (32)
Guinea-Bissau 10.95874 (56) Spain 5.592651 (22)
Haiti 11.70679 (60) Sri Lanka 11.41138 (58)
Honduras 8.911987 (46) Switzerland 3.312378 (13)
India 10.27417 (52) Thailand 7.414429 (31)
Indonesia 9.499390 (48) Togo 8.479736 (41)
Ireland 4.322144 (19) Turkey 7.729248 (33)
Israel 3.955688 (16) United Kingdom 2.247925 (9)
Italy 3.278809 (12) Zimbabwe 8.099609 (38)
Japan 1.834595 (8)
Jordan 7.751953 (34)
Kenya 10.91492 (55)
Lesotho 11.76355 (61) Mean Lag 6.651275
Luxembourg 3.027222 (11) Std. Dev. Lag 3.344070
Notes: 61 countries. Personal computer invention year: 1983. Lag measures
how many years ago the United States last had the usage level of internet users
per capita that each country had in the benchmark year 2002.
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Table B.3: Cell Phones per Capita — Time Adoption Lags
Country Lag Ranking Country Lag Ranking
Algeria 13.23938 (51) Mali 15.01709 (62)
Argentina 5.828003 (20) Mauritania 7.829346 (27)
Bangladesh 14.12561 (57) Mauritius 3.338989 (6)
Benin 11.00305 (43) Mexico 4.016602 (9)
Bolivia 7.537231 (26) Morocco 4.757568 (14)
Botswana 4.310547 (11) Mozambique 13.10181 (50)
Brazil 5.260010 (17) Namibia 8.349609 (29)
Burkina Faso 14.40405 (61) Nicaragua 10.21289 (38)
Burundi 14.35815 (59) Niger 17.04858 (66)
Cameroon 10.07715 (36) Nigeria 13.06262 (49)
Canada 2.209717 (3) Pakistan 14.22424 (58)
Central African Republic 15.94641 (64) Panama 5.448120 (18)
Chad 15.34192 (63) Papua New Guinea 15.98962 (65)
Chile 1.349121 (1) Paraguay 3.467285 (7)
Colombia 7.289795 (24) Peru 8.145386 (28)
Costa Rica 7.511719 (25) Philippines 5.583862 (19)
Dominican Republic 4.999512 (15) Romania 4.342285 (12)
Ecuador 7.180908 (23) Rwanda 13.29028 (52)
Egypt 8.877563 (30) Senegal 9.341309 (32)
El Salvador 6.382080 (21) South Africa 3.169434 (5)
Equatorial Guinea 9.151611 (31) Sri Lanka 9.728882 (35)
Ethiopia 17.66187 (68) Syria 11.78503 (44)
Gabon 4.706177 (13) Tanzania 12.26221 (46)
Ghana 12.11926 (45) Thailand 3.948608 (8)
Guatemala 6.726196 (22) Togo 10.87634 (41)
Guinea 13.59229 (55) Turkey 2.515503 (4)
Haiti 12.73389 (47) Uganda 12.82593 (48)
Honduras 9.642090 (34) Uruguay 5.088867 (16)
India 13.32336 (53) Zambia 13.34106 (54)
Indonesia 9.444824 (33) Zimbabwe 10.73901 (40)
Iran 10.89673 (42)
Jordan 4.210083 (10)
Kenya 10.18225 (37)
Lesotho 10.28149 (39)
Madagascar 13.71362 (56)
Malawi 14.39160 (60) Mean Lag 9.449093
Malaysia 2.157715 (2) Std. Dev. Lag 4.387134
Notes: 68 countries. Cell phones invention year: 1973. Lag measures how many years
ago the United States last had the usage level of cell phones per capita that each country
had in the benchmark year 2002.
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Table B.4: Volatility and Time Adoption Lags — Computers per Capita
Full Sample OECD Sample
(60 countries, 1960-2002) (24 countries, 1960-2002)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Volatility 163.712 149.402 301.506 304.425
(24.855) (29.397) (81.845) (86.185)
Growth 181.898 133.012 61.662 -31.825
(67.123) (55.706) (208.090) (169.365)
R2 0.298 0.121 0.360 0.324 0.004 0.325
Observations 60 60 60 24 24 24
Notes: The dependent variable Time Adoption Lag measures how many years ago the U.S. last
had the usage level of computers per capita that each country had in the benchmark year 2002.
Growth and Volatility are respectively the mean and standard deviation of per capita real GDP
annual growth rates over the sample period 1960-2002 for each country. Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include a constant. ***, ** indicate respectively
statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent level.
Table B.5: Volatility and Time Adoption Lags — Internet per Capita
Full Sample OECD Sample
(61 countries, 1960-2002) (23 countries, 1960-2002)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Volatility 74.900 65.190 104.349 101.149
(11.334) (13.590) (35.033) (36.265)
Growth 98.256 71.484 58.749 32.218
(29.963) (23.573) (64.731) (63.991)
R2 0.293 0.167 0.377 0.275 0.033 0.285
Observations 61 61 61 23 23 23
Notes: The dependent variable Time Adoption Lag measures how many years ago the U.S. last
had the usage level of internet per capita that each country had in the benchmark year 2002.
Growth and Volatility are respectively the mean and standard deviation of per capita real GDP
annual growth rates over the sample period 1960-2002 for each country. Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include a constant. ***, ** indicate respectively
statistical significance at the 1 and 5 percent level.
198
Table B.6: Volatility and Time Adoption Lags — Cell Phones per Capita
Full Sample
(68 countries, 1960-2002)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Volatility 31.623 40.749
(15.845) (13.664)
Growth 143.486 152.402
(30.864) (20.906)
R2 0.047 0.266 0.344
Observations 68 68 68
Notes: The dependent variable Time Adoption Lag measures how many
years ago the U.S. last had the usage level of cell phones per capita that
each country had in the benchmark year 2002. Growth and Volatility are
respectively the mean and standard deviation of per capita real GDP annual
growth rates over the sample period 1960-2002 for each country. The OECD
sample is not shown because it would include only four countries: time
adoption lags for cell phones are censored because the U.S. never reaches
the usage level that most OECD countries have in the benchmark year
2002. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions
include a constant. ***, ** indicate respectively statistical significance at
the 1 and 5 percent level.
Table B.7: Volatility and Time Adoption Lags (Benchmark Year 1995)
Computers Internet Cell Phones
(40 countries, 1973-1995) (19 countries, 1983-1995) (47 countries, 1973-1995)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Volatility 99.823 30.688 60.307
(18.947) (58.677) (15.845)
Growth 41.296 5.021 -31.489
(29.880) (37.541) (28.855)
R2 0.334 0.049 0.283
Observations 40 19 47
Notes: The dependent variable Time Adoption Lag measures how many years ago the U.S.
last had the technology usage level that each country had in the benchmark year 1995.
Growth and Volatility are respectively the mean and standard deviation of per capita real
GDP annual growth rates calculated over the sample period from the invention year of a
specific technology to the benchmark year 1995. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
in parentheses. Regressions include a constant. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1
percent level.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Firms’ Behavior and the Free-Entry Equilibrium
To characterize the typical firm’s behavior, consider the Current Value Hamiltonian
(CVH, henceforth)
CVHi  rPi  CXpW,PMqZ
θ
i sXi WφWLZi   ziαKLZi ,
where the costate variable, zi , is the value of the marginal unit of knowledge. The
firm’s knowledge stock, Zi, is the state variable; effort in cost reduction, LZi , and the
product’s price, Pi, are the control variables. Firms take the public knowledge stock,
K, as given. Since the Hamiltonian is linear, one has three cases: 1) W ¡ ziαK
implies that the value of the marginal unit of knowledge is lower than its cost. The
firm, then, does not invest; 2) W   ziαK implies that the value of the marginal unit
of knowledge is higher than its cost. Since the firm demands an infinite amount of
labor to employ in cost reduction, this case violates the general equilibrium conditions
and is ruled out; 3) the first order conditions for the interior solution are given by
equality between marginal revenue and marginal cost of knowledge, W  ziαK, the
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constraint on the state variable, (3.11), the terminal condition,
lim
sÑ8
e
³s
t rrpvq δsdvzipsqZipsq  0,
and a differential equation in the costate variable,
r   δ 
9zi
zi
  θCXpW,PMqZ
θ1
i
Xi
zi
,
that defines the rate of return to cost reduction as the ratio between revenues from the
knowledge stock and its shadow price plus (minus) the appreciation (depreciation)
in the value of knowledge.
The revenue from the marginal unit of knowledge is given by the cost reduction
it yields times the scale of production to which it applies. The price strategy is
Pi  CXpW,PMqZ
θ
i

 1
. (C.1)
Peretto (1998) (Proposition 1) shows that under the restriction 1 ¡ θ p 1q the
firm is always at the interior solution, where W  ziαK holds, and equilibrium is
symmetric. The cost function (3.10) gives rise to the conditional factor demands:
LXi 
BCXpW,PMq
BW
Zθi Xi   φ;
Mi 
BCXpW,PMq
BPM
Zθi Xi.
Then, the price strategy (C.1), symmetry and aggregation across firms yields (3.13)
and (3.14). Also, in symmetric equilibrium K  Z  Zi yields 9K{K  αLZ{N ,
where LZ is aggregate effort in cost reduction. Taking logs and time derivatives of
W  ziαK and using the demand curve (3.8), the cost-reduction technology (3.11)
and the price strategy (C.1), one reduces the first-order conditions to (3.15).
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Taking logs and time-derivatives of Vi yields
r 
Πi
Vi
 
9Vi
Vi
 δ.
The cost of entry is βWY {N . The corresponding demand for labor in entry is LN .
The case V ¡ βWY {N yields an unbounded demand for labor in entry, LN   8,
and is ruled out since it violates the general equilibrium conditions. The case V  
βWY {N yields LN  8, which means that the non-negativity constraint on LN
binds and LN  0. A free-entry equilibrium requires V  βWY {N . Using the price
strategy (C.1), the rate of return to entry becomes (3.16).
C.2 Proof of Proposition 12
Since the sectors producing the home consumption good and energy are competitive,
we have ΠH  ΠM  0. The consumption expenditure allocation rule (3.4) and the
choice of numeraire yield
9A  rA  L  pΩ
1
ϕ
YH .
Rewriting the domestic commodity demand (3.19) as
pO  Y  ξ ppq , ξ ppq 
 1

SMX ppqS
O
M ppq ,
allows us to rewrite the balanced trade condition as
1
ϕ
YH  pΩ  Y p1 ξ ppqq .
Substituting the expressions for financial wealth, A  βY , and the balanced trade
condition in the household’s budget constraint (3.3), and using the rate of return to
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saving in (3.5), yields
9Y
Y
 ρ 
9YH
YH
 
L  pΩ 1
ϕ
YH
βY
 ρ 
9YH
YH
 
L Y p1 ξ ppqq
βY
.
Differentiating the balanced trade condition yields
1
ϕ
9YH  9Y p1 ξ ppqq ñ
9YH
YH

9Y
Y
Y
YH
ϕ p1 ξ ppqq 
9Y
Y
Y p1 ξ ppqq
Y p1 ξ ppqq   pΩ
.
Substituting back in the budget constraint and rearranging terms yields
9Y
Y

Y p1 ξ ppqq   pΩ
pΩ

ρ 
L Y p1 ξ ppqq
βY

.
This differential equation has a unique positive steady-state value of manufacturing
production:
Y ppq 
L
1 ξ ppq  ρβ
.
We ignore, for simplicity the issue of potential indeterminacy, assuming that Y jumps
to this steady-state value. The associated expenditures on the home and foreign
goods, respectively, are:
YH ppq  ϕ

L p1 ξ ppqq
1 ξ ppq  ρβ
  pΩ

;
YF ppq  p1 ϕq

L p1 ξ ppqq
1 ξ ppq  ρβ
  pΩ

.
Since YH ppq and YF ppq are constant, the saving rule (3.5) yields that the interest
rate is r  ρ at all times.
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C.3 Proof of Proposition 13
The return to entry (3.16) and the entry technology 9N  pN{βY q  LN  δN yield
LN 
Y
x

x

φ 
LZ
N


 ρβY.
Taking into account the non-negativity constraint on LZ , we solve (3.11) and (3.15)
for
LZ
N

"
θ p 1qx pρ  δq {α x ¡ xZ 
ρ δ
αθp1q
0 x ¤ xZ
. (C.2)
Therefore,
LN 
#
Y


1 θ p 1q  φpρ δq{α
x

 ρβY x ¡ xZ
Y

 
1 φ
x

 ρβY x ¤ xZ
.
So we have
LN ¡ 0 for
#
x ¡ φpρ δq{α
1θp1qρβ
x ¡ xZ
x ¡ φ
1ρβ
x ¤ xZ
.
We look at the case
φ
1 ρβ
 xN  
ρ  δ
αθ p 1q
 xZ ,
which yields that the threshold for gross entry xN is smaller than the threshold for
in-house innovation xZ .
1
To obtain the value of Y when LN  0, first note that
LN  0 for
1


1
φ
x


¤ ρβ.
The household budget yields
0  N

Y
N
 φ


  L  Ωp
1
ϕ
YH .
1 The global dynamics are well defined also when this condition fails and xN ¡ xZ . We con-
sider only the case xN   xZ to streamline the presentation since the qualitative result and, most
importantly, the insight about the role of the commodity price remain essentially the same.
204
Using the balanced trade condition and rearranging yields
Y 
L φN
1 ξ ppq  1

.
This equation holds for
x ¤ xN 
φ
1 ρβ
ô N ¥ NN 
φ
1 ρβ

Y
.
The interpretation is that with no effort in entry, there is net exit and thus saving of
fixed costs. This shows up as aggregate efficiency gains as intermediate firms move
down their average cost curves. Note that in this region,
Y ptq 
L φN0e
δt
1 ξ ppq  1

,
which shows that intermediate production grows in value as a result of net exit. The
consolidation of the market results in growing profitability, that is,
9x
x

δL
L φN0eδt
ñ 9x 
δL{N0
1 ξ ppq  1

.
This saya that with the exit shock, the economy must enter the region where entry
is positive because the very definition of steady state requires replacing firms that
leave the market. Therefore, the only condition that we need to ensure convergence
to the steady state with positive cost reduction is x ¡ xZ .
C.4 Proof of proposition 14
Taking logs of (3.26) yields
log T ptq  θ logZ0   θ
» t
0
Zˆ psq ds  χ logN0   χ log

N ptq
N0


.
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Using the expression for g in (3.27), and adding and subtracting Zˆ from Zˆ ptq, we
obtain
log T ptq  log
 
Zθ0N
χ
0

  gt  θ
» t
0

Zˆ psq  Zˆ

ds  χ log

N ptq
N0


.
Using (C.2) and (3.28) we rewrite the third term as
θ
» t
0

Zˆ psq  Zˆ
	
ds  αθ2 p 1q
» t
0
px psq  xq ds
 γ
x0
x
 1
	 » t
0
eνsds

γ
ν
x0
x
 1
	  
1 eνt

,
where
γ  αθ2 p 1qx.
Observing that N ptq  Y ppq {x ptq yields 9N{N   9x{x, we use (3.28) to obtain
N ptq
N0

1 

N
N0
 1
	
1 

N
N0
 1
	
eνt
.
We then rewrite the last term as
χ log

N ptq
N0


 χ log
1 

N
N0
 1
	
1 

N
N0
 1
	
eνt
 χ log

1 

N
N0
 1



 χ log

1 

N
N0
 1


eνt


.
Approximating the log terms, we can write
χ log

N ptq
N0


 χ

N
N0
 1


 χ

N
N0
 1


eνt
 χ

N
N0
 1

 
1 eνt

.
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Observing that
N
N0
 1 
x0
x
 1,
these results yield (3.29).
Now consider
log u  ϕ log

YH
PHL


  p1 ϕq log

YF
PFL


 ϕ log

YH
PHL


  p1 ϕq log

1ϕ
ϕ
YH
PFL

 log

YH
L


 ϕ logPH   p1 ϕq log

1 ϕ
ϕPF


 log

YH
L


 ϕ log c ppq   ϕ log T  ϕ log


 1


  p1 ϕq log

1 ϕ
ϕPF


.
To simplify the notation, and without loss of generality, we set
p1 ϕq log

1 ϕ
ϕPF


  ϕ log
 
Nχ0 Z
θ
0

 ϕ log


 1


 0.
This is just a normalization that does not affect the results. We then substitute the
expression derived above into (3.1) and write
U ppq 
» 8
0
eρt

logϕ

1 ξppq
1 ξppq  ρβ
 
pΩ
L


 ϕ log pc ppqq   ϕgt

dt
 ϕ
γ
ν
  χ
	
∆
» 8
0
eρt
 
1 eνt

dt.
Integrating, we obtain (3.31).
C.5 Proof of Lemma 15
Observe that
MX  
B logM
B logPM
 1
B logSMX
B logPM
 1
BSMX
BPM
PM
SMX
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so that MX ¤ 1 if
BSMX
BPM

B
BPM

PMM
PMM   LX


¥ 0.
This in turn is true if
 
1 SMX
 B pPMMq
BPM
 SMX
BLX
BPM
¥ 0.
Recall now that total cost is increasing in PM so that
B pPMMq
BPM
 
BLX
BPM
¡ 0 ñ
B pPMMq
BPM
¡ 
BLX
BPM
.
It follows that
BLX
BPM
¤ 0
is a sufficient condition for MX ¤ 1 since it implies that both terms in the inequality
above are positive. The proof for OM ¤ 1 is analogous.
C.6 Proof of Proposition 17
(3.19) and (3.20) yield
Ω » O ô
Ω
L
»
1
1 ξ ppq  βρ
ξ ppq
p
.
Differentiating (3.20) yields
d log Y ppq
dp
 
d log p1 ξ ppq  βρq
dp

ξ1 ppq
1 ξ ppq  βρ
.
It is useful to write
ξ1 ppq 
ξ ppq
p
 
1 MX ppq

SOM ppq   1 
O
M ppq

,
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which shows that the sign of ξ1 ppq depends on the upstream and downstream price
elasticities of demand and on the overall contribution of the commodity to manufac-
turing cost. Assume for example that 1 MX ppq   0 and 1 
O
M ppq ¡ 0 because the
upstream, materials technology exhibits labor-commodity complementarity and the
downstream, manufacturing technology exhibits labor-materials substitution. Then
there exists a price pv such that
ξ1 ppq 
ξ ppq
p
 
1 MX ppq

SOM ppq   1 
O
M ppq

 0.
That is,  
MX ppq  1

SOM ppq  1 
O
M ppq .
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